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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
The universal human right to health care is a cliché that is 
frequently invoked by politicians and various activist groups to 
express the idea that inequalities in the distribution of medical 
resources are unjust. These disgruntled social reformers are 
largely uninformed about the true nature of human rights, 
claiming that any society in which some citizens go without 
comprehensive medical services is institutionalising immorality 
by violating Article 25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Such uninformed and exaggerated claims only 
serve to distort the public conception of human rights, obscure 
the legitimate demands of social justice, and impose unrealistic 
expectations on health care systems of limited resources. In this 
paper, I intend to uncover the true meaning of the universal right 
to health care, ultimately rejecting the commonly held notion that 
inequality in the distribution of medical resources necessarily 
entails a violation of human rights. 
 In Chapters One and Two, I dissect the notion of human 
rights in order to further define Article 25, discussing any moral 
and practical implications the acceptance of this right has for 
both the individual and society. Chapters Three and Four concern 
the just allocation of health care resources within society, in 
accordance with the right to health care, and will assess 
appropriate distributive principles for the health care institution.     
 1 
The Human Right to Health Care: A Distributive Cliché 
Nobody talks more passionately of his rights than he who, in the depths of his 
soul, is doubtful about them.  
Friedrich Nietzsche  
 
The universal human right to health care is a cliché that is often invoked by 
disgruntled social reformers to express the idea that inequalities in the distribution of 
medical resources are an injustice. It is frequently claimed by these people that 
universal access to health care is a basic human entitlement, and that any society in 
which some citizens go without comprehensive medical services is institutionalising 
immorality. Referring to human rights is a straightforward way of gaining support for 
any cause; rights have the benefit of being easy for laymen to understand without the 
need for any prior ethical literacy, often being no more than a few sentences long. 
They also have the supreme benefit of provoking a strong emotive response from 
people. If an objection to a current political system can be summed up with the simple 
catch-phrase “practice X violates human right Y”, then without the need for any 
further explanation the average citizen will whole-heartedly support reform. As such, 
human rights are an invaluable tool for politicians and activists, who habitually use 
talk of rights to convince the voting citizen that a current state of affairs is an affront 
to human decency.  
Proponents of medical reform buttress their position by referencing the United 
Nations, taking this organisation to be the definitive authority on the subject of human 
rights. In particular, the often quoted Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) is taken as unquestionable proof that “[e]veryone has the right 
 2 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including… medical care and necessary social services… and the right to 
security in the event of… sickness, disability,… old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.”1 Impassioned supporters of Article 25 never 
entertain the possibility that the strong universal claims made by the United Nations 
could be incorrect, nor do they consider the possibility that inequality in the 
distribution of medical resources may not necessarily entail a violation of the human 
right to health care. In this paper, I intend to uncover the moral and practical 
implications of accepting Article 25. It is not my intention, however, to add yet 
another paper to the burgeoning literature on whether or not there exist human rights 
to social goods. My motivating assumption is that there exists, in some meta-ethically 
mysterious manner that shall be addressed, a human right to health care. From this 
starting point, I shall investigate what it really means for the individual to hold 
universal rights in general, and more specifically, to hold a universal right to the 
social good of health care. This paper is also fundamentally concerned with the many 
moral and practical problems that arise when such a weighty obligation is imposed on 
society. The implications of health care for the individual and for society is a topic 
that was discussed extensively during the United States’ many attempts at health 
reforms throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but the disputation was largely inconclusive 
and has fallen from philosophical attention. Since those times, particularly in the 
United States of America, I maintain that the moral situation has degraded; now more 
than ever must this debate over universal rights to health care be taken up in a 
thoroughgoing manner.  
                                                 
1 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 2007),  See: Appendix 1. 
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To better understand the subject matter, I begin this paper with a descriptive 
assessment of human rights. It is my hypothesis in Chapter One that the right to health 
care can only be defined in terms of the right’s justified claim on societal resources; 
or in other words, the right’s moral force is in direct proportion to the fiscal realities 
of society. Article 25 provides the citizen with no real guarantee that they will receive 
health care as a matter of moral course, despite international consensus that all 
humans possess an inalienable right to receive medical attention. I argue that this is 
because the majority of human rights can be over-ruled by sufficiently high social 
benefits or a considered prioritisation of competing social norms. Under exceptional 
circumstances, a government’s obligation to satisfy the universal right to health care 
could be so weak that citizens are not justified in receiving any medical attention 
whatsoever. Furthermore, I conclude that due to the weakened nature of the majority 
of human rights, this forfeit of care does not constitute a violation of the rights of 
humans.  
Owing to the constitutional importance many societies place on human rights, 
a coherent rights theory requires strong theoretical foundations supported by even 
stronger arguments. Rights supporters draw their motivation and passion for 
defending human rights from a somewhat inherent sense that what they are doing is 
right and just. It takes, however, a great deal of intellectual labour to philosophically 
demonstrate human rights to be the self-evident and self-fulfilling moral prophecy 
they are so often supposed to be. In Chapter Two, I shall attempt to uncover the 
ethical foundations of the human right to health care. A coherent foundational theory 
is not only interesting for the sake of philosophy itself, but clarity of analysis has the 
practical advantage of improving solidarity amongst different campaign groups by 
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creating a clear common purpose. Foundational appeals can create a long-term 
commitment to the rights cause, and can significantly improve the exercise of rights 
by allowing activists to draw on only the most compelling arguments for action. As 
Michael Freeman succinctly declares: 
Rights without reasons are vulnerable to denial and abuse…. 
Evading the task of finding the best grounding for human rights, in 
the face of philosophical sceptics and political opponents, 
demonstrates a lack of intellectual responsibility.2 
 
I shall scrutinize three plausible foundations for human rights: theism, human 
dignity, and basic human needs or interests. This foundational investigation aims to 
support claims of universality and inalienability, and ultimately provide reasoning for 
the human right to health care that goes beyond mere appeals to relative culture. 
While the right to health care draws our attention to important human needs 
that must be addressed, merely asserting human rights does not deal with the issue of 
just health care in a proper manner. The main problem with human rights charters is 
that they read like a child’s Christmas wish list; the representative level of resources 
chosen by the authors of the United Nations Declarations was too high to successfully 
protect all the interests it addresses. As such, provision of universal health care is an 
impossible goal for many societies, and a blind pursuit of universal health care has 
dangerous potential for absorbing the resources of even the most affluent 
governments, reducing society to a level of poverty. This is compounded by the fact 
that Article 25 provides no practical definition or guidance for its fulfilment. The 
right to health care, then, cannot and must not be affirmed in the same manner as 
                                                 
2 Michael Freeman, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly 
16:3:1994:491-514, p. 493 
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many other fundamental liberties, such as freedom of speech or the right to own 
property. Chapter Three and Chapter Four shall address the topic of practical 
implementation of the right to health care in contemporary societies, discussing ways 
to distribute scarce medical resources amongst society’s needy in an equitable 
manner, given limited resources. If not all people can be treated equally, which 
groups must miss out?  
It is the main hypothesis of Chapters Three and Four that satisfying the right 
to health care is a responsibility of social justice, rather than merely beneficent public 
policy. I intend to assess the long-standing debate over whether health care is a social 
institution of special importance that is justified in consuming a disproportionate 
share of society’s resources. I shall also assess the morality of inequalities in health 
care distribution amongst the sick and needy, appraising the inherent justice of 
current rationing techniques. Moving towards my conclusion, four distributive 
principles shall be analysed: a utilitarian maximisation of the greatest good, 
distribution in accordance with income and wealth, distribution in order to produce a 
strict equality of health levels, and Rawlsian justice as fairness. These largely abstract 
distributive theories shall be given practical consideration, being analysed in light of a 
case study that I have carried out on health care distribution in the United States of 
America. 
In short, this paper shall include: (1) a descriptive assessment of the way 
human rights interact with one another in creating varying degrees of respondent 
obligation, (2) a foundational assessment so to understand why human rights ought to 
be obeyed and duties fulfilled as a matter of moral course. I shall then proceed (3) to 
criticise utilitarian and laissez-faire distribution, then discuss (4) distribution by strict 
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egalitarianism and Rawlsian justice as fairness. This assessment shall conclude with 
my own personal suggestions for an acceptable theory of medical distribution, which 
illustrates the fairest way of satisfying the human right to health care, given real 
world situations of resource scarcity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
Chapter One: Descriptive Analysis of Human Rights 
1: Introduction 
Throughout the history of moral rights theory there have been three very similar 
labels commonly used to address the subject: natural rights, the rights of man, and 
human rights. The changing name identifies a three-phase transition throughout the 
history of rights theory, each reflecting very subtle changes in the concept. The term 
“natural rights” comes from the Enlightenment philosophers, notably the work of 
John Locke, and serves to connect rights with natural law theory – a system that 
stretches as far back as Aristotelian teleology. The second term “rights of man” comes 
from revolutionary France. Heavily influenced by and almost identical in form to 
natural rights, these emphasise “man” as being naturally in possession of a god-given 
rational mind and universal moral nature from which universal rights can be deduced. 
The political philosophy of Montesquieu and Rousseau inspired revolutionary change 
within France and popularised the idea of man’s equal rights, the rejection of the 
divine right of kings, and the creation of legitimate governors in accordance with the 
will of the populace. “Human rights” is a contemporary term that has come into 
common usage as recently as the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. This 
term envisages rights as originating in human dignity, more specifically, in the 
maintenance of human moral inclinations. All three labels tend to refer to the same 
moral system of entitlements and prohibitions held by virtue of being human; 
however, the first two terms have some negative connotations as natural rights attach 
themselves to the controversial and rather obscure notion of natural law, and the rights 
of man have easily exaggerated sexist overtones. The label human rights is possibly 
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the least flawed of the three and as such is the term used by the majority of 
contemporary rights theorists.  
 Human rights are essentially extralegal. Confused people sometimes observe 
that legal rights are held by humans, as are contractual rights, so they all must fall into 
the category of human rights; however, what distinguishes these rights is the origin of 
their binding force. While legal rights derive their force from the pages of law 
irrespective of morality, and contractual rights derive from legally and sometimes 
morally binding agreements, human rights are morally binding irrespective of law. 
They derive from moral sources that are said to be above the law of any particular 
country and as such can be used to evaluate the actions of governments, institutions 
and individuals.  
Chapter One is intended to be a descriptive analysis only, therefore it does not 
contain any proof that these entities actually exist or give reasoning for why we ought 
to accept their moral dictates. In an attempt to understand what exactly the human 
right to health care entails I shall first describe the nature of human rights, continuing 
in Chapter Two to justify these prescriptions.  
Section (1a) of this essay shall begin by distinguishing three generations of 
human rights; the individualistic first generation, the socio-economic second 
generation, and the non-individualised third generation. Having positioned the right to 
health care within the second generation of human rights, Section (1b) of this essay 
shall propose the idea that the right to health care is logically untidy in its imposition 
of obligation on respondents. Due to the vast array of services provided by the health 
care institution and the definitional inadequacy of Article 25, the right to health care 
imposes an obligation of response on health care providers that varies in strength. 
This strength depends on the nature of the individual’s medical need, financial and 
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technological availability, and other competing norms such as the greater public good 
and conflicting rights to other social goods. In some cases, the right to health care 
imposes a strong correlative obligation to provide medical care, while in many cases 
the obligation to provide medical care is weak. Section (1c) of this essay shall go on 
to reject the idea that the right to health care is a negative right of omission that is 
absolutely applicable. What is more, due to the vast array of services provided by the 
health care institution and the fact that the right sometimes imposes a weak obligation 
of response, I shall also reject the notion of the right to health care being one of 
positive assistance. This section shall conclude that the right to health care is a prima 
facie right, regularly conflicting and requiring trade-offs with competing norms, and 
imposes obligations of both positive assistance and negative omission. Armed with 
the above distinctions, in Section (1d) I shall refute the proposition that there is no 
intelligible right to health care, only a human right to health. I conclude that the right 
to health is merely a negative prima facie right to non-interference that excludes 
others from interfering in personal health matters; therefore, it is practically worthless 
as a means towards the moral end of protecting health interests and satisfying medical 
need.  
 
1a: The Content of Human Rights 
It will be helpful first to identify the three different genres of rights content: first 
generation, second generation and third generation rights. It is arguable that they are 
named chronologically as to the order they appeared in philosophical history, whereas 
it could also be said that the ranking is an implication of importance, with the first 
generation rights being fundamentally prior for the successful exercise of the second 
and third. This is a contention discussed further in the proceeding pages.   
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The content of first generation rights are those traditional liberties of self-
mastery which initially found expression in the medieval writings of Gersonides and 
William Ockham. Great philosophers such as Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill and 
John Dewey have pioneered our modern understanding. The category of first 
generation rights constitute Articles 2-21 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)3 and as a general rule of thumb can best be understood to contain 
negative “freedoms from X” rather than positive “rights to X”. Although the very 
nature of liberty as a political concept is essentially contested and perennially open to 
debate, first generation rights are defended by liberal thinkers as a way of formally 
providing every person their moral due by securing individual freedom and protection 
from oppressive forces. The freedoms that comprise these rights are numerous, 
including freedom from unjust interference in holding property; various freedoms of 
conscience, expression, and religious practice; and the freedom to live a life and act in 
a manner desired. First generation rights are generally understood to formally grant a 
person the freedom to act as he or she wish without interference by others, so long as 
this action does not impinge on another person’s freedom. A person suffers a violation 
of first generation rights if he or she is unable to pursue a desired activity that does 
not conflict with another person’s similar system of rights. Of course, as Isaiah Berlin 
points out, I cannot declare that my freedom has been violated merely because I have 
the frustrated will to jump more than ten feet in the air, cannot read because I am 
blind or cannot understand the darker pages of Hegel.4 In such cases of frustration 
there is no interference by others in my sphere of action and it is simply untrue that 
                                                 
3 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 2007), See: Appendix 1. 
4 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, In: Four Essays on Liberty: New Edition (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) p. 122   
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my lack of ability equates to coercion unless others have made malevolent 
arrangements to secure such inability. In this sense, my individual freedom is secured 
by the recognition of first generation rights because people must not interfere with my 
will to act, while simultaneously inappropriate freedoms are restricted as I must 
respect the similar system of rights possessed by others. As Mill once said, “each 
should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct 
consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests 
which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be 
considered as rights.”5 
Second generation rights or so-called “welfare rights” find their origin in the 
socialist tradition of socio-economic arrangements designed to secure access to 
important institutions such as education, housing, employment and health care. Rights 
of this generation are essentially claims for those goods that act as social safety nets, 
and are embodied in Articles 22 – 27 of the UDHR.6 The second generation is 
generally described as “rights to a substantive good X” rather than “freedoms from 
X”, although some provide insubstantial benefits such as Article 27:1, the right to 
participate in the cultural life of the community. Second generation rights secure 
access to those goods that enhance and protect individual well being, provided on a 
large scale by the government or similar institution. They are similar to first 
generation rights in the sense that they are inherently individualistic; however, they 
require more of an interventionist ethic to justify. An interventionist ethic means that 
in order to provide welfare institutions of health care, education, unemployment 
                                                 
5 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, In: John Gray (ed.) On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991) p. 83   
6 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 2007), See: Appendix 1. 
 12 
benefits and the like, the state must tax its citizens and, depending on your beliefs 
about the legitimacy of taxation, this may constitute an unjust violation of the first 
generation right to legitimately hold property free from coercion by others (Article 17, 
UDHR).7  
It is important to note that although some philosophers attempt to justify the 
existence of second generation rights by reference to first generation rights, second 
generation rights are not necessarily justified by the previous generation despite the 
fact that they are named in such a serial manner. A referential justification for second 
generation rights, as the name suggests, shows similarities between the readily 
accepted first generation and the more controversial second. Such an argument points 
out that first generation rights are valued because they secure personal liberty, and 
since personal liberty can be infringed not only by political and social oppression but 
by malnutrition and disease, then rights to welfare goods such as health care are 
necessary entities as they enable a person to exercise those freedoms that first 
generation rights protect. Institutions such as the health care system facilitate the 
exercise of liberty, therefore second generation rights to health care must go hand in 
hand with those first generation rights that protect liberty. Henry Shue proposed such 
a referential argument, stating that “no one can fully, if at all, enjoy any right that is 
supposedly protected by society if he or she lacks the essentials for a reasonably 
active and healthy life.”8 Other successful arguments concede nothing to the previous 
generation by appealing directly to the importance of the second generation itself. 
Many prominent philosophers and rights activists declare health care to be equally 
                                                 
7 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 2007), See: Appendix 1. 
8 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980) p. 24  
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important to an individual’s freedom and well-being as the classical liberties secured 
by the first generation. It was this position the New Zealand political philosopher 
Jeremy Waldron had in mind when he wrote: “death, disease, malnutrition and 
exposure are as much matters of concern as any denials of political or civil liberty. 
Where such predicaments are avoidable, a refusal to address them is an evident insult 
to human dignity and a failure to take seriously the unconditional worth of each 
person.”9   
 Third generation rights are intended to secure goods not for individual people 
but for the entire community, usually on an international scale. They take on a 
mixture of the individualistic and non-individualistic, being mostly first and second 
generation rights that have been redirected and re-conceptualised to impact on groups 
of people. The third generation are supported by the largely uninformative Article 28 
of the UDHR, which states that “[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration can be fully 
realised.”10 Article 28 is supplemented by the extensive 1986 Declaration on the Right 
to Development.11 Burns Weston summarises Article 28 and the subsequent 1986 
declaration into six general classes of rights: “the right to political, economic, social, 
and cultural self-determination; the right to economic and social development; and the 
right to participate in and benefit from ‘the common heritage of mankind’… the right 
to peace, the right to a healthy and balanced environment, and the right to 
humanitarian disaster relief”.12 These “solidarity rights”13 are best understood as first 
                                                 
9 Jeremy Waldron, Rights, In: R. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds.) A Companion to Contemporary 
Philosophy (Massachusetts: Blackwell Malden, 1998) p. 579 
10 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 2007), See: Appendix 1. 
11 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Declaration on the Right to Development, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm> (15th of January, 2007), See: Appendix 2.  
12 Burns Weston, Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly 6:3:1984:257-283, p.266   
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and second generation rights that have been reoriented to ensure the self-
determination of collective entities. The content of this generation suggests that these 
rights derive, not from liberal or socialist concerns, but from the recognition of the 
possible failure of the nation-state (hence the rights to peace, a clean environment, 
and humanitarian aid) and also the emergence of third world nationalism (hence the 
rights to self-determination, development, and participation).  
Because they are non-individualistic rights that secure goods enjoyed 
collectively by groups, third generation rights cannot be justified by reference to a 
previous generation as they have no liberal provenance. It is hard to put forward a 
convincing argument grounded in individual liberty for non-individualistic public 
goods such as collective self-determination. A more likely solution is to appeal to the 
idea of group or community rights; however, the debate over whether or not groups 
can be relevant moral entities is unresolved, particularly in the arena of rectificatory 
justice.14  
All liberal theorists will grant the legitimate existence of first generation 
rights, some non-libertarians recognise second generation rights, but the justification 
of third generation rights is heavily contested and many rights theorists consider the 
third generation as stretching the concept of rights too far. “[T]he new claims 
represent a degradation of the currency of rights,” Waldron objects, “a hijacking of 
the concept by ideologies who are very little concerned with its liberal provenance.”15  
                                                                                                                                            
13 B. Weston, (1984), p. 266   
14 Joseph L. Cowan, Inverse Discrimination, Analysis 33:1:1972:10-12, and Michael D. Bayles, 
Reparations to Wronged Groups, Analysis 33:6:1973:182-184 are a good summary of the arguments 
involved. A serious logistical problem involved with group rights is that we can only secure third 
generation rights for a group of people by granting entitlements to each individual member of the 
group. Because groups are nothing more than a collection of individuals they cannot have a well-being 
independent from that of their members. In this way, third generation rights which are devised 
specifically for groups are reduced to the second or first generation.        
15 J. Waldron, (1998), p 578 
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Owing to constraints on space I must leave the issue of the legitimacy of third 
generation rights unresolved here. This paper is concerned primarily with the second 
generation right to health care, a topic that does not stray too far from the safety of 
established liberal tenets but “hijacks” the concepts just enough to make for an 
interesting and controversial discussion.  
 
1b: Rights and Obligations 
Rights that do not flow from duty well performed are not worth having. 
Mahatma Gandhi 
 
Investigation of a rights-based approach to political morality raises the question of 
what is meant when it is stated that P has a right to X. Today this expression is 
bandied around by almost any person out to promote their own interests – people 
demand a right to more parking in town, a right to keep a dangerous animal as a pet or 
a right to yell profanities from a soap box in the town square – but, as Beauchamp and 
Faden point out, “it is not sufficient grounding for a rights claim that one can argue 
forcefully that one ought to receive a good or service…. Even if there are strong 
arguments to favour publicly funded health programs, it does not follow that anyone 
has a right to health care through these programs because of these arguments.”16  
A person having a right to receive certain goods does not necessarily mean 
that they will receive these goods in full, every time they are requested. Rights are 
only a part of a more general account that stakes out a valid claim, so in order to 
construct a complete rights theory there must also be a workable theory of respondent 
                                                 
16 Tom L. Beauchamp and Richard R. Faden, The Right to Health and the Right to Health Care, 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4:2:1979:118-131, p. 119 
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obligation; a theory that states the strength of the obligation imposed on others in 
response to human rights. Assuming second generation rights to health care do exist 
inalienably within us all and assuming that claims can be legitimately made for a slice 
of governmental assistance, I shall now demonstrate how a respondent may 
legitimately refuse goods and services despite there being human rights to those 
goods. In other words, I shall investigate instances where the human right to health 
care does not strictly create or impose an obligation for society to provide a standard 
of health care.  
Traditionally it is held that there exists a strict logical rule stating that rights 
and obligations are necessarily co-existent. Neither the right nor obligation can arise 
without the other, and when one is given up the other vanishes; a relation which 
David Lyons called “conceptual correlatives”.17 An example of this strict logical 
correlation is if Alvin were to exercise his right to be free from non-consensual 
medical procedures, then the obligation not to medicate Alvin is created in all possible 
respondents by logical necessity. If either aspect of the correlation is missing – if a 
person holds a right without any identifiable respondent or if there is a respondent 
obligation without corresponding rights18 – the remaining counterpart is made 
redundant or becomes “practically superfluous”.19 It is nonsensical to exercise a right 
to be free from non-consensual medical procedures without there being anyone 
around to administer such procedures. The right is made practically superfluous 
without an identifiable respondent to interact with. Vice versa, it makes no sense to be 
                                                 
17 David Lyons, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, Nous 4:1:1970:45-55, p. 47 
18 It goes without saying that it is possible to have moral obligation without rights, such as an 
obligation of charity, where we are not obliged to practice that virtue towards any particular person. 
The rule of conceptual correlativity is not intended to cover duty that one merely ought to do, in this 
weaker sense of ought. Interest lies only with the strict relation between rights and the respondent 
obligation rights are supposed to create. 
19 David Braybrooke, Abstract of Comments, Nous 4:1:1970:56-57, p. 57   
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obliged (in the strictest sense of the term) to omit medical procedures on unconsenting 
agents if there is nobody around to treat in such a manner. The obligation becomes 
practically superfluous without a rights-subject to interact with. Although people still 
possess the right (owing to its inalienable nature), the rule of conceptual correlatives 
maintains that the right/obligation becomes practically superfluous whenever it lacks 
a strict logical correlation with its corresponding obligation/right.  
It is important to also keep in mind that the concepts of right and obligation 
necessarily have content – in this example non-consensual medical treatment – and 
just as there is a formal rule of correlativity connecting the concepts of right and 
obligation, the content too must match up according to that rule. An agent’s right to 
be free from non-consensual medical treatment must correlate to a respondent 
obligation not to administer non-consensual medical treatment. According to Lyons, 
the traditional rule of strict conceptual correlatives says that “rights imply duties (even 
if not all duties imply rights) and also that claims of individual rights need not be 
recognised unless backed by proof that corresponding obligations obtain.”20  
Lyons argues that while these strict conceptual correlatives are quite common 
and familiar in cases of promise keeping and contracts, wrongful injuries that require 
reparations, and parent-child and student-teacher relationships, the correlation is not 
as all-encompassing as initially proposed because some rights do not strictly correlate 
to an obligation. He accepts cases of strict correlativity where rights and obligations 
are necessarily co-existent, but conceptual correlatives do not exhaust all possible 
relations, since a large number of important rights impose obligations on respondents 
in a fitful manner. Just as many obligations do not necessarily entail rights, there exist 
rights that do not necessarily entail moral obligations.  
                                                 
20 D. Lyons, (1970), p. 45   
 18 
Consider another example of Alvin who is now exercising his right to stand in 
front of a crowd and protest against the Vietnam War. This is what Lyons calls an 
“active right”;21 a right to actively do something (to be contrasted with Alvin 
receiving ten dollars from a debt, which is a passive right). If the conceptual 
correlative rule holds, it is a direct logical result that all those present at Alvin’s 
speech have an obligation of non-interference placed upon them purely by virtue of 
Alvin exercising his right: they necessarily have what is called a “passive 
obligation”22 imposed on them by the speech-making (in contrast to active 
obligation). The audience are obliged to refrain from killing, kidnapping, assaulting, 
coercing or blackmailing Alvin for the duration of his speechmaking because to act in 
such an offensive way would, amongst other things, violate his right to free speech. 
The problem with the conceptual correlativity thesis in this case is that all those 
present at the rally have the passive obligation not to interfere with Alvin regardless 
of Alvin exercising his right to express himself. If these passive obligations of non-
interference truly are a strict conceptual correlative of Alvin’s right to free speech, 
they must necessarily be coexistent with the right, tied to the act of speechmaking, 
and become waived once the right to free speech is no longer exercised and 
speechmaking is concluded. These obligations of non-interference are not 
extinguished. In fact, these restrictions are placed on all people regardless of Alvin’s 
speechmaking; therefore, Alvin’s right to free speech does not impose a logically 
corresponding and necessarily coexistent obligation of non-interference on 
respondents. Moreover, the correlative rule maintains that the content of the right 
must match up to the content of the obligation, so the active right to free speech must 
                                                 
21 D. Lyons, (1970), p. 48 
22 D. Lyons, (1970), p. 48 
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create a passive obligation of non-interference in free speech; however, in this 
counter-example the content is mismatched. The content of the obligation is a general 
non-interference in the affairs of others, while the content of Alvin’s active right is 
specifically to free speech.23 Even if Alvin were completely unjustified in his speech 
making and had no right to do so, for example if he were inciting violence in an angry 
mob, there is still an overwhelming obligation not kill, kidnap, assault, coerce, or 
blackmail Alvin. The only recourse of the crowd would be to call the authorities and 
let them, with their extended powers of persuasion, pursue such avenues. 
This counter-example, as devised by Lyons, drives a wedge between the right 
and obligation, rejecting any logical connection and necessary co-existence the two 
were supposed to possess. Alvin possesses the right all the time, and the crowd are 
constantly obliged to act in certain ways around Alvin, but the two are not logically 
connected and definitely not necessarily co-existent. As a result, Lyons has 
demonstrated that there exist situations where a particular right does not necessarily 
invoke respondent obligation. Lyons concludes that: 
 
Since others are prohibited in general from (e.g.) assaulting, 
threatening coercing and forcibly restraining Alvin… [i]t may 
seem as if these obligations follow from, are ‘part’ of or ‘correlate’ 
with Alvin’s right. But once we see that these obligations apply 
generally, whether or not Alvin acts within his rights, and that this 
is what makes it seem as if they follow from Alvin’s right, we 
should no longer be tempted to say that they follow.24 
 
                                                 
23 It is imperative to this counter-example to keep in mind that, just as the right correlates to the 
obligation, the content of the two must also logically correlate, with the active right to free speech 
directly invoking a passive obligation not to interfere in the speech. “The rule is that the expression of 
the content of the right is related to the expression of the content of the obligation as the passive is 
related to the active voice.” D. Lyons, (1970), p. 48 
24 D. Lyons, (1970), p. 53 
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Braybrooke points out that although Lyons’ line of argument may successfully 
sever the logical connection between active rights and passive obligation (or in his 
words, makes rights and obligations “logically superfluous”25), this does not make 
rights meaningless or redundant (or in his words, “superfluous practically”26). Rights 
are inalienable and exist within human-kind even when they are not being exercised 
or imposing obligation on others. Despite lacking a strict logical correlativity with 
obligation, the right is still completely intelligible as a moral entity. Braybrooke 
asserts that: 
Both an active right and the associated implication (i.e. the 
obligation) could exist even though logically superfluous. Their 
being logically superfluous would not, moreover, imply their being 
superfluous practically. Nor would it follow from (the right) being 
superfluous practically (the obligation being heeded anyway) that 
[the right] does not exist.27 
 
A number of human rights are ambiguous in their formulation. This is 
particularly true of second and third generation rights, which are designed to be 
equally applicable to a variety of international institutions. Where I call rights 
“ambiguous”, Braybrooke gives perhaps a more appropriate label, claiming that 
rights have an “open texture”.28 By this he simply means that rights can be 
interpreted in a variety of different ways depending on the situations surrounding 
their exercise. It follows from this open texture that the degree of obligation imposed 
on health care providers will fluctuate in strength, depending on the particular 
interpretation and institutional arrangements surrounding the exercise of the right. 
Article 25 of the UDHR is clearly inadequately worded to impose a definitive and 
                                                 
25 D. Braybrooke, (1970), p. 57   
26 D. Braybrooke, (1970), p. 57   
27 D. Braybrooke, (1970), p. 57   
28 David Braybrooke, The Firm but Untidy Correlativity of Rights and Obligations, Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy 1:3:1972:351-363,  p. 360    
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uniform respondent obligation: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including…medical care.” As a result, the obligation imposed on Malawian or 
Haitian health care systems will be completely different –weaker and less demanding 
– than the obligation imposed on the more affluent systems of New Zealand, the 
United States and the Netherlands.  
The conclusion that may be draw from this discussion of rights and obligation 
is; primarily, that the rule of conceptual correlativity holds in limited cases. Some 
obligations are strict conceptual correlatives, being necessarily co-existent with rights. 
The prime example is Alvin exercising his right to be free from non-consensual 
medical treatment and all others being necessarily obliged to respect this. Secondly, 
sometimes a right implies a subtle relation to an obligation. Lyons demonstrated that 
while this is not the strict logical relation evidenced above, it is a relation nonetheless 
that Braybrooke best describes as an “implication to the obligation from [Alvin’s] 
right”.29 Lyon was right in saying that the crowd is generally obliged not to interfere 
with Alvin at all times, not specifically because he is in the process of speaking. 
However, if someone were to shoot Alvin mid-speech then surely this would violate 
not only his general right to integrity of person but also his specific right to free 
speech; so, although the contents do not logically correlate, it can be seen how the 
specific right to free speech does loosely imply a general obligation of non-
interference. Finally, some cases would require extended debate about the relevant 
connection between right and obligation because there exists no obvious logical 
correlation and no subtle relation. Flying a skywriting plane overhead or turning the 
thermostat up to 35 degrees is questionable interference in Alvin’s right and as a 
                                                 
29 D. Braybrooke, (1972), p. 361 
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result, a duty of non-interference may not be broken. Individual cases with blurry 
relations such as these are best debated on a case-by-case basis in a court of law or 
philosophy class, with novel cases becoming precedents to clarify future 
transgression. “Clearly, the situation with respect to the obligation, so viewed, not to 
interfere with [Alvin’s] speaking publicly is logically untidy”30; therefore, it is now 
agreed amongst the philosophical community that there is a “firm but untidy 
correlation between rights and obligation”31, with the strict conceptual correlative and 
subtle implicit duties being morally binding to varying degrees depending on their 
strength of relation to the right. It can even be maintained that some rights have 
questionable loose “duties” that carry no morally binding force as they may hold no 
relation whatsoever to the right.32 This firm but untidy correlation is reiterated by 
prominent rights theorist, Alan Gewirth:  
The idea, then, is that when duties are correlative with rights, 
fulfilment of the duties is morally required, as against loose duties 
whose b[e]neficiaries are also individuals but without the 
correlativity with rights or the accompanying modality of 
requirement. It is in connection with the latter duties that potential 
beneficiaries may have to ‘beg or entreat’, not because of the 
psychological recalcitrance of potential duty-bearers but rather 
because, as a matter of normative modality, fulfilment of such 
duties is not morally required.33   
 
Strong arguments can be made that the right to health care is a strict 
conceptual correlative of the obligation to provide only the most important medical 
care, obliging the state to devote resources in limited cases; for example, controlling a 
                                                 
30 D. Braybrooke, (1972), p. 360 
31 D. Braybrooke, (1972), p. 351 
32 Just because the duty does not relate to human rights this is not to say that they cannot be morally 
binding in other ways. It has been argued by Libertarian theorists who oppose the concept of positive 
rights that a morally binding duty to provide health care could derive from other concerns, such as 
charity. Utilitarian considerations may also come to similar conclusions out of concern for the greater 
good.    
33 Alan Gewirth, Rights and Duties, Mind 97:387:1988:441-445, p. 443   
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highly infectious and dangerous disease or providing clean drinking water and 
adequate waste disposal. Sometimes the right does not correlate strongly to an 
obligation and as a result there is only a loose implication. In such cases, the state will 
only have to provide restricted or selective treatment, meeting the rights holder 
halfway. The piecemeal funding of pharmaceuticals seems to exemplify this implicit 
relation as there is no strict obligation on the state to provide a comprehensive array 
of treatment options, only an acceptable minimum. At other times, there is no obvious 
correlation or implication at all between the right and the obligation and therefore the 
state is not morally obligated to respond to the right holder. Non-restorative cosmetic 
surgery is provided by the same medical establishment as restorative treatments, yet 
the health care institution is not obliged to fund such procedures in response to any 
purported right to health care. In this manner, the right to health care seems to be the 
prime example of an open textured right that fitfully imposes obligation on respondent 
institutions according to no hard or fast rule of correlation, depending heavily on 
situational context.  
Not all cases of exercising a right to health care will necessitate a response 
from health care providers. When combined with the prima facie nature of rights, the 
effective exercise of the right to health care is weakened by variable factors such as 
the availability of resources, society’s level of technological development, the moral 
importance of competing social projects, and the demands of the greater good. 
Depending on how these factors play against the implementation of a health care 
system, the respondent obligation imposed by the right could easily fall far short of a 
strict logical correlation or even loose implication. 
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1c: Negative Absolutes and Positive Prima Facie Rights 
Genuine tragedies in the world are not conflicts between right and wrong. They 
are conflicts between two rights.  
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
 
The language of rights is a powerful tool that expresses more than a desire to satisfy 
self-interest, but a morally or legally forceful claim that an action X is the right (or 
wrong)34 thing to do and therefore others are morally obliged not to interfere with P 
doing X. What is more, P having a right to X may entail some further obligation apart 
from mere non-interference; it could place an obligation of assistance on others to 
actively promote P’s interest in achieving X. 
In the case of the first generation right to be free from non-consensual medical 
treatment, the obligation is one of negative omissions. This is not an obligation that is 
relative to any particular respondent, as all imaginable respondents are morally 
obliged to withhold medical procedures from the unconsenting rights holder. What is 
more, since an act of omission is generally cheap and easy to perform, it is logically 
possible for all right holders to exercise this negative right simultaneously an endless 
number of times and have it respected. On the other hand, with the second generation 
right to health care, the obligation generated is to render positive assistance. A very 
laudable but expensive obligation to provide goods and services is imposed on 
respondents by the rights holder. If a right is absolute, this refers to the unlimited 
exercise of that right, for example the way in which negative acts of omission can be 
infinitely performed without draining resources or requiring the prioritisation of 
norms. A prima facie right means that norms must be balanced and traded against one 
                                                 
34 Jeremy Waldron, A Right to do Wrong, Ethics 92:1:1981:21-39 
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another owing to the regrettable fact that not all conditions can be simultaneously 
satisfied. For example, it is not logistically possible to positively provide unlimited 
health care services to every person in the world without diverting funds from and 
ultimately trading-off between other goods such as education or civil defence.  
Based on many similar observations, theorists have generalised that first 
generation rights are all negative omissions and absolute rights, as they can be 
exercised simultaneously without contradiction. Second generation rights are positive 
prima facie rights, constantly coming into conflict and having to be traded off against 
one another whenever exercised simultaneously. The contested third generation rights 
merit a passing mention if only for the fact that they do not fit this mould at all, being 
either positive or negative depending on the context. In reference to the previous 
section, this distinction between positive prima facie and negative absolutes is 
complemented by Lyons’ distinction between active and passive voices.35 Alvin can 
have a passive positive right to receive ten dollars a week from the state, a passive 
negative right to be born free and equal, an active positive right to seek health care at 
a hospital, and an active negative right to travel freely around the country.     
This way of categorising first generation as negative and the second 
generation as positive rights is at best a tentative rule of thumb, once it is understood 
that some first generation rights require substantial positive assistance. On voting day 
people would be unable to exercise their first generation right to vote in a democratic 
election unless some authority provides a secure and very expensive voting apparatus 
staffed by diligent officials. The first generation right to hold property free from 
interference of others also requires substantial positive assistance in the form of a 
police force to uphold and enforce property laws. Moreover, second generation rights 
                                                 
35 D. Lyons, (1970), p. 48 
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may contain negative and positive elements, for example in medical cases of 
preventive care or quarantine where the best medicinal course available is a largely 
inexpensive act of omission. It may therefore be concluded that the right to health 
care is a second generation right that contains elements of negative duties of omission 
and positive duties of assistance. Furthermore, I believe it is a misunderstanding to 
categorically call the first generation absolute rights and second generation prima 
facie rights. Ronald Dworkin36 clearly points out that few rights are absolute because 
the legitimate exercise of a right must be always be weighed against many other 
considerations such as cost, expected benefit, likelihood of success, and the greater 
good of society. Dworkin grants rights the magnificent power to “trump”37 claims of 
utility; however, he qualifies this, saying that on special occasions, if the greater 
social good is significantly greater, then rights claims do not have this power of veto. 
Dworkin writes: 
Someone who claims that citizens have a right against the 
government need not go so far as to say the state is never justified 
in overriding that right. He might say, for example, that although 
citizens have a right to free speech, the government may override 
that right when necessary to protect the rights of others, or to 
prevent a catastrophe, or even to obtain a clear and major public 
benefit.38  
 
In the above passage, Dworkin picks out a prime example of a first generation 
negative right that can be exercised infinitely free of cost, and clearly states three 
situations in which this so-called “absolute” right can be overruled. On occasion, 
rights may trump utility considerations, while at other times a sufficiently high utility 
gain can prevail. This is reasonably standard concession amongst rights theorists.  
                                                 
36 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) 
37 Ronals Dworkin, Hard Cases, Harvard Law Review, 88:6:1975:1057-1109, p. 1069 
38 R. Dworkin, (1977), p. 191 
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Rights not only come into conflict with other considerations of social justice 
such as the greater social good, but also conflict with one another. As a result, there 
are hardly any recognisable absolute rights, apart perhaps from the fundamental 
Article 1 “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”39 It is not 
possible to fully realise second generation rights to public goods such as health care, 
education, roading and housing, owing to the fact that in a system of limited resources 
rights must be traded off against each other and resource distribution skewed amongst 
groups in society. As Beauchamp and Faden poetically point out, there cannot be 
multiple absolutes without contradiction: “virtually all agree that no right always has 
the right of way when rights themselves come into conflicting traffic.”40  
Talk of absolutes is often confused with talk of inalienability, a misconception 
that results in people mistaking actions are not unjust for human rights violations. In 
some transcendent and mysteriously metaphysical manner that is explained in Chapter 
Two, rights adhere to humankind by virtue of being human. This is what the charters 
and declarations call the inalienable existence of human rights; it is not possible to 
voluntarily give up or forfeit an inalienable right, since the only condition for 
possession is simply being human. Inalienable rights are also said to be trans-
historical as neither the possession of humanity nor the adhering rights change over 
time. Even if a society cannot afford a health care system, does not engage in paid 
employment, or even has no concept of property or religion, the inalienability thesis 
still insists that there exists full human rights to health care, employment, and 
associated freedoms and protections. One could even go so far as to say that, within a 
pre-literate hunter-gather society, there exist full sets of human rights identical to 
                                                 
39 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 2007), See: Appendix 1. 
40 T. Beauchamp and R. Faden, (1979), p. 122 
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those held by a modern Western liberal society, the only difference between the two 
being that the former cannot exercise their rights while the latter can. If a pre-literate 
hunter-gather society was provided with a comprehensive acute care emergency ward 
they will be just as entitled to service by way of human rights as members of a 
developed society. The arguable point here is that all rights from any generation 
inalienably exist within humankind; but, owing to resource scarcity, period of 
historical development, or other considerations of social justice, the majority of these 
inalienable rights cannot be absolutely exercised and must be traded off against one 
another.  
It seems that if there are no resources available to fund a health care system, or 
if some alternative concerns such as civil defence or the greater public good trump the 
prima facie right to health care, then the correlation between the right and the 
obligation weaken to the point that state-funded health care becomes a questionable 
loose implication lacking moral requirement. This does not mean that the right itself is 
alienated by not being fulfilled; it simply means that due to the prima facie nature of 
the right the respondent obligation is not morally binding on that particular occasion.  
 
1d: A Human Right to Health 
 
In health there is freedom. Health is the first of all liberties.  
Henri Frederic Amiel 
 
To understand the exact nature of a moral right it helps to understand the obligation 
that the particular right generates; however, rights charters are intended to be to be a 
moral blueprint for the arrangement of almost any society and as a result tend to leave 
the finer details of respondent obligation and practical implementation for the society  
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in question to define. It has been said that the language of human rights is restrictively 
inflexible and intractable when dealing with important “big ticket” goods such as 
national health care, and the right itself as stated is extremely uninformative as to how 
a state must go about realising this great ideal. Article 25 of The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights ensures “the right to security in the event of sickness, 
disability… old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control”41, 
but this fails to justify the sprawling health systems evident in the world today. In the 
following quotation, Norman Daniels demonstrates the large leap that is taken from 
the human right, as minimally defined above, to the extensive modern health system, 
which the right is supposed to support: 
 
I include here our system of high-technology hospital and clinic 
based medicine, the training institutions for physicians, nurses and 
allied professionals, and the research and development institutions 
supporting these forms of health care services. Less visible and 
less glamorous, but extremely important in their effect on 
collective health status, are the various public health agencies 
concerned with preventive programs. I include here the laws and 
agencies responsible for the control of infectious diseases, nutrition 
and health education, drug and food protection, consumer product 
safety, and the regulation of health hazards in the environment, 
including the provision for clean water and for proper sanitation 
and other waste disposal. The health care system also involves 
institutions responsible for social support and personal care 
services needed by the mentally and physically disabled or the 
chronically ill.42  
 
 
                                                 
41 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 2007), See: Appendix 1. 
42 Norman Daniels, Just Health Care, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 2 
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Owing to the open texture of this mysterious moral entity named health care it 
is hard to see how such a vast array of respondent obligation’s can correlate to this 
nondescript and uninformative 25th Article. It is questionable whether goods and 
services such as educational programs or consumer safety programs can be 
comprehensively ensured by the somewhat limited right to security in the event of 
sickness, disability, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond one’s 
control. All rights are intended to be held equally, but it is disputable how this ideal 
pertains to the facets of health care. If the state is (ideally) obliged to provide all 
persons with equal amounts of health care, then the sick would have too little care and 
the healthy too much; equality with regard to cost, quality, access, and allocation of 
the resources are likewise troublesome to define and realise. Other human rights such 
as “Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude”43 seem rather self-
explanatory as it may be easily determined which practices constitute slavery and 
servitude and practical methods of realising this ideal may be envisaged; on the other 
hand, health care seems an ambiguous entitlement that varies dramatically between 
countries. A small third world African nation will be obliged to implement a radically 
different health care plan from that of a first world European nation, while an ageing 
population warrants an entirely different plan from that of a youthful population. As a 
result, it is a common criticism that “[a] right to health care should not exist because 
the concept is sufficiently ambiguous that it is impossible to specify precisely what 
claims it would warrant.”44  
                                                 
43 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 2007), See: Appendix 1. 
44 Michael Siegler, Right to Health Care: Ambiguity, Professional Responsibility, and Patient Liberty, 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4:2:1979:148-157, p. 149 
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Siegler points out that owing to the ambiguity associated with defining health 
care and because every society requires different plans for realising the ideal, it makes 
better sense to have a right to the outcome of a process, namely health, rather than 
have a right to the ambiguous process itself. Siegler argues by analogy, showing how 
it is a relatively unquestioned assumption that all humans hold an equal right to 
education. Education is not valued because it gives teachers a job or because society 
requires thirteen years of free babysitting while all the adults are all at work during 
the day; it is valued because it is important to have an informed, literate and socialised 
society. The act of education is simply a process that has a far less value than the 
outcome of that process. If we were to set in stone a relatively universal moral 
necessity such as a human right to education, surely the subject of that right would be 
a desired outcome, not simply a right to go through the process. By analogy, health 
care is a process that has health as its end – the colossus that is the health care system 
does not exist as an incredibly expensive hospice, it exists for the simple purpose of 
bringing people as close to “health” as is possible. In Siegler’s words, “[h]ealth care is 
claimed and desired only as a means toward some other good, and that good is 
health”45, so it makes some sense for humankind to possess a universal right to health. 
If a right to health is to be taken seriously within the framework outlined in the 
previous sections, I shall now address the question: what kind of right would it be?  
There is no way the right to health could be a positive absolute, as this would 
create what is commonly referred to in medical circles as “medical black holes”. If the 
right to health had a positive nature, then terminally ill patients would require endless 
aid and resources to be poured into their ailments, in an expensively futile attempt to 
bring about slight improvements in their health. The right to health is simply 
                                                 
45 M. Siegler, (1979), p. 152 
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impossible to maintain if it is understood as absolute, because any patient who dies 
under medical supervision would technically have their inalienable human right to 
health violated. This constitutes an inevitable, frequent and unacceptable disregard of 
moral entitlement. Moreover, life-saving medical procedures are exceedingly costly, 
so if a state were to attempt to realise a positive absolute right to health then medical 
black holes would divert funds from many other public services, such as education 
and defence forces, resulting in further rights violations. Any attempts to realise a 
positive absolute right to health would simply suck society dry of funds and result in 
numerous undesirable violations of human rights. 
Because of the black hole problems associated with a positive right to health 
and owing to the fact that hardly any rights can be absolute, the right to health must be 
a negative prima facie. To start with, the prima facie aspect seems correct because, as 
I have previously pointed out, it must be possible for one’s right to health to be 
overridden by competing rights or sufficiently high utility considerations. This 
negative aspect implies that people have a right to their present state of health, 
whatever that state may be, and that state of health can only be interfered with given 
sufficiently good reason. This is not a claim to good health, only to health as I 
currently have it. The idea of a negative right to health is similar to the negative right 
to hold property; it does not guarantee that a person attain good property or indeed 
hold any property at all, only that they can retain property free from unjust 
interference once in their possession.  
It is a rather severe implication of the negative right to health that if an 
individual is born with debilitating illness, contracts a disease, or becomes otherwise 
disabled and no one can be identified as the cause of the interference, then the state is 
not obliged to provide restorative care. Genetic disease, birth deformity, pandemics 
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and accidents of general misfortune will not violate one’s negative right to health and 
hence will not oblige restitution – no one has interfered so there is no identifiable 
respondent obligation. On the other hand, there will be a strict respondent obligation 
to cure those ailments caused by others – from assault, car crashes or second-hand 
smoking related illnesses – although as Bell points out, it can be argued that in these 
cases rectification is not a moral obligation imposed on the health care system, but an 
obligation imposed on the perpetrator of the crime. Consider the analogy to property 
once more, as portrayed by Nora Bell:  
Our moral intuitions are that theft and mugging are wrong – that 
they violate the victim’s rights. But the ‘right’ to be free from 
mugging and theft is more an interest to be weighted against other 
interests in the allocation of funds than it is an absolute right.… 
[N]ot only is the ‘right’ to police protection only one of a number 
of competing interests, but it is not something legitimately claimed 
against the state for the state has not violated the right – the 
mugger has.46  
 
While ambiguity is a justified complaint of the right to health care, it appears 
that the right to health is likewise so to a devastating degree. The World Health 
Organization defines health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”47, but the right to health is 
only intelligible as a negative prima facie right that fails spectacularly in achieving its 
purpose of returning people to this healthy state. It fails in this task because it rests on 
the arguable empirical assumption that the majority of disease is socially caused and 
therefore excludes disease and disability derived from the natural lottery, only 
concerning itself with disease and disability produced by the interference of others. 
                                                 
46 Nora K. Bell, The Scarcity of Medical Resources: Are There Rights to Health Care?, Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 4:2:1979:158-169, p. 161  
47 World Health Organization Regional Office for South-East Asia, Constitution of the World Health 
Organization, <http://www.searo.who.int/EN/Section898/Section1441.htm> (15th of January, 2007), 
See: Appendix 3 
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Genetic disease, ailments associated with aging, pandemics of influenza, and even 
devastation from earthquakes and floods will not be covered under the human right to 
health. As if this did not restrict the class of treatable ailments enough, it is hard to see 
exactly who is obligated to remedy the right bearer’s loss. A case of intentional 
assault will obligate the assailant to provide health care. This hardly seems plausible. 
What we need is for the state to be obligated to provide care in a range of cases; 
however, “on this view [of a negative right to health] society is not obligated to 
initiate legislation or programs for the maintenance of my health, nor is it clear that it 
ought to be.”48  
A prima facie right to good health seems to be what is required, as this 
obligates the state to aid in the entire spectrum of disability we intuitively think a 
health care plan must cover. A right to good health is, of course, a right to positive 
assistance, which equates to the prima facie positive right to health care.  
Coming full circle now, Siegler may be correct that this is a right to health 
care is a right to a mere process, rather that an outcome. It may also be true that 
“health care” is a rather ambiguous term that requires definition before we can 
attempt to implement it as a moral standard. Nonetheless, I contend that these are 
relatively minor issues that pale in comparison to the problems associated with its 
closest competitor – the negative right to health. Definitions are easily devised for 
practical purposes and, once formulated, definitions are best assumed simply for the 
sake of argument. All the right to health care seems to require is some philosophical 
tidying-up in defining the content of health care, whereas the negative right to health 
requires far more work than mere definition; it seems fundamentally unworkable and 
impractical. One may object that this is a rather parasitic defence of the right to health 
                                                 
48 N. K. Bell, (1979), p. 161 
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care (one that feeds off its competitor’s weakness). Nevertheless, we possess human 
rights in order to protect fundamental human interests, and in this case the ill-defined 
right to health care succeeds at restoring and maintaining human health, autonomy 
and freedom far better that the practically ineffective and restrictive right to health. 
 
1e: Summary and Conclusions of Descriptive section 
Human rights in general are essentially extra-legal entities designed to work as an 
independent blueprint for assessing the moral appropriateness of governmental action, 
social institutions, and individual action, irrespective of cultural or political 
differences.  
The right to health care itself is a second generation socio-economic human 
right held inalienably by all and exercised as a method of ensuring both a moral due 
of negative omissions and positive allocation of goods and services from institutional 
arrangements. This human right imposes varying degrees of obligation on health care 
providers depending on the strength of the logical correlation between the entitlement 
and the respondent obligation. The health care institution provides some services that 
are moral necessities in society due to a strict conceptual correlation with the right, for 
instance the immediate quarantine of all seriously infectious diseases. Other services 
are loosely implied by the right and carry a weaker moral imperative because full 
implementation of service is subject to contingencies such as funding constraints and 
technological availability. The subsidisation and distribution of some pharmaceuticals 
is an example of a weakened correlation from right to obligation. Other times, there 
can be no implication from the obligation to the right, so the performance of some 
health care services is best described as supererogatory.  
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Article 25 provides us with no informative guidance as to the services 
included for entitlement and no guidelines as to the level of service a state is obliged 
to provide, leaving health care ill-defined and impractically broad in definition. What 
is more, theoretically the prima facie nature of the right leaves us no guarantee that we 
will receive any health care as a matter of moral course despite international 
consensus that humans possess an inalienable right to receive it. This is because the 
majority of human rights can be over-ruled by sufficiently high social benefits or a 
considered balancing of competing norms; this is especially so for second generation 
rights to goods and services.  
No system can incorporate multiple absolutes without irreconcilable conflict, 
so to call the successful exercise of health care rights “conditional” seems to be an 
understatement. As more social programs compete against each other for society’s 
limited resources and as these programs become exceedingly more complicated and 
expensive, the societal obligation to set such programs in place becomes weakened 
and difficult to achieve. As a result, the right to health care is not as clean cut as many 
rights activists propose. If there are no available resources, or if utility trumps the 
consideration, or if it is considered that competing interests demand moral priority, 
then the correlation from the right to the obligation is weakened becoming a loose or 
questionable implication. Therefore, by its very nature the right to health care is 
exercised conditionally, being dependent on numerous factors such as the health 
provider’s fiscal competency, the moral priority of other competing entitlements, the 
pressures of the greater social good, and the technological or logistical availability of 
health services.     
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Chapter Two: Conceptual Foundations for a Right to Health Care 
In every country, we should be teaching our children the scientific method and the 
reasons for a Bill of Rights. With it comes a certain decency, humility and 
community spirit. In the demon-haunted world that we inhabit by virtue of being 
human, this may be all that stands between us and the enveloping darkness.         
Carl Sagan 
 
2: Introduction: Relative vs. Universal 
Philosophy is not always allied with rights activism. Cultural relativism is a 
philosophy employed by social scientists to counter the inevitable ethnocentrism that 
plagues inter-cultural analysis. Cultural relativity essentially states a rule that is 
fundamental to the social sciences of anthropology and sociology; that one must not 
judge the behaviour of other people by the standards of one’s own culture or ethnic 
background. While cultural relativism is essential for the anthropological battle 
against ethnocentric bias, this philosophy is defective when applied to ethical 
analysis, as it often fuels an ideology endorsed by malevolent tyrants and dictators – 
the idea that it is best for the state to have moral sovereignty over the populace. Many 
rogue states tend to subscribe to moral relativist ideology, viewing human rights as a 
liberal democratic invention applicable only to Western democratic society. 
Acceptance of this relativist position means that any state can decide for itself those 
practices that are morally legitimate and illegitimate, making it impossible for others 
to persuade a government that what it is doing is inappropriate. Human rights are 
designed to be used as a moral blueprint or objective standard that can be held up 
against any given state in order to track discrepancy. If the central tenet of radical 
cultural relativism is applied to ethics – that outsiders are not competent to dictate 
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moral law to another culture – then the entire concept of international human rights is 
undermined.  
Moral cultural relativists would say that slavery is wrong because society 
disapproves of slavery, but this goes against a commonsense understanding of justice 
and morality; most people would argue the other way, stating that society disapproves 
of slavery because slavery is wrong. Along with offending commonsense, relativism 
commits the same error as that in the descriptive analysis of third generation group 
rights; namely, it makes the questionable ontological assumption that entities such as 
“state”, “community”, or “culture” can possess a moral status. Norms such as human 
rights are traditionally based on uniform observations about the individual, while 
moral relativists attempt to base moral rule making uniform observations about 
culture. This picture of cultural systems as being clearly defined and united entities is 
incorrect, because in reality the boundary of any culture is practically unidentifiable. 
Even if some uniform similarities can be identified which to attach the uniting label 
“culture”, within that culture there are further sub-groups that may hold belief systems 
diametric to the state defined morality. What is more, a person may belong to more 
than one group or culture resulting in a further concoction of beliefs. In essence, the 
moral cultural relativist argument contradicts itself; it claims that since there exists 
variation between cultures it would be improper to impose some external moral 
standard that applies to all, but then goes on to support an internal moral standard that 
completely ignores the huge variation that is present within the culture.   
One alternative to this defective position is to ascribe universality and 
inalienability to human rights. Inalienability means a right exists by virtue of the right 
holder’s existence and cannot be taken away or forfeited. Universality follows from 
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inalienability, as all humans possess moral rights equally, irrespective of cultural 
differences. One important distinction is central to universal theories of human rights, 
which was discussed in Section 1c; human rights exist necessarily as universal and 
inalienable entities in all people, but, depending on the strength of the respondent 
obligation, it is possible (and sometimes legitimate) for them to not to be realised. 
This is because human rights are largely prima facie in nature and context-sensitive. 
Whether rights can be realised or successfully exercised is dependent on the particular 
society in question and its ability to fulfil the right. It is futile for the activist to 
campaign for the enjoyment of a right to work, a right to health care, or a right to hold 
property if a society has no jobs, doctors, or land. Although rights inalienably exist 
within all citizens, rights are not being illegitimately violated or ignored if they are 
impossible to realise in a particular context. Illegitimate or immoral violation comes 
about when it is logistically possible for a state to realise a particular human right, but 
the right is still ignored. 
Chapter One provided a descriptive assessment of human rights by making the 
assumption that these universal and inalienable entities exist; however, up until now I 
have provided no proof in the strictest sense of the term that human rights are 
anything more than a relativist social convention or an empty tool for social progress. 
Chapter Two shall now proceed to address the issue of why human rights possess this 
moral authority, demonstrating why we all must abide by their universal and 
inalienable dictates. The theories investigated commonly hold that the good is prior to 
the right – they hold that a universal good such as god or human nature, when 
combined with the power of reason, can produce and justify an itemised list of human 
rights. I shall investigate three plausible foundations for human rights; theism, human 
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dignity, and basic human needs or interests. In the order presented these theories 
represent one “radically universal” position and two “relatively strong universal” 
positions. This foundational investigation buttresses claims of universality and 
inalienability, ultimately providing reasoning for human rights that goes beyond mere 
appeals to relative culture. 
 
2a: Theism 
Work on human rights during the Enlightenment attempted to explain and justify the 
existence of universal and inalienable rights by viewing them, not as a product of the 
rule and law of any particular society, but as a product of the rule and law of the 
natural world. Natural Law theory dates back to Plato and Aristotle, and over time has 
amounted to a large body of complicated literature concerning politics, religion, civil 
law and ethics. In this brief discussion of Natural Law, I analyse the paradigmatic 
theory set out by Thomas Aquinas and adopted for use in John Locke’s political 
philosophy, which holds the following basic tenets:  
(1) The natural law is given by god; (2) it is naturally authoritative 
over all human beings; and (3) it is naturally knowable by all 
human beings. Further, it holds that (4) the good is prior to the 
right, that (5) right action is action that responds non-defectively to 
the good, that (6) there are a variety of ways in which action can be 
defective with respect to the good, and that (7) some of these ways 
can be captured and formulated as general rules.49  
 
Natural law theory states that, in addition to the culturally relative and ever-
changing political (positive) law, there is an objective law that applies to all people 
irrespective of where they live, their beliefs, historical situation or their political 
                                                 
49 Mark Murphy, The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, In: Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Winter 2002 Edition 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/natural-law-ethics/> (15th of January, 2007)   
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agreements. Natural law is a product of the “good”. This good is not merely any 
contingent item that one may deem to be good for life, such as happiness or 
friendship, but if I were to put together a very long list of all the goods imaginable and 
somehow rank them in order of their goodness, the good which would be placed at the 
top of the list would be known as the highest good. Natural law is a product of the 
highest good, meaning that if one reflects on the attributes and demands of this 
highest good – be it God (Locke, Aquinas), self-preservation (Hobbes), completion 
(Aristotle), or whatever else you wish to argue50 – the “right” or moral rule follows 
from the good as a conclusion of reason. 
Great advances in natural rights theory during the Enlightenment took place 
against a backdrop of revolution and political instability. In fact, John Locke’s 
respected Treatise of Civil Government is often described as a defence of the 
“Glorious Revolution” of 1688, when the British government invited the Dutch Prince 
William of Orange to overthrow King James II, marking the end of absolutism and 
the beginning of constitutional government in England. By looking at some of the 
rights charters written during this era and noting the heavy emphasis on theistic and 
rationalistic justification for the rights listed, the influence of natural law theory on the 
formulation of famous declarations is evident. The French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen (1789) “set[s] forth in a solemn declaration the natural, 
unalienable and sacred rights of man... [and] recognizes and proclaims, in the 
presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the… rights of man and of the 
                                                 
50 Not all natural law theorists rely on god as the highest good. While this section is founding natural 
rights on theistic grounds, it is worth noting that many modern natural law theorists, such as Robert 
Nozick, use a secular grounding.  
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citizen.” 51 Another famous example is the United States Declaration of Independence 
(1776) which reads; “[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that 
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”52  
This natural law is to be distinguished further from what Locke and Aquinas 
called divine law; the latter being the word of God laid down via mediums or prophets 
to apply to specific groups of people, and the former being word of God procurable by 
any rational mind. For instance, Locke considered large sections of the Old 
Testament, including parts of the Ten Commandments, to be divine law applicable 
only to the people of Israel.53 In contrast, natural rights were considered by Locke to 
be inalienable rules owing to their divine providence and universal because no human 
being can enjoy rationality and not be bound by its great universal law:  
 The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges 
every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who 
will but consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one 
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions. For 
men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely 
wise maker… they are his property, whose workmanship they are, 
made to last during his, not one another’s, pleasure.54   
 
As the above passage suggests, reflecting on natural law produces natural 
rights, the most important for Lockean civil society being natural property rights. 
Theistic foundations are evident, as Locke’s famous property rights follow from the 
                                                 
51 Human and Constitutional Rights, Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen, 
<http://www.hrcr.org/docs/frenchdec.html> (15th of January, 2007)  
52 The US Constitution Online, The Declaration of Independence, 
<http://www.usconstitution.net/declar.html> (15th of January, 2007) 
53 John Locke, Works, In: W. Yolton (ed.) The Works of John Locke 1632-1704: 9th edition, (London: 
Routledge, 1997), Sect. 6:37 
54 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, In: J. W. Gough (ed.) The Second Treatise of 
Government, and a Letter Concerning Toleration (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), Sect. 6 
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similar idea that people are all the property of God, so all people have a duty to 
“preserve” themselves and a duty to “preserve the rest of mankind”55 in a similar 
fashion. Because people have God given or natural status as equal and independent 
beings, reason defines the rights and responsibilities of humanity as non-interference 
in life, health, liberty or possessions. No man has the right to subordinate others 
(except for limited purposes of self-defence) and those who violate natural rights to 
non-interference defy the rule of reason and therefore subject themselves to 
punishment “to such a degree as may hinder [the rights] violation… preserve the 
innocent and restrain offenders.”56 For Locke, political society exists when men agree 
to surrender their natural powers of punishment to some authority, so the purpose of 
government is simply to protect and ensure those natural rights found in a state of 
nature.  
 
2a. (i): Objections to Theistic Foundations 
God gave us the gift of life; it is up to us to give ourselves the gift of living well. 
Voltaire 
 
For a long time this theistic interpretation of natural law was acceptable as 
philosophical foundations for universal and inalienable human rights to non-
interference from others; however, in contemporary debates philosophers can no 
longer justify the existence of universal human rights by simply invoking the good of 
god. One famous rejection of divine command theory comes from the ancient 
dialogues of Plato, where Socrates asked the religious expert Euthyphro “whether the 
pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved 
                                                 
55 J. Locke, (1946), Sect. 6 
56 J. Locke, (1946), Sect. 7 
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of the gods.”57 If morality is commanded by god because god recognises such acts as 
being right, then this implies that god is not the ultimate authority on morality – there 
is a standard of goodness independent of god which god is referring to in law-making. 
If divine command theorists reject this unacceptable conclusion, then by default they 
fall on the second horn of the dilemma, concluding that moral law is right because it 
is commanded by god. This conclusion is also unacceptable for two reasons: first, the 
word of god becomes arbitrary as god could have commanded lying and stealing to be 
virtuous and they would be so. Second, to use descriptive facts (god said “do not 
steal”) to justify a prescription (do not steal) commits a logical fallacy by arguing 
from an “is” to an “ought”. Since Augustine and Aquinas understood God as being 
the exhaustive authority on goodness in the universe, for them it is simply not 
possible for there to be a supremely good entity independent of God. These thinkers 
preferred to fall on the first horn of the dilemma, claiming that God must always look 
inwards to Himself for guidance on the right and the good; He theoretically could 
demand “immoral” acts as moral, but would never do so as He is essentially good.  
Kai Nielsen neatly pointed out a central problem for theistic natural law: “If 
there is no god… the classical natural law theory is absurd”.58 I interpret this 
statement in two ways: the burden of proof is put on those who wish to refute theistic 
natural law as they must disprove god’s existence and providence; and conversely, 
apologists face the insurmountable task of arguing that god exists and promulgates 
natural law. Both of these are contested positions not easily vindicated, to say the 
least; therefore, the argument reaches stalemate. 
                                                 
57 Plato, Euthyphro, In: H. Tredennick and H. Tarrant (eds.) The Last Days of Socrates (London: 
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Michael Moore notably sidesteps the problem by applying a technique 
reminiscent of Ockham’s razor. He claims that, because respectable inquiry demands 
the omission of unnecessary entities when giving explanations, “[i]f non-theistic 
grounds for the belief in moral objectivity are fully sufficient, then theistic grounds 
are not necessary.”59 Nielsen points out that there seems to be no hope of refuting the 
theistic natural law theory by attacking its fundamental premises and disproving either 
the existence of god or his purported involvement in natural law. It seems, therefore, 
that Moore is correct in suggesting that the most likely recourse is to argue an 
acceptable account of objective morality that does not involve god. Even then, if the 
assumption that god exists is allowed, god’s position as the good from which the right 
derives is made redundant – god is an unnecessary entity in a universe of objective 
morals not of theistic providence and can be removed from an assessment of natural 
rights.  
Having said this, it is important to keep in mind that there is no way to 
conclude convincingly that either side of the debate is correct. It makes sense to talk 
of natural human rights outside a theistic frame, if only for the benefit of avoiding this 
intractable ontological debate. I believe the final word must go to John Finnis, who 
views the debate between the faithful defenders and religious sceptics as a circular 
task of futility; stating that even if non-theistic universal foundations for morality are 
accepted, this in no way disproves the premise that a creator god could be responsible 
for those non-theistic foundations: 
 
 
                                                 
59 Michael Moore, Good without god, In: R. P. George (ed.) Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 225 
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[T]he fact that natural law can be understood, assented to, applied 
and reflectively analysed without adverting to the question of the 
existence of god does not of itself entail either (i) that no further 
explanation is required for the fact that there are objective 
standards of good and bad and principles of reasonableness (right 
and wrong), or (ii) that no such further explanation is available, or 
(iii) that the existence and nature of god is not that explanation.60  
 
2b: Human Dignity 
Jack Donnelly believes that it is a mistake to view rights strictly as gifts from god, 
relative entities born of society, or as strictly universal facts of human nature. He 
makes the motivating observation that nowhere in any contemporary rights bill does it 
seriously suggest that human rights are founded on theistic goods or relative culture; 
in fact, the preamble of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966) makes the positive claim that “these rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person”.61 This claim is worth investigation, not only so I can 
discuss the insights of such an eminent rights theorist, but also because Donnelly’s 
argument is a logical expansion on the United Nations claim that rights derive from 
the inherent dignity of man. As such, discussion may prove that the United Nations 
itself is incorrect in this foundational opinion of human rights, having based global 
charters on the misguided conception of dignity for the past sixty years. 
According to Donnelly, a thoroughgoing moral universalism such as the one 
portrayed by Locke gives “absolute priority to the demands of the cosmopolitan moral 
community over all the (‘lower’) moral communities”.62 This amounts to an 
intolerable denial of national moral autonomy. What is more, the radically universal 
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position is said to be based on an ethnocentric bias as it ignores the empirical fact that 
there once existed, and may still exist, traditional African, Chinese, Indian cultures 
that do not possess concepts integral to rights theory, such as “human”, “individual”, 
and “equality”. The defender of radical universalism may reply that, in much the same 
way as individuals can be harmed without their knowing it, these concepts can still 
apply to some cultures even if the people concerned do not understand them. These 
cultures that lack the concept of equality may unwittingly be morally defective. In 
spite of this, Donnelly blindly maintains the cultural relativist defence that pockets of 
conceptual exclusion not only exist, but a few societies even hold ideological 
convictions that are entirely incompatible with the exercise of “universal” human 
rights. Therefore, radically universal human rights are unintelligible and inapplicable 
to those cultures that do not attach any moral significance to, or do not even possess, 
the necessary concepts of individuality and equality. As Donnelly puts it, 
“autonomous individuals are easily viewed as essentially equal. Basic equality, 
however, is likely to be an incoherent or incomprehensible notion when people are 
defined, as they usually are in traditional society, by ascriptive characteristics such as 
birth, age or sex.”63   
It is Donnelly’s fundamental premise that, “as a matter of historical fact… 
most non-western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice of human 
rights but the very concept”.64 On this reading one could be forgiven for thinking him 
a radical cultural relativist; however, he qualifies this position by saying that moral 
rule is derived from a “relatively universal”65 human nature. He accepts a universal 
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core of human nature only as far as saying that all human beings exist within certain 
fixed boundaries – we all share a common humanity defined by fixed psychological 
and biological limits. However, within this universal psychological and biological 
frame, humans have a tremendous potential to grow spiritually, culturally, and 
politically into beings that can be quite unfamiliar, repulsive, and even frightening to 
other humans. Donnelly emphasises the many differences and similarities that exist 
within the common humanity, taking them to be evidence of a relatively universal 
core of human nature: a fixed physiological and psychological framework reflects the 
universal aspect of human nature, while an essential relativity is retained owing to a 
potential for growth into markedly different people.   
Because humans all share in this relatively universal human nature, people 
also share similar fundamental interests that originate from this core, which Donnelly 
calls “central moral aspirations”.66 Donnelly takes human rights to be the most 
effective way a society can protect the fundamental interests or moral aspirations of 
the populace. When these basic interests are sufficiently protected, the people are said 
to lead a life that is worthy of humankind, or in Donnelly’s words, the people lead a 
“life of dignity”. Donnelly gives examples of central moral aspirations: “life, social 
order, protection from arbitrary rule, prohibition of inhumane and degrading 
treatment, the guarantee of a place in the life of a community, and access to an 
equitable share of the means of subsistence.”67  
Since moral aspiration is derived from a relatively universal human nature, it 
follows that these basic interests will also be socially relative, with different societies 
subscribing to different sets of aspirations. Moreover, because a life of dignity is 
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nothing more than a life of secured aspiration, conceptions of dignity are also relative 
to societies. In liberal democratic societies the concept of a life of dignity is protected 
and maintained by human rights, whereas in traditional Islamic African, Confucian 
Chinese, and Hindu Indian communities where the concept of human rights is 
purportedly unintelligible, dignity is protected and maintained by a diverse range of 
alternative institutional agreements such as religion, social hierarchies and family. 
These traditional societal practices are neither derivative nor correlative to rights, so 
this is why some traditional cultures appear to violate enumerated United Nations 
human rights, such as women’s rights to vote, while at the same time maintaining 
their own concept of female dignity through other means.68  
 
2b. (i): Enumerating a Human Rights List  
Typically, in order to catalogue and defend any particular list of human rights, 
philosophers must first identify and defend a particular conception of human nature to 
work with. Philosophers then proceed to show exactly how a chosen conception of 
human nature supports a chosen list of human rights. For example, to follow 
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy is to defend the Kantian self-governing individual as a 
model of human nature and explain how this nature reveals the “categorical 
imperative” or moral right. Alternatively, to accept a Hobbesian nature of self-
preservation requires proof as to how this nature reveals a negative formulation of 
“the golden rule”. In the following quotation, Donnelly refuses to adopt and defend 
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any comprehensive theory of human nature. As a result, he cannot directly defend a 
substantive rights list:  
[F]ew issues in moral and political philosophy are more 
contentious or intractable than theories of human nature. There are 
many well-developed and widely accepted philosophical 
anthropologies [and]… [e]ach of us probably has a favourite that, 
up to a certain point, we would defend. But there are few moral 
issues where discussion typically proves less conclusive. I doubt 
there is much really new that can be said in defence of any 
particular theory of human nature. I am certain that I have nothing 
significant to add.69   
 
Defence of an acceptable theory of human nature and defence of the manner in 
which human nature bestows and enumerates moral aspirations is an issue not taken 
up by Donnelly because he views such details of philosophical anthropology as 
beyond his role as a rights theorist. He does say that the human nature underlying his 
theory is “plausible and attractive”,70 but fails to provide specific details of how this is 
so. Owing to his ambiguity, there is no theoretical way of telling what aspirations 
man’s moral nature demands and no direct way for Donnelly to enumerate a workable 
list of human rights.  
In order to gain content for his theory, Donnelly acknowledges a 
comprehensive list of prima facie “universal” human rights, namely the various 
United Nations covenants and bills, which he indirectly adopts as content on the 
grounds that they are accepted and assented to by a majority of the global community. 
It must be understood that Donnelly does not expect these rights to range over all 
societies in all cases. He includes only those societies whose moral aspirations are 
similar enough to the Western Democratic tradition to have their particular conception 
                                                 
69 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice: 2nd Edition (London: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), p. 16-17 
70 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (London: Cornell University Press, 
1989), p. 21  
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of dignity sufficiently protected by the charters. This relatively universal 
interpretation of human rights allows limited local exceptions to international rights 
charters because of traditional ideologies that exclude the practice of human rights, 
while simultaneously maintaining human dignity in their own “less effective”71 
fashion. 
Donnelly contends that leaving the argument from dignity vague and 
insubstantial (or “empty” as he calls it) is “one of its great attractions”.72 This is 
because it leaves his position consistent with most theories of human nature, so long 
as they are compatible with human rights, without allying with any one particular 
theory and engaging in irresolvable debates on philosophical anthropology. Donnelly 
states that “[the argument from dignity] is thus able to provide (relatively) ‘neutral’ 
theoretical insight and guidance across (or within) a considerable range of 
positions.”73 Nonetheless, I must object that the theory is weakened by its inability to 
directly produce a rights list. After all, there is no point in providing a philosophical 
foundation of human rights if the argument fundamentally cannot say what rights 
those foundations support. 
 
2b. (ii): Objections to Human Dignity 
There is circularity in the argument from dignity that springs, not surprisingly, from 
Donnelly’s ill defined and poorly defended conception of human nature. Michael 
Freeman criticises the way Donnelly utilises an undefined and undefended theory of 
human nature to produce moral aspiration and dignity. Because of this flaw Donnelly 
is unable to derive a specific list of such aspirations and, in turn, is unable to produce 
                                                 
71 J. Donnelly, (1984), p. 314 
72 J. Donnelly, (1989), p. 23 
73 J. Donnelly, (2003), p. 17  
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a list of rights designed specifically to protect these human interests. Donnelly does 
not find this to be a problem, because there is an almost universal consensus on the 
best way to protect dignity – United Nations rights charters – which his theory can 
indirectly adopt. For Donnelly, the only reason that this consensus could possibly 
exist is because it derived from an almost universally accepted theory of human 
nature, which is undefined and under defended. Freeman concludes that “[t]he 
consensus is based on the theory. The theory is not defensible, but, to Donnelly, this is 
not a defect because there is a consensus. The circularity of this argument is vicious 
because Donnelly himself admits that both consensus and theory are weak.”74 The 
entire argument from dignity rests on the moral posit of human dignity while 
simultaneously refusing to acknowledge any account of man’s moral nature, so, as a 
result, his moral posit is neither justified nor adequately explained. 
In response to this objection, Donnelly emphasises that his argument is merely 
a description of human rights, as they are understood in the world today. He intends to 
answer the question “how do rights function in political and linguistic contexts?” not 
“how are human rights moral entities?” These are two entirely separate tasks. If the 
project is merely an analysis of how rights work he does not need to philosophically 
defend a theory of human nature. The above objection is sidestepped. If I allow that 
the project was intended as descriptive from the beginning, it is permissible to use a 
theory of human nature in the manner Donnelly does – more like an assumed axiom 
than an argued premise. As a result, however, his argument from dignity is non-
normative and cannot justify moral human rights. This change of tack is inconsistent 
to the great lengths he takes to argue the foundational importance of human dignity.  
                                                 
74 M. Freeman, (1994), p. 503   
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If this argument is designed truly as a descriptive argument, the argument 
from dignity cannot provide any reason as to why dignity is morally important and 
founds human rights, let alone explain why rights must be accepted as moral rule. As 
far as the indirect adoption of the United Nations content goes, Donnelly seems to 
think that a strong consensus in favour of a rule adds moral force to that rule, but this 
is against the entire point of human rights which have traditionally protected the 
individual against tyranny of the majority. On a descriptive account, just because 
there exists a list of rights that are accepted by a majority does not mean that those 
lists have moral force. Donnelly provides no consistent account of his own project and 
what he wishes to achieve. There are many passages in his text that explain his project 
as descriptive assessment of how rights work, but then he proceeds to give 
prescriptive arguments that attempt to found human rights in man’s relatively 
universal moral nature. If his goal were to formulate the argument from dignity in 
order to normatively justify human rights, then he has failed because he does not 
adequately explain and defend what he means by man’s moral nature. As a result, the 
argument from dignity is weak because it is impossible for him to directly give rights 
content. Any attempt to save the theory by reference to indirect content is circular. On 
the other hand, if he wishes to provide a merely descriptive account of the workings 
of human rights then he avoids the circularity problem because this analytic project 
does not require a full account of human moral nature. However, this evasion 
generates new problems as it provides no moral reason for the adoption of the United 
Nations lists and undermines his claim that dignity is the foundation of human rights. 
If his project is a descriptive account, in order to accept the reasoning that dignity 
founds moral rights he must show how those United Nations lists have moral force 
beyond consensus. 
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Without an appropriate understanding of human nature, Donnelly’s attempt to 
base rights in the recognition of human dignity fails. It seems that in some respects 
references to dignity are an attempt to emotively persuade the reader that rights are a 
noble cause worth upholding; a proverbial tug at the heart strings. If he intends 
dignity to be taken seriously as a foundation for human rights, a more rigorous 
defence is needed. I do, however, approve of Donnelly’s middle path of relatively 
weak universalism as a platform from which to view human rights. Rights are a social 
practice that the majority of humanity recognises, but there can still be legitimate 
exceptions. Out of a need to respect the ideologies of those “lower” moral 
communities who do not share the same moral aspirations of the Western Liberal 
Democratic tradition, human rights must be prima facie universal entities that allow 
these societies a strictly limited level of moral autonomy. In societies where a level of 
respect for human beings is maintained through alternative means such as religion or 
social hierarchy, it must be accepted that these rules can perform identical functions 
and achieve the same beneficial goals as human rights. The final theory I shall address 
is best understood from the philosophical standpoint of relatively weak universalism. 
In my opinion, the following needs based theory is one of the more successful 
attempts as it is a normative theory for the foundations of human rights which finds 
support in empirical science and evolutionary theory. Although it is proposed by the 
theorist in the flawed language of radical universalism, it is not incompatible with my 
favoured philosophical position of relatively weak universalism. 
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2c: Human Needs 
A man will fight harder for his interests than for his rights.  
Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
John O’Manique adopts a needs-based approach to found human rights, claiming that 
“[a] human right is a person’s moral claim to that which is needed for his or her 
development”.75 Many theorists in the past have taken a needs-based approach to 
morality by founding human rights directly on recognised need: Christian Bay, for 
example, claims that “needs establish human rights”76 and Reginald Green states that 
“need logically gives rise to a right”.77 The famous psychologist Abraham Maslow 
devised a hierarchical pyramid of need that ranked security of health as one of the 
most powerful categories of instinctive human need, second only to breathing, eating 
and sleeping. While reflecting on such basic needs, Maslow maintains that “it is 
legitimate and fruitful to regard instinctoid basic needs… as rights”.78  
It is necessary to carefully define what is meant by the term “need”, in order to 
exclude trivial claims that could be better described as “wants” or “preferences”. This 
is because the majority of needs cited by people are either not the type of needs that 
concern justice and morality, or do not translate successfully into the language of 
rights. An example could be if “X needs a flu vaccination”, then this could correlate 
to “X has a right to a flu vaccination”. On the other hand, “X needs a car” does not 
translate to “X has a right to a car”, in spite the fact that X finds himself in urgent 
                                                 
75 John O’Manique, Universal and Inalienable Rights: A Search for Foundations, Human Rights 
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need of transport. Norman Daniels calls for a “truncated” or “selective”79 needs 
criterion; meaning simply that all needs are not created equal and, as such, the 
criterion used for judging needs must be weighted to favour those that are morally 
relevant. In one well-anthologised paper, Thomas Scanlon suggests a distinction 
between subjective and objective needs, favouring only those needs that are 
objectively identifiable and objectively ascribable:  
“By an objective criterion I mean a criterion that provides a basis 
of appraisal of a person’s level of well-being which is independent 
of that person’s tastes and interests, thus allowing for the 
possibility that such an appraisal could be correct even though 
conflicted with the preferences of the individual in question”.80  
 
An objective criterion seems to be required to form a truncated scale of need; 
however, not all objective needs weigh equally with respect to justice. The need for a 
flu vaccination may be objectively ascribable to all people, but having said this, the 
needs of some immune-deficient groups such as the elderly will receive moral priority 
over younger, more flu-resistant groups. To decide a correct weighting of objective 
needs, Scanlon considers people’s motives and their “urgency” for needing such 
things – for comfort and status or health and protection against injury. Judging by 
motive and urgency, needs find their prioritised place on a truncated scale of need 
satisfaction.81 On a scale which is truncated to rank health needs, needs for flu 
vaccination are objectively more urgent than needs for fast cars, while vaccination of 
the frail elderly is objectively more urgent than vaccination of the strong and youthful.   
                                                 
79 N. Daniels, (1985), p. 25 
80 Thomas M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, Journal of Philosophy 72:19:1975:655-669, p. 658 
81 T. M. Scanlon, (1975), p. 660-661 
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Having concluded with Scanlon that it is proper to only consider objectively 
ascribable and objectively important needs, the needs theorist must now decide on an 
itemised list of such needs and place each need on a truncated scale according to 
urgency. One way of creating a truncated needs list is to appeal to empirical science to 
determine exactly what constitutes legitimate human need. This has resulted in lists 
with content such as “minimum quantities of protein, water, carbohydrates, heat, 
etc”,82 which is an empirically identifiable content that correlates to rights to those 
basic goods necessary for the maintenance of life. In contrast to the un-truncated 
needs criterion, this scientific criterion has the problem that it is far too restrictive to 
create a satisfactory needs list successfully. While those who propose the scientific 
needs criterion have no trouble in determining basic necessities for a minimum 
maintenance of life, using science in this way simply does not go far enough in 
determining the necessary conditions for a dignified life. If every human being 
secured minimum quantities of protein, water, carbohydrates, heat and so on, this still 
would be a far cry from providing a life that is worthy of a human being. Donnelly 
laments that “‘human needs’ is almost as obscure and controversial a notion as 
‘human nature’. Science reveals a list of empirically validated needs that will not 
generate anything even approaching an adequate list of human rights.”83 This concern 
is even echoed by one of the primary advocates of needs-based theories, Christian 
Bay, who agrees with Donnelly that “it is premature to speak of any empirically 
established needs beyond sustenance and safety”.84     
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84 Christian Bay, Human Needs and Political Education, In: R. Fitzgerald (ed.) Human Needs and 
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 58 
2c. (i): Survival and Development Needs 
The underlying problem with needs-based approaches is that they directly correlate a 
need to a human right, acknowledging objective need as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for human rights. Leaving the needs list un-truncated creates an over-
inflated rights list, while attempts to truncate the needs list by utilising a scientific 
needs criterion generates a human rights list that is too limited to secure a life worthy 
of a human being. O’Manique provides a novel twist to needs-based theories, arguing 
that only those needs which pertain to human survival and development can found 
rights. This approach recognises rights that fulfil scientifically ascertainable survival 
needs, such as a minimum quantity of essential nutrients, and also expands the 
criterion to include developmental needs, such as freedoms of expression, association, 
religious practice, and non-interference.  
Investigations into human rights conducted by governments, the United 
Nations, and assorted human rights scholars often connect the two concepts of human 
development and human rights. Development is described by the United Nations as 
both a process one may undergo while under the protection of rights and as a highly 
desirable goal and a right in itself. O’Manique states that “[development] is to change 
from what is to what is believed (by the individual or community) ought to be the 
case”;85 and elsewhere he defines development as “a process (of individual or 
community) of actualising what is believed… to be good.”86  
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This is similar in formulation to the definition used in the United Nations 1986 
Declaration on the Right to Development, which states that:  
“[D]evelopment is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and 
political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the 
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the 
basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in 
development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting 
therefrom.”87  
 
The health care system can easily be understood as an institution concerned 
with helping people survive. What is more, modern health care institutions are also 
intimately concerned with the development of patients and even the development of 
members of the wider healthy community. Medical practitioners not only help people 
to survive physiologically by treating debilitating ailments, but also provide 
rehabilitative, educational and social working services that aid people in their 
psychological, social and even spiritual development. 
By using this survival-development needs criterion, O’Manique finds no 
trouble in enumerating human needs and formulating a comprehensive and legitimate 
list of human rights similar, if not identical, to the United Nations declarations.88 He 
claims that this is because “all real needs, including those that relate to [development], 
are, at least in principle, empirically testable or can be inferred from empirically 
confirmed premises.”89 Basic requirements for the maintenance of life can easily be 
determined through biology, and human developmental needs can be ascertained 
through psychology and the social sciences. If a human need for haemodialysis, 
                                                 
87 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Declaration on the Right to Development, 
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88 J. O’Manique, (1992), p. 84   
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primary education, or non-interference in life and liberty can be empirically 
determined to be necessary for survival and development, then, according to 
O’Manique, that particular survival and development need correlates to a basic human 
right. 
 
2c. (ii): Evading Logical Fallacy 
O’Manique recognises that many philosophers who have attempted to ground human 
rights have encountered problems in their attempts to make descriptions logically 
entail prescriptions.90 As a result, he does not attempt to make needs logically entail 
rights, but still provides an empirical formula for identifying valid rights claims. In 
keeping with the law of David Hume that it is a logical fallacy to deduce an “ought” 
from “is”, O’Manique is not trying to prove that normative rights claims can be 
logically deduced from empirical survival and development needs. O’Manique goes 
to great lengths to point out that “[t]his is not one more useless attempt to derive 
ought from is; there is no logical connection here.”91 The truth of a rights claim 
cannot be proven nor denied in any empirical sense, nor deduced logically from the 
existence of needs. Whether a person possesses survival or development needs is a 
                                                 
90 Most notably see Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 
for his attempt to ground a universal moral principle – “Act in accord with the generic rights of your 
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own generic rights, Gewirth cannot logically universalise these reasons so they apply with equal force 
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induced from prudential descriptive facts. For example, if “Y is a good” and “I ought to have X as it is 
necessary for my having Y” and “A ought to have X as it is necessary for his having Y”; in spite of 
Gewirth’s insistence, this does not logically entail a moral obligation for me to aid or refrain from 
hindering A’s accruement of X. 
91 J. O’Manique, (1990), p. 475 
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matter best established empirically, independently of any considerations of human 
rights. In this way, the acceptability of any entry into human rights lists can be tested 
by correlating it to a need; normative claims for goods are valid as long as the claim 
(right to health care) corresponds to empirically determinable developmental or 
survival needs (need for health care). As O’Manique correctly points out in the 
following quotation, throughout his theory normative assumptions remain logically 
distinct from any empirical considerations: 
Since a right corresponds to a need whose validity can be tested 
empirically, any statement that identifies the object of a right is 
empirical. The assertion that I have a right is normative, but the 
statement that the right is to do or have X is empirical. The validity 
of entries on a list of rights can be empirically tested. If no such test 
can be conceived, at least in principle, then it would follow that the 
claim is not justified.92     
 
2c. (iii): Objections and Qualifications 
This is the most cogent argument so far presented as it is simple to follow, avoids the 
pitfalls of the previous theories, and does not over-expand the realm of valid rights 
claims beyond that already accepted by the United Nations. The theory has generated 
a minimal amount of peer criticism and I find that only one minor objection warrants 
discussion. I shall conclude by discussing some sceptical concerns about foundations. 
O’Manique claims to be basing a theory of universal and inalienable human 
rights on the good of survival and development and explicitly states that he is 
adopting the radically universal position that “all humans have rights in the same way 
and to the same extent regardless of their race, culture, political system or any other 
                                                 
92 J. O’Manique, (1990), p. 477 
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distinction.”93 If this is his position, then the theory is open to Donnelly’s objection 
that radically universal human rights deny the ethical autonomy of some non-western 
cultures. What is more, it is arguable that the theory is contradictory in thinking that 
rights claims can be made by cultures which do not understand fundamental concepts 
necessary for the making of such claims. As stated in the above argument from 
dignity, I find these objections damning to the radically universal position; however, I 
am unsure as to whether O’Manique’s theory is truly radically universal. This is 
because radically universal human rights must be based on a radically universal good 
– which O’Manique identifies as survival and development needs – but he then goes 
on to contradict his previous statement by claiming that this need is not strictly 
universal: “The belief that survival is good is virtually universal[;]… found, explicitly 
or implicitly, in almost all human beings.”94 He then goes on to explain how there 
exist exceptions to this so-called “universal” need for survival, such as “[t]hose who 
sacrifice their own lives for the lives of others, or for a ‘higher life’ in a religious 
context.”95 This is not the language of a radical universalist; in fact, this is exactly the 
language used by Donnelly when he described his own position of relatively strong 
universalism. It is clear that O’Manique is confused as to the degree of universality 
his foundations possess. I suggest, however, that in order to answer Donnelly’s 
objection that rights are unintelligible to limited non-western cultures, O’Manique 
must revert to the weaker position of relatively strong universalism. In this way, the 
theory can continue reasonably unscathed, allowing limited traditional societies their 
own methods of ensuring that survival and development needs are fulfilled, while the 
Western world can adopt a rights-based approach to need satisfaction.  
                                                 
93 J. O’Manique, (1990), p. 477 
94 J. O’Manique, (1990), p. 473, Italics mine. 
95 J. O’Manique, (1990), p. 473 
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O’Manique succeeds where others fail as he utilises a needs-based criterion 
rather than adopting a highly contested theory of human nature to derive content, 
while at the same time including the notion of development. Development provides a 
criterion of need that avoids giving too small a claim on goods and avoids an over-
inflation of relevant needs. In his 1992 paper, he compiles a list of human rights 
produced solely on the basis of this theory that is identical, bar one or two articles, to 
the UDHR charter.96 One rather important benefit of this theory is that it does not 
attempt to bridge the is-ought gap, but still provides a means of validating the “ought” 
conclusion by “is” considerations. As a result, the existence of human rights is not 
logically linked to empirical science, but there still is convincing reason for accepting 
their moral conclusion. As theoretical misunderstanding can easily spill over into 
problematic practical implementation, high standards such as human rights require 
strong foundations supported by even stronger argument. For some, nothing short of 
direct logical proof will justify the high moral standard imposed by human rights; 
however, this search for strictly logical foundations will always result in aporia so 
long as fundamental terms such as “human nature”, “universality” or even “equality” 
are contentious. Even if convincing moral arguments can be put forward as to how 
humans ought to act, as a study of Donnelly and O’Manique has shown, lists of 
human rights can only be indirectly supported by empirical argument owing to 
“Hume’s Guillotine”. I believe the best philosophers can hope for are arguments that 
indirectly produce some consent as to why rights must be respected, but which 
provide no logical proof exactly why dictates of human rights must be accepted. As a 
result, the theoretical disputation is inconclusive and many human rights activists or 
governments may be left without solid reasons for why they act as they do.  
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There are some non-foundational philosophers who hold that, owing to the 
chimerical nature of foundational appeals, the entire quest is paradoxical and results 
in infinite regress. Their argument is similar to the “first cause” or “unmoved mover” 
argument found in the philosophy of religion. Foundationalists operate on the premise 
that every theory or practice has a foundation, but once they discover what appears to 
be the ultimate foundation of the practice in question, they completely drop this 
motivating assumption and assume that there exist no further reasons beyond this 
“ultimate” principle. In order to be consistent, the motivating assumption that “all 
principles have foundations” must be retained, resulting in a futile search of infinite 
regress. There is another variation of this objection, which argues that the 
foundationalist’s task is self-defeating. Hypothetically, if foundationalism ever 
succeeds in discovering an ultimate Foundation (F) of a practice, this means that 
foundationalists are accepting the rule that there exist principles in the world, namely 
F, that do not require foundations. If this rule is applicable to F, then it must also 
apply to the initial practice they are trying to found, that is, human rights. Therefore, 
by accepting the possibility of an ultimate foundation for human rights, philosophers 
are also accepting the possibility that rights themselves do not require a foundation. 
These objections are so clever that they can even be turned against the non-
foundationalist. If there are no ultimate foundations, then there are no good reasons 
for accepting any principles whatsoever, even those principles held by the non-
foundationalist. Therefore, no good reason exists for accepting the non-
foundationalist position in preference to the foundationalist position.  
Non-foundationalist objections can be taken in two ways. Either there exists 
human rights, but there is no method of proving or explaining their dictates beyond 
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morally arbitrary social convention or unsupported belief; or, as the nihilistic Alasdair 
MacIntyre maintains in the following quotation, there are no reasons for following 
human rights because there are no such entities:  
[F]or the truth is plain: there are no such rights, and belief in them 
is one with belief in witches and in unicorns. The best reason for 
asserting so bluntly that there are no such rights is indeed of 
precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess for 
asserting that there are no witches and the best reason which we 
possess for asserting that there are no unicorns: every attempt to 
give good reasons for believing that there are such rights has 
failed…. Natural or human rights then are fictions – just as is 
utility – but fictions with highly specific properties.97 
 
It is problematic for human rights theory that no foundation can be absolutely, 
objectively, or logically true; however, philosophers definitely possess a good deal of 
descriptive knowledge about human rights, fictitious or not. When human practices 
correspond to these descriptions and countries are run according to their dictates, it is 
an understatement to say that the “highly specific properties” of human rights promote 
a great amount of good and prosperity by thwarting the designs of villainy. It is for 
this reason that the human rights cause is not abandoned, in spite of foundational 
troubles.  
 
2d: Summary and Conclusions of the Foundational Section 
In this chapter I have demonstrated a general normative framework, balanced in part 
by empirical considerations, of what a successful foundational theory may look like. 
god and culture are not readily available as moral sources, so the initial orientation for 
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theorising about human rights must not be radically universal or radically relative. 
Donnelly’s position of relatively strong universalism serves my purpose well as it 
avoids the respective problems of moral nihilism and Western moral imperialism over 
cultures. Donnelly seems correct in saying that any rights theory that relies on a 
particular conception of human nature often becomes bogged down with “intractable” 
and “inconclusive”98 discussion. In order to derive an acceptable content of human 
rights I feel it is best to avoid speculation about human nature, arguing instead that 
correct lists correlate to the fulfilment of survival and development needs. Although I 
am not rejecting the possibility of ever bridging Hume’s logical gap, philosophers 
must be wary of attempts to justify prescriptive conclusions with descriptive premises. 
A successful theory requires normative premises to give human rights their moral 
force. These premises must be supported by, yet are logically independent of, 
empirical considerations. O’Manique succeeds in achieving this, as he provides a 
foundational theory that is purely prescriptive, yet supported independently by 
biology and the social sciences. O’Manique has even gone so far as to use his theory 
to formulate a list of survival and development needs that match almost identically the 
various United Nations rights charters. This means that the theory will be in keeping 
with Donnelly’s requirement of a relatively universal consensus on both the existence 
of human rights and their enumeration in international law. None of what I have said 
so far is incompatible with the current expression and wording of the United Nations 
Rights charters, as the fulfilment of survival and development needs will satisfactorily 
protect and maintain the inherent dignity of humankind.  
 
                                                 
98 J. Donnelly, (2003), p 16-17 
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Chapter Three: Distributing Health Care 
3: Introduction: The Role of Distributive Justice 
Protecting the rights of even the least individual among us is basically the only 
excuse the government has for even existing.  
Ronald Reagan 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, philosophers who strive to uncover foundations 
for human rights work with premises that attempt to explain the inherent value of a 
norm. Although this allows an understanding of why rights are significant entities, 
these principles are unable to direct public policy because they are concerned 
primarily with individuals, lacking the specifics needed to deal with larger societies. If 
a society were to distribute resources according to O’Manique’s moral dictate to 
satisfy human survival and development needs, needs for health care, education, civil 
defence, and housing will all come into irreconcilable competition with one another. 
Human needs are often prohibitively expensive to satisfy when demanded 
simultaneously as positive rights, so it follows that not all of them can be maximally 
realised within a society beset by resource scarcity. The prima facie nature of positive 
rights allows the legitimate trade off of one right against the other, satisfying those 
“more important” rights first. What is more, some situations may even require a trade-
off between human rights and the greater public good, and because foundational 
theories always give an overriding priority to human needs, foundational theorists are 
unable to decide which particular needs are to be sacrificed or “trumped”99 for a large 
gain in utility.  
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Foundational theories inform us that satisfying needs by way of rights is 
morally important, but they provide no way of telling which particular rights are to 
receive priority given real world situations of conflict and scarcity. Tristram 
Engelhardt, former editor of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, laments that 
the concept of an inalienable and universal human right to health care is reduced to a 
cliché, although an important one.100 He goes on to say that the interesting theoretical 
question is not so much whether there exists a universal and inalienable right to health 
care or how this right is founded within moral systems, but what limits are there on 
the obligation to provide health care? It is arguable that people are justified in 
claiming a right to health care only if it can be harvested from an acceptable theory of 
distributive justice; because, if there are no substantial mechanisms to allocate 
medical care, then the right to receive medical care is reduced to impractical rhetoric. 
Some philosophers have even gone so far as to argue that a right to health care is 
unintelligible, even as abstract theory, without a particular distributive framework in 
which to view it.101 Issues of distributive justice are present even if the existence of 
positive human rights is denied. So long as there is a general recognition that services 
such as health care are good for a society, a theory of distributive justice is required to 
explain how they can best be achieved. It is for these reasons that an investigation into 
human rights must not only explain why rights are morally important, but also provide 
an acceptable theory of distribution that illustrates the fairest method of maximally 
satisfying restrictively expensive human needs. 
                                                                                                                                            
Dworkin’s words “a goal of special urgency”, can overrule rights on occasion. See: Hard Cases, 
Harvard Law Review, 88:6:1975:1057-1109, p. 1069 and Taking Rights Seriously, (London: 
Duckworth, 1977), p. xi-xii 
100 Tristram Engelhardt jnr., Rights to Health Care: A Critical Appraisal, Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 4:2:1979:113-117, p. 113 
101 N. K. Bell, (1979), pp. 158-169 
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It is helpful to first make a distinction between macro-allocation and micro-
allocation, as discussed by Norman Daniels.102 Micro-allocation decides appropriate 
funding between competing treatments or facilities within the health care institution. 
Macro-allocation, on the other hand, is more complicated; deciding which 
institutional services should be available in a society, who can access the services and 
on what basis, and deciding who should pay for the services. I shall begin by arguing 
in favour of a mechanism for micro-allocation that is currently in use across the globe; 
distribution by Quality Adjusted Life Years. Following this, a discussion of Macro-
allocation health policy leads to the rejection of utility maximisation and the rejection 
of a preponderant reliance on privatised insurance markets. These approaches are 
rejected because neither one ensures an efficient access to the health care institution 
for all who require it, also neither of these mechanisms distribute with an aim to 
satisfy objectively defined medical needs.103 This paper shall then proceed in Chapter 
Four to address two, more promising, theories of distributive justice that are 
compatible with the needs-based foundation of rights; egalitarianism and justice as 
fairness. Given the associated drawbacks of all four theories discussed, I shall 
conclude by suggesting a two tier blend of private marketplace and governmental 
egalitarian allocation, designed by me to create a fair and equal distribution of health 
care in a community.  
 
 
 
                                                 
102 N. Daniels, (1985), p. 2 
103 Utilitarianism will meet basic human interests if and only if doing so will achieve the primary goal 
of utility maximisation, while a laissez-faire market distributes in accordance with personal income and 
wealth. 
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3a: Utilitarianism 
It seems natural to begin with an assessment of utilitarian distribution since this is 
already a surprisingly dominant principle for medical distribution in medical systems 
in the developed world. Generally speaking, a utilitarian health policy will state that 
justice demands the maximisation of the greatest good for the greatest number. 
Society has the strict obligation to prevent and treat ailments because doing so brings 
about a greater balance of benefits when weighed against the costs of providing a 
health care system, or the costs associated with ignoring the health concerns of 
society. Since it is a serious problem that many positive rights are too expensive to 
realise fully, a cost-benefit assessment such as this seems ideally situated to allocate 
resources and maximally satisfy rights in the most efficient manner. 
As seen above, it is arguable that the right to health care exists as a means of 
satisfying basic human needs. Utilitarian calculations do not strictly run in accordance 
with this right because the entire point of a utilitarian medical system is to promote 
the greatest good to the greatest number, not specifically to satisfy medical needs. If 
overriding utility could be gained by sending funds elsewhere, then a utilitarian 
system would not satisfy medical survival and development needs. In fact, if enough 
utility could be produced by acting otherwise, it would be unjust to distribute 
resources in order to satisfy these needs. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of 
situations, the satisfaction of medical needs is a utility maximising activity, so the 
theory will be most likely to advocate a health care system; not directly for the end of 
satisfying medical needs, but indirectly for the end of utility maximisation. In this 
way, rule-utilitarianism supports, or is at least is compatible with, the human right to 
health care because the recognition of this right is often a utility promoting activity.  
 71 
Particularly in the United States, on a micro-allocative level, the cost-benefit 
measure is institutionalised rule: medical decisions are regularly made after a 
complicated balancing of benefits and costs. This is because health care economists 
can easily compare similar surgical procedures or pharmaceutical options by looking 
at the numerical dollar value versus the number of people positively affected. It is 
possible to see utility-type calculations in use in health care distribution within the 
military. Frontline paramedics in the heat of battle are instructed to treat the slightly 
wounded before the critically wounded, because limited medical resources are better 
spent turning around five lightly wounded soldiers who will return to combat, rather 
than hospitalising one who will never fight again.104 The same policy applies to 
treatment in the event of nuclear catastrophe; a policy of the greatest good for the 
greatest number means treating those with a higher chance of survival in preference to 
treating the seriously injured, or even allowing surgeons of high social utility into the 
bomb shelter before tobacconists.105 A simple case of utilitarian number crunching 
occurred when the UK health board distributed resources for a steroid contraceptive 
pill estimated to cause embolisms in 14 users for every million. The drug was 
distributed on the grounds that deaths resulting from childbirth were 228 per million 
pregnancies; a number the pill would ultimately reduce at a fraction of the cost.106  
There is a notorious objection to the utility approach that it requires a 
comparative figure to be placed on the numerous costs and benefits associated with 
weighing moral decisions. It is easy in theory to say “60 utility units outweigh 40 
disutility units, therefore the benefits outweigh the costs”, but such ethical arithmetic 
                                                 
104 Joseph Fletcher, Ethics and Health Care Delivery: Computers and Distributive Justice, In: R. Veatch 
and R. Branson (eds.) Ethics and Health Policy, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976) p. 105 
105 J. Fletcher, (1976), p. 105 
106 J. Fletcher, (1976), p. 106 
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does not easily translate to real life situations. For example, in times of scarcity it is 
uncertain whether it is a disutility to redirect funds from chemotherapy to improve 
radiotherapy facilities. Furthermore, any predictions made about future costs and 
benefits, and the consequences of action in general, are often inaccurate and vary 
according to the outlook of the person who predicts. In response to these troubles, 
authorities have formulated admittedly rough calculations for “quantifying 
qualities”107 on both the micro-allocative and macro-allocative level.  
 
3a. (i): Utilitarian Micro-allocation 
On the level of micro-allocation, the main criterion used to assess the benefits of 
medical procedures is the metric of the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY). This 
takes the estimated number of years a medical procedure will bring to a patient and 
multiplies by a quality assessment of those years to produce a QALY number. One 
year at full quality is 1.0, one year at less than full quality ranges from 0.9 to 0.1, and 
death or an equivalent state equals 0.0. On this scale, for example, a year of mild 
angina receives a 0.9, insulin dependent diabetes is 0.58, while being blind, deaf or 
dumb is 0.39.108 The QALY figure for any particular ailment is established by 
surveying those people affected by the medical condition and averaging their 
subjective assessment of quality of life. Subjective assessments such as these 
eliminate problems associated with classical utilitarianism, concerning the accuracy 
and legitimacy of evaluating future consequences. Moreover, the QALY metric looks 
at a patient’s post-treatment prospects as a way of assessing the cost-effectiveness of 
                                                 
107 J. Fletcher, (1976), p. 106 
108 Andrew J. Wang, Key Concepts in Evaluating Outcomes of A.T.P. Funding of Medical 
Technologies Journal of Technology Transfer 23:2:1998:61-65; also at The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, “Key Concepts in Evaluating Outcomes of A.T.P. Funding of Medical 
Technologies” <http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/jtt/wang.htm> (15th of January, 2007) 
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competing treatments, not to prioritise between the specific needs of competing 
individuals. If two cancer patients are awaiting treatment, the number of QALYs will 
decide between chemotherapy (which could give 3 years at 0.36 QALYs) and 
radiotherapy (giving 4 years at 0.3 QALYs). The metric does not decide which of the 
two patients will be treated. It is therefore strongly impersonal and mitigates the 
influence of morally arbitrary factors such as age, social class, race or religion on 
resource distribution. Having a medical need qualifies a patient to enter the medical 
system and then the QALY calculation decides the most cost-effective treatment for 
the patient.  
The post-treatment QALY benefits are compared to the costs associated with 
the medical procedure. Costs are ideally considered broadly, such as the impact on 
family or community, but unfortunately are too often narrowly assessed according to 
the dollar value of treatment. Before a comparison of financial costs versus QALY 
benefits can take place, the numerical QALY figure must be converted into monetary 
terms; or in other words, health economists must discover how much money one year 
at 1.0 quality, or part thereof, is worth. It may sound cold and callous, but in order to 
achieve this economists first calculate the dollar value that a particular society places 
on an entire human life of full quality. A hypothetical situation is proposed to a 
sample community of 100,000 people, in which they are told that one individual from 
within the group faces immediate death. The identity of this person is left anonymous: 
it is explained to group members that this person could be their neighbour, a family 
member, a complete stranger or even themselves. The sample group is then surveyed 
as to how much money each individual is willing to pay in order to save the life of the 
unidentified person. If the population responds that they will spend on average $50 
each to reduce the chance of death in the community by 1 in 100,000, then this is 
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statistically equivalent to one person spending $50 to reduce their own chance of 
death by 1 in 100,000. Therefore, if each person in the community is on average 
willing to pay $50 for a 1 in 100,000 reduction in the risk of death over his or her 
lifetime, then this means that the dollar value this particular community places on a 
full human life at 1.0 QALY is $50 x 100,000 = $5 million. When an otherwise 
healthy forty-year-old man goes in for an operation that will enable him to live a full 
life to the male average of 76 years old, the procedure is creating a benefit of 36 years 
at 1.0 QALYs. With a full quality complete life valued at $5 million, each year of the 
man’s life that is created has the monetary value of $5 million÷ 36 = $139,000. 
Keeping in mind that QALYs are not designed to prioritise patients, but rather the 
funding of treatments, if the cost of this operation is more than $139,000, then this 
means the resources can be used more efficiently pursuing other treatment options.109  
 
3a. (ii): Objections to a Utilitarian Micro-allocation 
I do not mean to over-simplify the issue. Although this approach is frequently used, 
the accuracy and appropriateness of QALYs is heavily debated and intimately tied to 
long-standing dilemmas of the classical utilitarian calculus.110 Andrew Edgar 
describes a hypothetical situation where there are two competing procedures, with 
funds either being allocated to a treatment that keeps patients alive for sixty years at a 
very low figure of 0.1, or a treatment that keeps patients alive for five years at 0.9. 
                                                 
109 A. J. Wang, (1998) p. 65 
110 For my analysis I follow: Andrew Edgar, Sam Salek, Darren Shickle and David Cohen, The Ethical 
QALY: Ethical Issues in Healthcare Resource Allocation, (Haslemere, U.K.: Euromed 
Communications, 1998); however, the main arguments are replicated almost identically in most other 
publications concerning QALYs. For similar discussions see: Michael Lockwood, Quality of life and 
Resource Allocation, In: J. Bell and S. Mendus (eds.), Philosophy and Medical Welfare, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); and John McKie, Jeff Richardson, Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, 
The Allocation of Health Care Resources: An Ethical Evaluation of the Q.A.L.Y Approach, (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1998). 
 75 
Because the QALY metric rules in favour of treatments which maximise life years 
multiplied by quality, the multiplication of these fractions results in the former 
treatment receiving priority. This means that, according to the QALY approach, an 
extremely long life in a vegetative coma is preferable to a shorter life as a fully-
productive member of society. This conclusion is repugnant, since all would agree 
that being in a vegetative coma is undesirable compared with being a fully-
functioning and productive member of society, regardless of the amount of time spent 
in either condition. This discussion is similar to Mill’s argument of quality 
outweighing quantity considerations in a hedonistic utilitarian calculus:  
Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the 
lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s 
pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, 
no instructed person would be an ignoramus… It is better to be a 
human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.111 
 
Just as no quantity of animalistic pleasure outweighs the higher quality of 
being human, no quantity of comatose years will outweigh the higher quality of a 
fully-functioning life, regardless of its length. “Superficially at least,” Edgar argues, 
“QALYs do not appear to be designed to make the sort of discriminations required in 
order to decide the point of discontinuity between biographical [with a life plan] and 
merely biological life.”112 In keeping with the public consultation theme inherent in 
QALYs, as a partial solution Edgar suggests that the public decide which conditions 
constitute a biographical or merely biological existence. As a guideline, if no amount 
of money spent on a condition will ever return the patient to a positive quality of life, 
then the public must assign the condition a low score that ranges, for example, from 
                                                 
111 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, In: G. Sher (ed) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), pp. 9-10  
112 A. Edgar et al, (1998), p. 72 
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0.0 to 0.15. This serves as a point of discontinuity, with so-called “death-like-states” 
below a quality threshold of 0.15 not warranting continued treatment or arguably life-
support, regardless of the number of years that could be spent at this level. Quality 
levels above this threshold will justify treatment. According to the QALY scale 
suitably revised, a long life at low quality will no longer be preferable to a short life at 
high quality. 
There are, however, other objections that are not as easily answered by a 
reference to public opinion. If faced with the funding of two treatments that cost the 
same – one that brings a person back to full health, or another the treats ten people to 
1/10th health – the multiplication of values becomes equal with no numerical 
difference between the two. Because QALYs cater to the utilitarian notion that the 
healthier life will produce a richer array of experiences and utility than could ever be 
achieved by the ten unhealthy lives, the advocates of the QALYs system will sacrifice 
ten lower quality lives to save one superior quality life. The same can be said of 
competing procedures that, all other things being equal, either treats ten people to 
survive for one year each, or treats one person to survive for 10 years. Utilitarians will 
deem this sacrifice of the majority a necessary outcome of maximisation and a 
demand of justice. It seems to be a correct objection that the QALYs approach fails to 
show adequate reverence for human life, lacking a respect for sanctity of life that 
must be inherent in any just distribution of health care.113   
Finally, it is a valid complaint that QALYs have an inbuilt bias towards 
funding treatments for younger people. This is because the funding of treatments for 
20 year olds will clearly produce more QALYs than treatments for 80 year olds; or, 
reductio ad absurdum, treatments for a 19 year old will create more QALYs than 
                                                 
113 A. Edgar et al, (1998), p. 66 
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treatment for a 20 year old.114 It is, however, a convincing reply that, when scarce 
medical resources are being allocated, it is not necessarily unjust to give preference to 
the younger generation, considering the fact that the elderly have already had their so-
called “fair-innings”115 of years. Lewis, Charney and Farrow116 cite a study where 
respondents were asked to distribute medical care between two patients with identical 
ailments, one aged 5 and another 70 years. 94% responded that they would give the 
child priority. When the ages were brought closer together, distributing to a 35-year-
old or a 60-year-old, 80% gave preference to the younger patient. The closer the ages 
became the harder it was for respondents to decide, with a majority of 46% being 
unable to choose between a 2 year old and an 8 year old. Based on this study, it can be 
concluded that rationing to the younger generation out of respect for fair-innings is 
commonsense morality, supported by a majority of the public.  
It has been argued in the past that any favouritism when rationing medical 
resources wrongs the unfavoured group, simply because they are denied access to 
medical resources.117 For those who subscribe to the above position, QALYs will 
inevitably wrong patients because it is a rationing technique; however, QALY’s 
favouring of the young only wrongs the elderly once, while if it were to favour the 
elderly it would wrong the younger generation twice. In other words, if we do not 
favour the younger generation, not only will the young be wronged by a system that 
denies them access to medical care, but also they will be wronged a second time by 
                                                 
114 Because QALYs are designed to compare treatment options, not individuals, this reduction to 
absurdity can only work if we are choosing between two treatments, one designed specifically for 19 
year olds and another designed specifically for 20 year olds. While it is true that there is an inbuilt age 
bias, the reduction is correct iff we grant the existence of these unlikely treatment options.    
115 A. Edgar et al, (1998), p. 67 
116 M. C. Charny, P.A. Lewis and S. C. Farrow, Choosing Who Shall Not be Treated in the NHS, 
Social Science and Medicine, 28:12:1989:1331-1338, pp. 1333-1336 
117 Robert Veatch is a proponent of this view, arguing that rationing techniques such as waiting lists 
and lotteries violate an individual’s right to equal treatment. Robert Veatch, What is a “Just” Health 
Care Delivery?, In: R. Veatch and R. Branson (eds.), Ethics and Health Policy, (Cambridge: Ballinger 
Publishing Co., 1976), p. 141 
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being deprived of a fair innings. Because the elderly have already enjoyed their fair 
innings, they will only receive the single injustice of being denied access to medical 
care. If we are in a position where we must choose between two competing 
treatments, QALY’s favouritism towards the younger generation allows youth the 
same opportunities that the elderly have already enjoyed. What is more, to go against 
this commonsense position may serve a double-injustice to the younger generation. 
Regrettably, owing to constraints of space I can only scratch the surface of this 
debate which has roots spanning over two and a half centuries. I must conclude that 
the QALYs approach is theoretically defensible and a useful tool for conducting cost-
benefit assessments of micro-allocation; however, by itself it is by no means a 
solution to controlling the expensive costs that obstruct fair and just health care 
distribution. Particularly in the USA, the price of health care has skyrocketed owing 
to corruption and fraud within the system. There is also an artificial inflation of the 
price of health care because of a large reliance on privatised insurance markets. A 
constant fear of malpractice lawsuits forces doctors to practise so-called “defensive 
medicine”; needlessly duplicating expensive tests and treatments. What is more, 
competing hospitals perceive a need to keep up with the latest “big-ticket” 
technology, replacing satisfactory equipment with the latest model each year. Such 
issues surrounding the uncontrollable costs of health care are discussed in detail in the 
following section on free-market allocation; suffice to say, these are largely problems 
of macro-allocation that the micro-allocation assessment of QALYs cannot resolve on 
its own. I endorse the QALY assessment within micro-allocation spheres, and as such, 
the remaining bulk of this paper shall discuss the wider sphere of macro-allocation. 
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3a. (iii): Utilitarian Macro-allocation 
On the larger scale utilitarian macro-allocation, the benefits of spending X amount on 
the health care institution are weighed against the costs of not spending X on 
alternative goods such as civil defence or education, or the costs to society’s health of 
sending the funds elsewhere. Familiar problems with utility calculations concerning 
how moral mathematicians establish numbers are not necessarily relevant to the 
macro-allocation of health care, because most societies have readily available health 
statistics on all relevant indicators, such as infant mortality, average life expectancy, 
days of hospitalisation, and morbidity by disease. In this way, mathematical morality 
is less problematic in the realm of health care ethics than it is in other fields of 
morality, as difficult ethical problems can be solved in a formulaic manner. For 
example, a new hospital costs $10,000,000 to install, $850,000 per annum to operate, 
is accessible to 55% of the population, treats 50,000 patients per annum at an average 
cost of $400 each, resulting in average QALYs of 0.75: these are familiar terms for 
health economists who devise complicated equations for finding the maximising 
moral course.  
On face value, the utilitarian goal of maximising the health of the greatest 
number at the least cost is workable because cost benefit analysis such as this is 
currently implemented around the world, albeit with questionable success in 
achieving the goal of maximal coverage and quality. Having said that, public health 
policy is never pure utilitarian calculus but often a Frankenstein’s monster of differing 
ideologies and distributional principles, so perhaps it is arguable that a more 
wholehearted adoption of the utilitarian calculus will provide more success in the 
realm of maximal coverage and quality. The famous situational ethicist, Joseph 
Fletcher, proposes that “somehow we must learn to program computers with 
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preference questions”118, suggesting a purely utilitarian macro-allocation health policy 
that will ideally be dictated by what can only be described as a maximisation 
machine; a super computer that will “quantify qualities”119, programmed with all the 
relevant distributional facts and societal health figures to calculate the most cost 
effective distribution of resources amongst the sick. 120  
Given the questionable assumption that such a hypothetical machine is 
workable and can successfully achieve a maximal distribution of quality health care to 
the greatest number, the issue of desirability is most telling. Egalitarian thinker Robert 
Veatch believes that utilitarian calculations are undesirable because a strict cost-
benefit criterion will require caps on expenditure and limitations on services that will 
inevitably prevent many people from returning to a level of health equal to others. 
This allocation is incompatible with Veatch’s strict equality principle that “justice 
requires [that] everyone has a claim to health care needed to provide an opportunity 
for a level of health equal, as far as possible, to other persons’ health.”121 
Furthermore, just as utility calculations could deem it wasteful for a health care 
system to provide genetic therapy, nuclear powered hearts, or cryogenics, it is 
possible that a cost benefit calculation could deem it never cost-efficient to provide a 
health care system. This would dramatically increase the level of inequality within 
society. Libertarians such as Robert Nozick will also find utilitarian assessments 
undesirable as there is always the possibility that a calculation will restrict an 
individual’s freedom if there are sufficient gains to be made for society. Furthermore, 
Nozick would find it problematic that Peter Singer weighed up the benefits and 
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120 J. Fletcher, (1976), p. 104 and p. 108 
121 R. M. Veatch, (1976), p. 134  
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drawbacks of a medical marketplace – a non-patterned distributive mechanism 
favoured by Nozick – and compared it to the patterned alternative of a taxpayer-
funded national health plan, with the result that the latter system produced a greater 
balance of benefits over costs for the community.122 Although these are not strictly 
objections against utilitarianism, it is worth noting that these positions are not 
compatible with one another, as the institution favoured by Singer’s reasoning puts 
utilitarianism at odds with libertarianism, and the toleration of unhealthy citizens 
defies Veatch’s egalitarian thinking.    
 
3a. (iv): Objections to a Utilitarian Macro-allocation 
Utilitarian health policy is susceptible to the old objection that calculations demand 
the intuitively undesirable sacrifice of an individual or group of individuals if a 
sufficiently high gain can be made to offset the sacrifice. Robert Veatch considers a 
hypothetical board of utilitarian public planners who feed all the relevant health data 
into Fletcher’s maximisation machine. In this hypothetical society, there exists a small 
underclass (0.1% of society) of poor, unemployed, uneducated, brain-damaged and 
chronically unhealthy citizens who consume a disproportionately large slice of 
taxpayer-funded health care. The maximisation computer will propose the policy of 
cutting service to these people, with the inevitable result of killing off sections of the 
underclass, thus improving statistics in the social measures of health (morbidity not 
mortality). The health plan also involves identifying the healthiest 10% of society and 
encouraging them to reproduce, further improving morbidity statistics. Veatch 
contends that “the harm of death is critical and must be added to the calculation of 
                                                 
122 Peter Singer, Freedoms and Utilities in the Distribution of Health Care, In: R. Veatch and R. 
Branson (eds.), Ethics and Health Policy, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 175-193 
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goods and harms. Non-health harms also might have to be taken into account, such as 
social malaise or rebellion”.123 The harm of a rights violation could even be included, 
since rule-utilitarianism endorses the right to protection from arbitrary loss of life and 
liberty. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine a system that produces huge benefits 
and to imagine similar ways of reducing the harms: aside from the obvious financial 
gains from restricting treatment, organs of the deceased underclass could be 
transplanted to those in need, or the system could be organised so the majority of 
those banned would be vicious criminals sentenced to death. “It is conceivable”, 
Veatch concludes, “that even after these [harms] are added in, banning of the one in a 
thousand still turns out to be utility maximising”124    
Even if the system were carefully formulated to produce utility, this 
discriminatory and semi-genocidal health plan would not sit well with my intuitive 
sense of justice. In fact, according to utilitarian health policy it would be an injustice 
to include poverty-stricken and unhealthy people in a national health system. Rule-
utilitarianism is endorsed primarily because it is able to account for important moral 
rules such as human rights, but it is problematic that all rules are justified by the 
amount of utility they produce. If greater utility can be produced by adopting an 
alternative set of rules; for example, swaping the rule “respect the human rights of 
underclass murderers” for “ban underclass murderers from health care and transplant 
their organs”, then this maximising course must be adopted. In this sense, rights make 
absolutely no difference to the moral course because ultimately the issue rests on 
utility. David Lyons makes this point in a different illustration: “Mary is fully justified 
in exercising her legal rights only when she can promote human welfare to the 
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maximum degree possible, and others are fully justified in encroaching on Mary’s 
rights in the same sort of circumstances and for the same sort of reasons.”125 Rule-
utilitarianism fails to account adequately for the moral force of rights, allowing them 
to be “trumped” too easily by inhumane and clearly immoral maximising public 
policy. The true motivation for not adopting such a despicable health care policy is 
separate from the fact that a disutility is produced; genocidal public policy is a 
disutility because it is wrong, not wrong because it is a disutility. I must side with 
Veatch and Lyons that, once the programmatic implications of utilitarian macro-
allocation are drawn out, the resulting health care plan is flawed: it is perversely 
counter-intuitive, it promotes as just a health policy that is clearly undesirable for any 
society, and it fails to take seriously the moral force of human rights.  
Cost benefit calculations are necessary within medicine to avoid sending funds 
down medical black holes; however, the important weighing of costs against benefits 
must not be blown out of proportion into an all-encompassing maximisation of the 
greater good for the greatest number. As I have shown with micro-allocation by 
QALYs, cost-benefit analysis can be a simple economic tool that is acceptable from a 
variety of ethical perspectives, while utilitarian macro-allocation is a misguided 
ethical theory that promotes undesirable and counter-intuitive social policy. What is 
more, because I am searching for a distributive theory that is compatible with human 
rights, I must not favour a macro-allocative theory that disregards an individual’s 
medical needs or the medical needs of a morally notable section of society. Keeping 
in mind the financial and social costs of any public policy is important when planning 
under scarcity and any normative vision of health care should allocate maximally 
                                                 
125 David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994) p. 156 
 84 
within the technological and financial limitations of society. Nonetheless, when 
society is dealing with life-saving medical technology, I feel a single-minded utility 
calculus does not exhaust the notion of ethical macro-allocation.  
 
3b: Macro-allocation by Laissez-Faire Insurance Markets 
The macro-allocation of health care on the free-market is another method that, on face 
value, disregards human survival and development needs. This is because there is no 
taxation to support health care goods and service provision, leaving distribution 
primarily in accordance with an individual’s own level of income and wealth. A free-
market approach to health care accentuates individual freedom to such a degree that it 
leaves no room for social intervention into health care matters, with a basic minimum 
supported by charity for indigent individuals. In spite of how it appears, this approach 
does not entirely reject O’Manique’s survival and development needs criterion, but 
changes the focus from an objective to a subjective assessment of need. Supporters of 
a more socialistic system could refer to the satisfaction of objective needs of citizens 
and provide health care out of respect for rights, whereas supporters of a laissez-faire 
system could cite individuals’ free choice to satisfy their own subjectively defined 
needs, distributing health care via the market in accordance with income and 
wealth.126  
 
                                                 
126 A fair share of income and wealth will be regulated by separate principles of justice. While I do not 
need to take a detailed stand on these principles, a possible laissez-faire principle for income 
distribution could be “to each according to his contribution in satisfying whatever is freely desired by 
others in the open marketplace of supply and demand.” (See: Gene Outka, Social Justice and Equal 
Access to Health Care, Journal of Religious Ethics, 2:1974:11-32, p. 19) Ideally, all will achieve a fair 
share of income and wealth in accordance with this income principle, and therefore all shall be in a 
position to purchase market goods and satisfy their subjective health care needs. Charity plays the part 
of picking up those who fall through the gaps of this idealized system.   
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Robert Sade attacks a program of nationalised health care provision in favour 
of a medical marketplace, on the grounds that people have a right to select their own 
ends, determine their own methods of goal realisation, and execute and dispose of 
their goals without coercion from others.127 In short, Sade argues that the market 
provides a freedom of choice that is not possible with a nationalised distribution. He 
draws an analogy between the doctor and the baker,128 pointing out that it is immoral 
to appropriate bread from the baker without paying for it. Sade claims that any 
coercive interference by the state into the business of health care providers constitutes 
a similar injustice, going on to conclude that “medical care is neither a right nor a 
privilege: it is a service that is provided by doctors and others to people who wish to 
purchase it.”129 Those who oppose the reformation of the medical marketplace in  
A often do so by appealing to the reduction in consumer choice and provider 
freedom that results from nationalisation, so Sade appears to articulate an argument 
central to the privatisation camp. In this section, I shall side with Sade and others in 
the opinion that medical insurance markets play a vital role in the creation of a just 
distribution of health care. However, my point of difference is that I believe markets 
do not create a just health care system unaccompanied. While the free-market may 
increase consumer choice, freedom, and arguably increase service quality, it is an 
inefficient distributor that is unable to establish comprehensive access and, as such, 
must be supplemented by a government controlled health care system. 
Privatisation of industry is said to have increased efficiency and quality of 
service; its advocates often emphasise the inefficient nature of extensive government, 
                                                 
127 Robert M. Sade, Medical Care as a Right: A Refutation, The New England Journal of Medicine, 
285:1971:1288-1292 
128 Or, perhaps I should say, Sade draws a mis-analogy. A baker does not rely on millions of taxpayer 
dollars to finance the training, research and development of the baking profession. This is a 
fundamental and morally relevant difference. 
129 R. M. Sade, (1971), p. 1280 
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half-joking that a national health care system loses human lives as a national postal 
service loses letters. Privatisation is also said to have the supreme benefit of 
maximising choice, because health care providers have significant freedom from 
interference in the pricing, diagnosis and treatment of patients. Without state 
economists regulating department expenditure, the only restriction on a medical 
specialist is the affluence and ailment of the patient. Moreover, because a state will 
not subsidise their training, specialists owe no special debt to society, meaning that 
providers have complete freedom to set up shop wherever and in whatever speciality 
they like. Patients therefore have the option of choosing medical practitioners of their 
liking from a variety of specialist backgrounds in any location that suits; patients may 
choose an inexpensive doctor who performs minimal services or an expensive doctor 
who over-prescribes and caters to the hypochondriac. There is no need for centralised 
cost control or waste control measures since health care will receive as much or as 
little funding as citizens wish to give, in accordance with their subjectively defined 
needs. Most importantly, taxation is not required to fund social projects. Aiding the 
medically worst-off is transformed from a legal and moral necessity to a strictly moral 
matter: citizens have the free choice of either aiding the impoverished sick or ignoring 
any possible duty without fear of legal retribution.  
There is truth behind the criticism that the majority of health care is priced 
beyond the reach of healthy employed citizens, let alone sick unemployable citizens 
relying on charity. The extreme pricing often reflects the high cost of production that 
goes into the research and development of new medical procedures. If citizens cannot 
afford to purchase care, then it is not right to say the price will simply drop; the 
treatment or product will be removed entirely from the market. Cost sharing practices 
such as insurance markets attempt to solve this problem by taking infrequent and 
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unpredictable events of prohibitively expensive cost and averaging them over a larger 
population so they become statistically regular and affordable. In this way, people 
prepay and share the excessive price tag of most medicine with a comparatively small 
premium that is ideally affordable, even for those who are poverty-stricken.  
The USA is a prime example of insurance-based medical markets of this kind. 
While not one hundred percent privatised, with around seventy percent of Americans 
utilising some form of private insurance, no other system in the world even comes 
close to the massive dependence the USA has on its legion of private health insurance 
providers. As a way of assessing what role the private sector must play in the just 
distribution of health care, I shall now discuss the inherent advantages and 
disadvantages present in a highly privatised insurance system like that of the USA.   
  
3b. (i): Medical Markets in the United States of America: A Case Study 
America's health care system is neither healthy, caring, nor a system.  
Walter Cronkite 
 
Established in the 1930s the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) is a 
dominating force in the medical marketplace, made up of 39 regional insurance 
companies across the USA. They are unashamedly proud of the fact that one in three 
Americans carries either a Blue Cross or a Blue Shield membership card. A variety of 
customised packages is available and, like all insurance plans, the more people pay, 
the more coverage they should receive. Blue Cross is a prepay hospital plan that can 
cost anywhere from US$50 to US$500 (NZ$72 to NZ$720) a month for a set amount 
of hospitalisation days (regardless of how sick the individual actually is at the end of 
that period) and Blue Shield provides prepaid pharmaceuticals and doctor services up 
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to a certain dollar value. Out-of-pocket payments make up the difference. Other 
options include compensation according to the amount a person has already paid into 
the system or a set limit on physician visits, such as eight per year, and even 
“catastrophic coverage” with a lifetime maximum limit of five million dollars.130  
Another popular insurance practice in the USA was born out of the worker 
shortages of World War Two, when government legislated against the practice of 
competing for labour by offering exorbitant salary incentives, as this would unfairly 
disadvantage smaller companies. As a way around these restrictions on salary 
incentives, the workers would bargain with their employer for competitive retirement 
packages, health and dental insurance. Employers will either pay for the workers’ 
health care within certain price limits, or work as an agent for BCBSA, providing 
various blue plans at subsidised rates. In 2005, 60 per cent of employers offered some 
type of health insurance to their workers, a figure that is lower than previous years. 
Employers are also progressively charging more for their health packages: average 
premium rates increased 73 per cent from 2000 to 2005.131 
Medicare is probably the most infamous provider of American health 
insurance, with around 14 per cent of citizens subscribing in 2005.132 Established mid-
1960s, the plan comprises two independent schemes that can be purchased from the 
government. Part A is hospital insurance for citizens aged 65+ and Part B provides 
subsidies on doctor and pharmaceutical bills for people with specific ailments. In 
2005 it cost US$78 (NZ$112) per month for part B, so is generally cheaper than other 
market options, but eligibility is severely restricted as is the array of illness and 
                                                 
130 Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Homepage, <http://www.bcbs.com/> (15th January, 2007) 
131 US Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States, 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf> (15th of January, 2007) 
132 US Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States, 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf> (15th of January, 2007) 
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disability covered.133 Health providers directly bill the patient, who then requests 
partial reimbursement from the government, so while this process allows the doctor 
considerable freedom in pricing, consumer autonomy is somewhat restricted as 
reimbursement is only valid if people are treated in a “Medicare approved facility”. 
What is more, Medicare only provides coverage if people have made a “deductible 
payment”; or in other words, if they have already paid over US$110 (NZ$158) of 
their own money on medical bills in the past 12 months.134 
 
3b. (ii): Objections to the Medical Marketplace  
Despite this abundance of private health care providers, 47 million Americans were 
left without any kind of health care coverage in 2005 and this figure is increasing.135 
There is much empirical evidence against the claim that insurance privatisation 
provides increased efficiency, quality, and choice. It is generally held within the 
literature that such laissez-faire distribution fails to score highly on any criteria of 
justice, with Allan Buchanan concluding that “the U.S. health care system is seriously 
ethically unjust.”136 
An excessive burden is placed on the American public by this inefficient 
method of health care delivery. The US system in 2004 had the highest health 
                                                 
133 The US Department of Health and Human Services narrowly defines Medicare as insurance for 
“People 65 years of age or older, certain younger people with disabilities, and people with End-Stage 
Renal Disease (permanent kidney failure with dialysis or a transplant, sometimes called ESRD).” US 
Department of Health and Human Services, Glossary, 
<http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/glossary/default.asp?Letter=M&Language=English> (15th of January, 
2007) 
134 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare Part B, 
<http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareGenInfo/03_Part%20B.asp#TopOfPage> (15th of January, 2007) 
135 U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States, 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf> (15th of January, 2007) 
136 A. Buchanan, (1994), p. 729   
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expenditure in the world, consuming US$5711 per person137 compared with New 
Zealand’s nationalised system costing US$1893.138 By the year 2013, the US figure is 
expected to rise to US$10,709 per person.139 Owing to the ever-rising price of US 
health care there has been a significant emphasis on cutting costs rather than 
improving coverage and quality for citizens. Insurance companies frequently adopt 
self-interested policy that actually decreases access to care; designing packages 
guaranteed to maximise profit and avoid the costs of carrying the sick. While 
Medicare was established as an affordable alternative to other non-federal insurance 
plans, increasing deductibles and restricted eligibility clauses leave many clients 
under-insured, thinking that they have adequate coverage when in reality they possess 
only a dangerously limited plan. This places such a burden on consumers that medical 
costs are a factor in over half of all bankruptcies in the USA, and of these, 20% had 
private medical insurance but lost coverage over the course of their illness.140 What is 
even more appalling, owing to the financial impoverishment of Medicare and the red 
tape associated with state bureaucracy, reimbursement rates are 40% lower than those 
of other insurance providers,141 so many Medicare approved facilities often turn away 
patients “covered” by Medicare out of a very real fear of not being paid. If the 
efficiency of a health care system is measured by the level of access to service 
compared with the cost of provision, the USA has the most inefficient health care 
                                                 
137 The World Health Organisation, Countries: USA, <http://www.who.int/countries/usa/en/> (15th of 
January, 2007) 
138 The World Health Organisation, Countries: New Zealand, <http://www.who.int/countries/nzl/en/> 
(15th of January, 2007) 
139 US Department of Health and Human Services, Effects of Health Care Spending on the US 
Economy, <http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/costgrowth/index.htm> (15th of January, 2007) 
140 Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Expanding Access to Care, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap5/uninsured/ch5_Slide_3.html> (15th of January, 
2007)   
141 A. Buchanan, (1994), p. 729  
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system in the world at the expense of those patients who have no other choice but to 
participate in it. 
This only scratches the surface of criticism about how insurance privatisation 
is an utterly ineffective and wasteful mode of health care provision. The most telling 
study conducted from 1970-1982 was the RAND health insurance experiment, in 
which 6000 US families were randomly assigned to one of two groups: one which had 
relatively free health care (comparable to insurance coverage with affordable 
premiums) and the other who had to pay full-price for health care (comparable to 
being under/uninsured). The predictable outcome was that those given relatively free 
health care received one-third more medical attention.142 However, a notable 
conclusion of the RAND study was that, at the end of five years, despite one group 
seeking substantially more care, “there was no significant difference between the 
groups’ levels of health”143, and the group that received relatively free care was 
estimated to have gained a statistically insignificant seven weeks of increased life. 
Based on this experiment, it seems that, when compared with paying full-price for 
medical care, the purchasing of private health insurance does nothing notable towards 
helping people to live a significantly longer or healthier life. To put it another way, 
the American government spends US$765,000,000,000 per year144 of taxpayer money 
on inefficient insurance schemes that extend the average life by less than 0.2 per cent.  
The very nature of a medical free-market encourages waste and detrimental 
competition, contributing to its inefficiency. Privatisation promotes the attitude that 
                                                 
142 As measured in dollar-value, number of eye-glasses and dental work obtained, and “restricted 
activity days” where subjects could do nothing more but engage themselves in health care related 
issues. 
143 Robin D. Hanson, Why Health is not Special: Errors involved in Bioethics Intuitions, Social 
Philosophy and Policy, 19:2:2002:153-179, p. 162 
144 Total health expenditure was over 1.7 trillion USD, with government expenditure as a percent of 
total health expenditure at 45% (2003). Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, National Health Care 
Trends, <http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap1/> (15th of January, 2007) 
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doctors are just another market commodity that can be brought, sold, and sued if they 
fail to live up to consumer expectations. The patient is made unsure of a doctor’s 
motive for treatment (follow up treatment may be ordered just to boost the doctor’s 
salary) and the doctor is made fearful of the patient’s consumer right to sue. Aside 
from destroying the doctor-patient relationship, an increase in malpractice litigation 
forces fearful doctors to practise “defensive medicine”. This involves ordering two or 
three rounds of tests rather than one, hospitalising patients rather than recommending 
they rest at home, and over-prescribing in order to carpet-bomb the ailment before a 
patient becomes too uncomfortable. Dan English maintains that this partially accounts 
for the huge cost of health care in the USA: “Financial estimates of these services 
yield a figure of [US] $52 billion per year as the cost of ‘defensive medicine’ on the 
part of surgeons alone.”145 What is more, when medical practitioners are sued in the 
USA, this does not guarantee that the doctor will be banned from continuing to 
practise, so litigation in no way protects patients from any future malpractice. 
Privatisation also encourages competition between hospitals attempting to become 
more technologically advanced than their neighbours. Less expensive, yet equally 
effective, equipment and services are made redundant every year to make room for 
the newest upgrade. The Office of Technology Assessment of the US Congress 
maintains that this wasteful attitude towards “big ticket” technology is estimated to 
account for up to 40 per cent of all cost increases within hospitals. What is more, with 
such a high demand for goods, it is claimed that less than twenty percent of new 
upgrades have undergone any form of controlled clinical trial or systematic study.146          
                                                 
145 Dan English,  Bioethics: A Clinical Guide for Medical Students, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 
p. 138 
146 R. Bayer, D. Callahan, A. Caplan and B. Jennings, Towards Justice in Health Care, In: T. 
Beauchamp and L. Walters (eds.) Contemporary Issues in Bioethics: 4th Edition, (Belmont: Wadsworth 
Publishing Co., 1994), p. 713 
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Attaching health care to employment is a disastrous idea that seriously 
disadvantages the unemployed and unemployable, reducing consumer choice. It is a 
scheme guaranteed to sell health care only to those who are healthy, because 
presumably, people suffering from an illness requiring moderate long-term medical 
care will be unable to work full-time and therefore be ineligible for this form of 
insurance. Moreover, when people lose their jobs their stress levels increase, as does 
the likelihood of falling sick, at a time when they are unable to afford private 
coverage. In 1986 the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) 
was passed, granting all terminated employees the choice of purchasing continuing 
coverage with the firm at a competitive price.147 In reality, the COBRA does nothing 
to improve consumer choice, because, unless a former employee walks straight into 
another job (in which case there would be no need for coverage), “competitive” 
private insurance packages are unaffordable for the unemployed. The failure of 
employer-based health insurance to provide adequate access to care is evidenced by 
the fact that more than two-thirds of uninsured adults belong to the labour force.148 
In discussing the contention that privatisation of medical care promotes 
consumer choice, Peter Singer rightly points out that “[t]here can be no freedom 
without adequate information on which to make a choice.”149 Access to health care in 
the USA is determined by the amount of coverage people buy, which is in turn 
determined by access to information about what plan best fits their needs. If, like 
Medicare, an insurance company is constantly on the brink of bankruptcy and has an 
                                                 
147 US Department of Labour, FAQ about COBRA, 
<http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_cobra.html> (15th of January, 2007) 
148 Alain C. Enthoven and Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990’s: Universal 
Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy, In: T. Beauchamp and L. 
Walters (eds.) Contemporary Issues in Bioethics: 4th Edition, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 
1994) p. 719 
149 P. Singer, (1976), p. 180  
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unhealthy preoccupation with curbing its medical costs, an ideal legal way of 
minimising payouts while still receiving income from premiums is to restrict the flow 
of information to the public. The BCBSA echoes Singer’s concern that there is a 
notable lack of clear health information available to the American public, with 
frequent misunderstandings over how to procure effective coverage and under what 
specific conditions a package will not pay out: “Ninety million adults in the U.S. have 
difficulty understanding and using health information, and there is a higher rate of 
hospitalization and use of emergency services among patients with limited health 
literacy.”150 A lack of health information among those most likely to be hospitalised 
means the insurance companies have to pay out less frequently to a high-risk group, 
but still receive regular premiums from these people. Federal and State attempts to 
restrict consumer understanding of health issues are not uncommon in the USA. In 
1974, Ralph Nader’s consumer research organisation attempted to compile a directory 
of doctors’ fees, qualifications and office hours so the public could possess a clear and 
precise charter of health-related information, but the Maryland County Medical 
Society stopped the attempt by threatening sanctions against those doctors who 
participated in the survey.151 For whatever reason, presumably because there is money 
to be made in maintaining the status-quo, there is evidence of active resistance to 
informing the American public about health insurance related issues. The US 
insurance community and its affiliates work to severely restrict the individual 
consumer’s free-choice.  
                                                 
150 Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Engaging Consumers, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap2/general/ch2_Slide_7.html> (15th of January, 
2007)   
151 P. Singer, (1976), pp. 179-180 
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Pre-1992, before the health care industry perfected blood screening 
techniques, blood from US private blood banks was estimated to have a 55 per cent 
contamination rate of hepatitis C.152 The threat of hepatitis C can be reduced to zero 
by simply interviewing potential donors about their health history and lifestyle 
preferences and turning away those with a high risk. However, if blood is sold for 
money, then potential donors have a very good reason to lie about their past health 
record. In this way, the privatization of blood banks directly promoted the likelihood 
of blood contamination, because those who are most in need of the meagre sum paid 
for blood are from a socio-economic class that is more likely to have hepatitis C. 
Presumably, if patients requiring a blood transfer had the choice between “blood A” 
that has a 55 per cent chance of contamination or receiving donated “blood B” that 
has a zero percent chance, any person would choose the latter. However, advocates of 
an entirely privatised health system deprived patients of the opportunity to access 
uncontaminated blood. Supporters of privatisation may reply that this is far fetched as 
no health care system would ever be so reckless as to intentionally increase infection 
rates by fifty-fold. Moreover, a laissez-faire distribution will allow the market to be 
supplemented by charity, so the patient truly does have a choice between “blood A” 
and “blood B”. However, Singer informs us otherwise: 
[W]hen hospitals in Kansas City chose to obtain blood exclusively 
from a non-profit community blood bank rather than from either of 
two commercial banks operating in the city, the commercial banks 
complained to the federal trade commission. In due course the 
commission ruled that the community bank and the hospitals had 
illegally conspired together to restrain commerce in whole human 
blood, and ordered them to stop doing so – this despite testimony 
that the commercially obtained blood carried a greater risk of 
infecting the recipients with hepatitis.153  
 
                                                 
152 P. Singer, (1976), p. 187 
153 P. Singer, (1976), p. 182 
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Considering the numerous problems associated with privatisation of health 
care, the fundamental issue seems to be keeping the price affordable so all people can 
access the institution. However, controlling the rising price tag of care and increasing 
insurance coverage is not simple, because the privatisation problems listed above 
create a prisoner’s dilemma whenever cost-cutting measures are introduced. To 
improve the health system, it is beneficial for all concerned to enter a cost-cutting 
pact. Such a pact cannot work if individuals defect from the agreement; however, 
owing to the mistaken assumption that an increased level of medical care equates to 
an increased level of health (disproved by the RAND experiment) it is rational for any 
individual to continue their uninhibited consumption. This is compounded by the fact 
that the national problem is so large that the detrimental effects of one person 
defecting from the pact are seen to be negligible. From the perspective of private 
health care providers, any attempt at cost cutting leaves them open to malpractice 
litigation and a severe reduction in personal income. Even if everybody acknowledges 
that cutting the costs of health care is necessary to increase health care coverage, 
reduce excessive burdens and create a more just system, the act of cutting costs 
encourages free-riders; therefore, costs will continue to rise.  
It seems that when privatisation advocates are confronted on their own 
grounds, any claims of increased efficiency, choice and quality are contradicted by an 
over-abundance of cold US statistics pointing to the contrary. Privatisation of any 
industry encourages self-interested policy designed to increase income and reduce 
expenditure; health care practitioners and insurance companies in the medical 
marketplace are concerned with maximising returns rather than an ethical distribution 
of their goods and services. The competitive nature of the marketplace also increases 
rivalry between practitioners. This encourages a wasteful use of medical technology 
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and generates a fear of malpractice litigation, which destroys the sacred patient-doctor 
relationship and encourages the expensive practice of defensive medicine. Privatised 
health care systems are far from efficient, because the rising cost of national health 
care forces insurance companies to introduce cost-cutting measures that create 
excessive financial burdens on the medical consumer, reducing access to care. What is 
more, in an effort to reduce costs, the insurance industry ebbs the flow of health-
related information to the consumer, actively restricting the individual’s choice and 
opportunity for effective care. It is difficult to vindicate the claim that privatisation 
increases quality. While it may be true that in some underdeveloped countries the 
quality of private health care is generally better than the nationalised system, Allen 
Buchanan finds that “there is no good evidence that privately insured individuals in 
the US receive higher quality care”.154 Nonetheless, keeping in mind the adage that 
absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, I must declare that the debate over 
improved quality has yet to be decided.  
 
3b. (iii): A Proposed Solution 
I suggest that many of the problems outlined above can be reduced or eliminated by 
having a taxpayer funded national health system working alongside private insurance 
markets.  
The free-market is said to enhance individual choice; however, health care 
premiums continue to grow at several times the rate of inflation, leaving an 
astonishing number of people without the opportunity to access care. In the USA, 
charity-based free clinics are unable to keep up with the demands of the uninsured; 
consequently, multitudes of uninsured and underinsured people have severely limited 
                                                 
154 Allen Buchanan, Privatisation and Just Health Care, Bioethics 9:1995:220-239, p. 222 
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health care choices. Establishing a centralised governmental health care system 
alongside the private industry will relieve the stress placed on charity hospitals, 
maximising individual choice. The affluent will have four immediate choices: to pay 
for private care through insurance schemes, to receive care from the national health 
centres, to visit charity-based health centres, or even to omit medical care entirely. 
The indigent will have three choices: nationalised care, charity-based care, or no care. 
Furthermore, the example used earlier in Singer’s discussion of contamination in 
private blood banks would not have arisen, as the affluent would have had the free 
choice of receiving either private or public care, and the indigent would have received 
public care, including uncontaminated blood. 
The creation of a national health service means that health care access in the 
USA will no longer need to be attached to employment status. Apart from increasing 
efficiency and opportunity for access, detaching health care from employment also 
has the huge benefit of stimulating the economy by encouraging business growth. It is 
estimated that employers in the USA spend 58 per cent of after-tax profits on health 
care for their employees;155 funds that employers could otherwise use to expand their 
business, offer staff pay-raises and create new positions.  
The health care industry will no longer have to implement underhanded cost-
cutting measures, because the financial burden of carrying the sick will be shared by 
three arrangements: private industry, public taxes, and charity. Private medical 
practitioners receive their primary income directly from patients, so have a significant 
financial incentive to order unnecessary repeat visits, tests or pharmaceuticals. On the 
other hand, public providers do not receive income directly from patients, so have no 
                                                 
155 Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Employer and Insurance Trends, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap6/employer/ch6_Slide_2.html> (15th of January, 
2007)    
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incentive to practise such expensive and wasteful tactics. In this way, drawing patients 
away from the inefficient private industry to the more efficient public system is in 
itself a cost-cutting technique. Taking the majority of health care providers out of the 
marketplace will also improve efficiency by altering the consumer’s view that 
medical practitioners are just another commodity that can be purchased, sold and 
sued. Incidences of malpractice litigation will be reduced, together with the practice 
of defensive medicine. Moreover, as is the case with other government-run agencies, 
public health care providers will be standardised across the county. This will reduce 
hospitals’ wasteful attitude towards big-ticket technology and eliminate doubling-up 
on expensive procedures, specialists and equipment within regions.   
Privatisation is also exceedingly inefficient on an administrative level and will 
benefit by working in partnership with a public system. When a patient receives 
treatment in the USA, the medical bill is passed from the doctor to the patient and 
then on to either the insurance company or the US government. Patients then receive a 
co-payment request and must prove that they have met the threshold of deductible 
payments for that year. Finally, payments are sent to the medical practitioner, with 
numerous supervisors and departments rubber-stamping approval on the paperwork at 
each stage. This process creates millions of dollars in red-tape formalities and staff 
overheads, which can be eliminated by keeping the majority of treatments and 
payments under the supervision of one centralised health agency. The unification of a 
fragmented administrative system will also make it harder for people to commit health 
care fraud; a crime that cost America US$90 billion in 2004.156 Moreover, in a 
privatised health care system a patient’s medical records can often be spread out 
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<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap4/healthit/ch4_Slide_6.html> (15th of January, 
2007)  
 100 
amongst several doctors and insurance companies, creating duplicate paperwork and 
making it hard to establish a full medical history. These inefficiencies will be 
eliminated by keeping all health information in a centralised governmental store. 
Centralisation of records would also aid the medical community in tracking disease 
incidence; a collated store of medical data could be frequently analysed without 
difficulty, to monitor the rise and fall of disease demographics. Finally, in the USA 
many insured people who fall sick forgo doctor’s visits because they cannot afford the 
co-payments and deductibles, or are reluctant to endure the excessive paperwork 
associated with insurance claims. A centralised provision of medical care will remove 
any such disincentive for visiting a medical professional. This shall result in an 
increase of inexpensive preventative medical care, such as routine physicals; disease 
will be discovered at an earlier stage, preventing the development of major disorders 
that require expensive treatment. 
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Chapter Four: Distributing Health Care: Part 2 
4a: Strict Egalitarianism 
The private sector of health care distribution can be suitably regulated by the 
distributional principle: to each according to their personal share of income and 
wealth. However, to fill the gaps in access left by the private sector I propose that 
nationalised health care distribution shall best be regulated by egalitarian principles of 
justice. The egalitarian understanding of justice, subject to certain important 
qualifications, is that all people over the course of their lifetime should have the 
opportunity to achieve an equal amount of net welfare. Earlier in this paper I 
mentioned Robert Veatch’s formulation of an egalitarian principle for equal access: 
“Everyone has a claim to the amount of health care needed to provide a level of health 
equal to other persons’ health.”157 I find this principle subject to three important 
clarifications.  
The above egalitarian principle has a restrictive sense about it, practically 
forcing the sick to utilise health resources they may not desire in the name of making 
their health equal to others. Although freedom of choice is not a dominant ideal under 
egalitarianism, in any fair system a patient should be free to abstain from treatment or 
select ineffectual “treatment” if so inclined. The first half of the principle “every one 
has a claim to the amount of health care needed” must be understood as securing all 
people the opportunity to stake their claim, as well as the opportunity to abstain from 
accessing health care. 
While the first half of the principle established the opportunity to reach a 
desired outcome, the second half of the principle defines this desired outcome as “a 
                                                 
157 R. M. Veatch, (1976), p. 133 
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level of health equal to other persons’ health”. It is important to note that Veatch is 
not advocating that an equal level of health care resources be allocated to all people 
and used at the patient’s discretion as the need arises. To give people a strictly equal 
amount of health care resources in the form of dollar-limits or day-limits on service is 
a profligate distributional practice frequently employed by insurance companies; it 
results in those who live a healthy life receiving more resources than they need, while 
the chronically sick have inadequate resources to meet their needs. Different people 
obviously have diverse health needs of varying urgency and expense, so Veatch’s 
desired outcome of an equal level of health can only be achieved by providing an 
unequal level of resources.  
Although egalitarianism and utilitarianism are traditionally in diametric 
opposition to one another, Veatch’s distributive principle is not contradicted by the 
current practice of QALYs. Egalitarianism can be used to justify the existence of the 
health care institution itself and therefore applies only to the macro-sphere, while 
QALYs are used to justify decisions made within the health care institution and 
pertain to the micro-sphere. This means that the egalitarian decree to take all 
necessary steps to restore an equal level of health does not conflict with a QALY 
decision to remove a patient’s opportunity for equal health by withdrawing treatment; 
strict equality is an institutional ideal that is qualified in practise by the QALY 
rationing technique. The compatibility of these two principles prevents a situation 
where black hole patients drain unjustified amounts of resources in the name of 
equality.158 
                                                 
158 However, QALYs do not address the problem of the entire health care institution becoming a black 
hole itself, draining excessive resources away from other important institutions. This is an objection 
addressed in detail below. 
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Later in his writings, Veatch brings these clarifications to the fore in a 
reformulation of his strong equal access principle: “justice requires everyone has a 
claim to health care needed to provide an opportunity for a level of health equal, as far 
as possible, to other persons’ health.”159 This principle secures what health planners 
often call equal access to health care, or in terms more familiar to the moral 
philosopher, provides all people with an equal opportunity to fulfil their medical 
needs. Veatch’s egalitarian approach is clearly compatible with founding a right to 
health care in the equal satisfaction of medical survival and development needs. 
 
4a. (i): Discontinuity as Justification for Equal Access 
It is important to note here that this egalitarian principle need not apply to society’s 
other goods, such as food, clothing, housing, and education. These societal goods are 
primarily distributed by free-market transactions, according to personal merit or 
societal contribution, with a minimum level of service supported by charity. Justice 
need not require that everyone should have a claim to a level of clothing that is equal, 
as far as possible, to that of other people, and the same can be said of food, housing, 
and education. If an individual cannot afford clothes, then that individual must turn to 
charity, so it stands to be explained why justice demands that health care be 
distributed on such a strict egalitarian principle when most other imaginable goods are 
not.  
It has been proposed by Gene Outka that there is a strong discontinuity 
amongst society’s goods, and health care has special features that make it particularly 
unsuitable for distribution by any principle of justice other than equal access. Namely, 
                                                 
159 R. M. Veatch, (1976), p. 134 
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health care needs are “beyond our control or power to predict”160 and possess an 
“overriding importance”161 whenever they do occur. People may reasonably expect 
that tomorrow they will need clothes to wear and food to eat, or expect that at some 
stage they will need employment facilitated by some level of education. Not only are 
these needs predictable, but so is the cost of their satisfaction. People know that 
winter comes every year and also know they can buy an umbrella for under ten 
dollars, so they can plan to use their fair share of income and wealth (which is ensured 
by separate principles of justice) to satisfy these predictable needs. It is a grim 
thought, but no one knows when cancer or a runaway truck may strike them down. 
Moreover, the anti-cancer drug Herceptin costs over seventy thousand dollars per 
patient per year, so this is hardly something a person could pay for out-of-pocket, 
even if the occurrence of cancer were predictable. To compound this, the costs of 
health care are often shielded from the consumer and constitute specialist knowledge 
available only to the medical elite. One study cited by the BCBSA found that: “For 
higher cost health services, consumers consistently under estimate the actual costs by 
at least half. In comparison, one survey reveals that consumers, on average, can 
estimate the price of a new Honda Accord to within $300.”162  
The disparity between these two estimations is clearly because of the greater 
level of prime-time advertising used to promote the latest Honda, compared with the 
promotion of hip-replacement surgery; nevertheless, the point is that health 
consumers are completely unable to plan and save for medical eventualities. This is in 
discontinuity with the purchasing of food and education, raincoats and houses. In 
                                                 
160 Gene Outka, Social Justice and Equal Access to Health Care, Journal of Religious Ethics, 
2:1974:11-32, p. 15 
161 G. Outka, (1974), p. 20 
162 Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Engaging Consumers, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap2/general/ch2_Slide_4.html> (15th of January, 
2007) 
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expounding his discontinuity thesis, Outka also maintains that health care needs have 
an overriding importance when they occur, being far more important to satisfy than 
the need for an umbrella when it rains or even a house to live in. Given twenty dollars 
and a rainy day, a person still has a choice between goods; to buy an umbrella or pay 
library fines, to take a taxi or save the money and walk. However; as Outka points 
out, “[w]hen lumps appear on someone’s neck, it usually makes little sense to talk of 
choosing whether to buy a doctor’s service rather than a colour television set. 
References to just trade-offs suddenly seem out of place. No compensation suffices, 
since the penalties may differ so much.”163  
Distribution by meritarian principles, according to societal contribution, or 
according to what may be purchased with a fair share of wealth and income could 
very well be appropriate principles to satisfy needs for scholarships, clothing and 
housing, or outstanding citizen awards. However, taking into account the nature of 
health care needs – being uniquely undeserved, uniquely unpredictable, and 
possessing an overriding importance whenever they do occur – it seems that health 
care must be completely disassociated from such meritarian distributive principles. 
Outka takes discontinuity as sufficient reason for society to adopt two distributive 
principles: “to each according to his need”164 and “similar treatment for similar 
cases”.165 According to Outka, these two principles are equivalent to a policy of equal 
access to health care, which ensures that no person goes without access to the 
important institutional good and ensures that all medical needs are satisfied to an 
equal level.  
 
                                                 
163 G. Outka, (1974), p. 21 
164 G. Outka, (1974), p. 21 
165 G. Outka, (1974), p. 23 
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4a. (ii): Rationing Under Equal Access 
Veatch and Outka differ in their opinions on how to implement a principle of equal 
access in times of scarcity. Outka accommodates for scarcity by rationing medical 
care through waiting lists or lotteries, or by the exclusion of certain types of disease. 
He argues that discriminatory measures such as waiting lists and lotteries unavoidably 
violate people’s right to equal treatment; in the sense that medical needs will be 
satisfied at a different time and place to others with identical needs. Despite this, 
Outka maintains that rationing techniques do not violate the weightier right to be 
treated as an equal; in the sense that medical needs are not being arbitrarily ignored 
through rationing, nor being satisfied according to dubious inegalitarian principles 
such as, desert, wealth, or societal contribution. Outka maintains that “(1) if we accept 
the case for equal access, but (2) if we simply cannot, physically cannot, treat all those 
in need, it seems more just to discriminate by virtue of categories of illness, rather 
than between the rich and the poor ill.”166 Outka considers treatment as equals to be 
central to egalitarian rationing; whereas Veatch, with his stricter egalitarian concept, 
finds any policy that excludes the sick to be an unjust violation of equal treatment. For 
Veatch, rationing techniques of lottery, waiting lists, and disease prioritisation are 
“repulsive as well as gargantuan.”167 He downplays the problem of resource scarcity, 
claiming that as a society we are more than able to treat those medically worst-off by 
increasing revenue through graduated payroll taxation or by introducing a system of 
deductibles and co-payments for the rich, alongside a serious effort to eliminate waste 
within the system. In one article, Veatch makes the bold statement that: 
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[w]e have the capacity to provide available health care necessary to 
improve the health, insofar as possible of the medically least well 
off. In fact, we can probably work our way up the list of the worst 
diseases before the question of limits is even raised – if we 
approach the allocation of health care from this egalitarian 
perspective.168 
 
4a. (iii): Objections to Equal Access 
Perhaps this form of strict egalitarianism goes too far by placing health care on such a 
high moral pedestal. Allen Buchanan challenges discontinuity of the health care 
institution by pointing out that not all health services are special in the manner desired 
by Outka.169 There exist health care goods and services that are resourced in a similar 
manner to other social goods and services, owing to their lack of urgency. In addition, 
many medical needs may be reasonably predicted or expected by those who lead an 
insalubrious life. There have even been movements to exclude some medical services 
not worthy of public subsidy from a national health system, or more commonly and 
perhaps more humanely, a huge tax on the cost of purchasing alcohol and cigarettes 
supplements the cost of treatment. Elsewhere, Veatch has gone so far as to demand 
additional health care taxes on those who voluntarily participate in dangerous 
recreational activities such as motor racing, rock climbing, and stunt flying; 
demonstrating how even he believes not all health needs are unpredictable, 
undeserved, and of overriding importance.170 What is more, there are many wasteful 
                                                 
168 Veatch opposed the need for disease prioritisation when he said: “The task of ranking diseases from 
worst to most benign is rather repulsive as well as gargantuan. Fortunately much of the ranking is 
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diseases before the question of limits is even raised”. I find it to be a problem for Veatch as to how 
exactly he intends this “list of the worst diseases” to be generated if it is true that “ranking diseases 
from worst to most benign… is unnecessary”. It seems that to avoid such contradiction, if any health 
care system is to run efficiently by treating the worst diseases in society, then it must do so by 
implementing the necessary rationing technique of disease prioritisation. See: R. Veatch, (1976), p. 141  
169 Allen Buchanan, An Ethical Evaluation of Health Care in the U.S., In: T. Beauchamp and L. 
Walters (eds.) Contemporary issues in bioethics: 4th edition, (Belmont: Wadsworth publishing co., 
1994) 
170 Robert Veatch, Who Should Pay for the Smokers Health Care?, Hastings Center Report, 4:1974:8-9 
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health care procedures, from the “medically defensive” practise of ordering excessive 
tests and X-Rays, to unnecessary bureaucratic red tape and the needless duplication of 
specialist positions in a community. Much esoteric research and development 
subsumed under the health care umbrella is unnecessary and wasteful given the 
numerous benefits that could be gained from redirecting funds to services such as 
health education programmes, or even allocating funds to other institutions exterior to 
health care. This appears to falsify the discontinuity tenets that all facets of health 
care relate to needs that are undeserved, unpredictable, and of overriding importance.  
James Childress171 and Charles Fried172 both object that Outka’s discontinuity 
thesis is impractical as it places such a high moral importance on the satisfaction of 
medical needs that the institution absorbs a dominant share of society’s resources, 
creating an intolerable burden on society. If health care needs possess an overriding 
importance, then the institution is justified in taking the largest possible slice of 
funding. In fact, it is an unintended result of the overriding importance of medical 
needs that any policy that funds other institutions above the level allocated to health 
care constitutes an unjust distribution. What is more, it is possible for other non-health 
related needs to possess an overriding importance; for example, the need for a defence 
force in a country that is facing imminent attack. While these defence needs are more 
important than health care, the unpredictability of health needs compared with the 
predictability of defence needs would make it unjust to finance this important military 
operation if the costs were above, or drew resources away from, the provision of equal 
access. Outka does not intend that all of society’s resources be dedicated to health 
                                                 
171 James F. Childress, A Right to Health Care?, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 4:2:1979:135-
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172 Charles Fried, Equality and Rights in Health Care, Hastings Centre Report, 6:1976:29-34; and 
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 109 
care, but he does demand that health care be funded in a manner consistent with its 
unique nature. This has the impractical outcome that the only way other institutions 
can receive funding above that of health care is if those other interests are more 
important and more unpredictable and more undeserved than medical interests. This 
undermines the funding of all other social institutions and diminishes the importance 
of the human interests those institutions protect, burdening society unnecessarily. 
Buchanan is right in criticising the sweeping claim that health care is special, 
at least for the reasons cited by Outka, because the discontinuity is based on an 
assumption of homogeneity within the medical institution that is contrary to fact. 
Even if Outka’s discontinuity of all health needs is accepted, then Fried and Childress 
seem correct in their criticism that discontinuity does not accurately reflect our 
intuitions about the diminished importance health care has in situations such as 
military invasion. Either way, Norman Daniels points out that “[s]imply claiming that 
health care is of special importance, and that utilitarianism or meritarian distributions 
are too risky, does not generate an equality argument.”173 Citing differences between 
various human needs is a good first step that helps us to define exactly what a just 
allocation might entail, but Veatch and Outka appear to require more argument to 
vindicate equal access as a demand of medical justice.  
Theoretical inadequacies of discontinuity aside, there are still three objections 
to implementing the strong equal access principle. First, the principle is incompatible 
with a medical marketplace. Second, the principle unfairly restricts patient and 
provider autonomy. And third, the equality demands are too strict to succeed within a 
society of limited resources, disadvantaging society’s worst-off.  
                                                 
173 Norman Daniels, Rights to Health Care and Distributive Justice: Programmatic Worries, Journal of 
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Under Veatch’s principle, a morally desirable level of health for any person is 
a level that equals others, not necessarily a high or a good level of health. To achieve 
equal health levels and avoid an immoral levelling-down of the healthiest citizens, the 
best care that is available to any one person in society must be made available to all. 
This form of equality necessitates the creation of a single taxpayer-funded tier of the 
highest possible quality, and is incompatible with the existence of a medical 
marketplace. In a frequently cited article, Claudine McCreadie points out that a tax 
funded sector will always be second-best if it is put in direct competition with a 
medical marketplace, since “the balance of professional manpower, and hence of 
political strength, lies in the ‘insurance’ sector.”174 For example, it is often the case 
with health care and other similarly organised institutions such as education that the 
private sector will out-compete the national sector for scarce resources, such as skilled 
workers or equipment. A second tier will allow access to be influenced by income and 
wealth and, assuming that McCreadie is correct that the quality of the first tier is 
undermined by the existence of the second, this will result in unequal health levels 
influenced by income and wealth. Because Veatch’s strict equal access principle will 
not allow inequality in health levels, there must be a complete prohibition on the 
provision and purchasing of additional care from a medical marketplace.  
With no independently determined level of service, but instead a strict equality 
of access to whatever services the system can support, there will be a severe 
restriction on the autonomy of those doctors who wish to practise medicine privately. 
Doctorial restrictions will also hamper consumers who wish to spend their hard 
earned money on so-called “Cadillac care”. Egalitarians often justify this lack of 
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provider autonomy by stating that doctors owe a debt to society, because of the huge 
amount of public subsidies that go towards their training. Doctors must repay this debt 
over their career, with the price being a restriction on the range of opportunities for 
choosing an economically lucrative specialty or location. The lack of consumer choice 
is an unfortunate and, in my opinion, unacceptable side-effect of the doctorial 
restriction and the egalitarian quest for equal access.  
Limiting the choice of consumers will force those people who in alternative 
systems would purchase health care from a second tier of private providers to draw on 
state resources against their will. Veatch argues that an elimination of the second tier 
will improve the position of the worst-off, as it forces the wealthy, powerful, and 
influential upper class with their expensive medical tastes into the same tier as the 
poor, provoking improvement in service and closing the gap between the classes.175 
Maximin arguments of this sort go beyond the rich having a mere right to participate 
in the single tier. Those well off have an obligation to participate in a national health 
care system, despite the fact that their higher level of health could suffer if they do so. 
Veatch’s argument that the upper class will provoke improvements in service raises 
the question: How is society to pay for these substantial improvements in times of 
scarcity? I find it hard to believe that any state funded health care system could 
support the massive influx of patients that will come from subsuming a second tier, 
plus make improvements in quality to satisfy their expensive medical tastes. Including 
these people with their luxurious demands will only serve to lower the health levels of 
the upper class and increase the strain on an already impoverished medical institution; 
reducing, not improving, the level of health of society’s worst-off. What is more, as 
evidenced many times in the past, any strict prohibition on desirable goods and 
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services results in the creation of black markets. Health care will be no exception; a 
strictly egalitarian single tier system will force providers to take matters into their 
own hands, developing an underground and dangerously unregulated second tier of 
illegal health care. A second tier of unregulated health care will not serve to benefit 
the worst-off in society as they simply cannot afford to pay the inflated prices of black 
market goods and services.  
 
4a. (iv): Concluding Remarks on Equal Access 
The egalitarian principle of justice that everyone must have the opportunity to access 
the health care needed to provide a level of health equal to other persons is flawed 
both theoretically and practically. Discontinuity, as portrayed by Outka, is understood 
to justify the egalitarian principle of health care distribution, while allowing non-
egalitarian principles to regulate other institutions. However, this assumes 
homogeneity of function amongst health care services that is contrary to fact. 
Moreover, discontinuity makes health care primary amongst the institutions, skewing 
a distribution that runs against commonsense. Given that discontinuity fails, the 
exclusion of health care from regulation by principles of decent minimum, desert, or 
free-market distribution; or at least, the distribution of health care by egalitarian 
principles, becomes arbitrary.  
When the principle is implemented practically it is incompatible with a 
medical marketplace because competition between the two tiers will lower the quality 
of national service. Those patients who can afford better quality will seek private care, 
creating an inequality in individual health levels that is directly influenced by personal 
income and wealth. Veatch’s principle does not permit a medical marketplace; 
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however, without this second tier existing, provider and consumer choice is restricted 
and there will be an illicit trade in black market medicine.  
As the first tier subsumes the patrons of the redundant second tier, the first tier 
must ensure that the best care that was available to any one person in the 
disestablished second tier be made available to all in the first. I believe that this will 
place an excessive burden on an already impoverished national system. I disagree 
with Veatch’s unrealistic optimism that society can provide an array of treatment 
options at the highest level of quality for the majority of illnesses before the question 
of financial limits is raised, while simultaneously maintaining an equal access to 
service. If the principle of equal access is to survive practical implementation, the 
more fundamental right to treatment as equals must take priority over the right to 
equal treatment, allowing the rationing of health care via waiting lists or lottery of a 
restricted package of services. While this manoeuvre brings the theory in line with 
fiscal realities, it does not solve all problems, as any system that rations out services 
will be detrimental to the health of those patients whose treatment options are 
restricted. It seems to me that what is required is an egalitarian system that shares the 
cost of carrying the sick by accepting the existence of a medical marketplace, thus 
avoiding Veatch’s most serious problems. 
 
4b: Justice as Fairness 
Rejecting the strong equal access principle allows the possibility of adding a second 
tier that allocates health care on the free-market, permitting income and wealth to 
influence distribution. Whereas Veatch would not consent to any inequality in health 
levels, the theory portrayed now allows inequality as long as it results from a fair 
process. The most successful development of this two tier philosophy has been 
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Norman Daniels’ extensive analysis of health care from the Rawlsian perspective, 
which also draws on elements from Charles Fried’s and Gene Outka’s discontinuity 
debate. Since A Theory of Justice is one of the most studied and critiqued works of 
twentieth century political philosophy, I shall assume a relative familiarity with 
Rawls’ framework, detailing only those aspects relevant to assimilating Rawls’ theory 
to health care.    
According to John Rawls, people living within society are contractors who 
agree to abide by various rules of engagement and receive the associated benefits of 
mutual co-operation. A Theory of Justice is subtitled “Justice as Fairness”, as the 
Rawlsian principles that dictate society’s basic structure are formulated in an “original 
position”176 of complete impartiality. Readers are asked to imagine an initial society 
occupied by hypothetical contractors whose job it is to formulate guiding principles. 
A so-called “veil of ignorance”177 enforces impartiality in the original position, 
blinding the hypothetical contractors to any personal factors or attributes that may 
pervert fair decision-making. When the veil is lifted, the hypothetical contractors may 
have to live out their lives as members of any social class, race, religion, gender, 
occupation or historical era, so, because they are averse to risk, it is in their own best 
interests that the principles of justice should not unfairly disadvantage any of society’s 
representative individuals. Rawls states that human abilities and attributes and the 
social conditions into which people are born are contingent matters “that seem 
arbitrary from a moral point of view”;178 therefore, the first part of Rawls’ theory is 
designed to eliminate all morally arbitrary contingencies from the establishment of 
fair and just institutions.  
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According to Rawls, the principles of justice as formulated by original 
hypothetical contractors under conditions of complete impartiality, lexically 
prioritised and in accordance with an intuitive sense of what is right are as follows: 
 
First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar liberty 
for all. 
 
Second Principle 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent 
with the just savings principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.179    
  
Rawls’ first principle secures equal basic liberties that are constitutionally 
imbedded and cannot be traded for social and economic gains.180 The second principle 
is the main focus of this investigation, as it determines a just distribution of resources 
amongst society’s institutions and representative individuals.  
Health, vigour, intelligence, and imagination are counted as natural primary 
goods181 and not considered by Rawls to be indicators of social redistribution because, 
“although their possession is influenced by the basic structure, they are not so directly 
under its control.”182 Rawls uses an index of primary social goods183 to constrain the 
                                                 
179 J. Rawls, (1971), p. 302 
180 This is called the special conception of justice. J. Rawls, (1971), pp. 151 
181 J. Rawls, (1971), p. 62 
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and positions of authority and responsibility. (iv) Income and wealth, understood as all-purpose means 
(having an exchange value) generally needed to achieve a wide range of ends whatever they may be. 
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domain of issues relevant to social justice and to indicate those representative 
individuals who are subject to the second (difference) principle. These objectively 
ascribable goods are all-purpose means that people need to pursue their conception of 
the good, regardless of their aims. Primary social goods are influenced directly by the 
basic structure, so it is morally desirable to arrange society in such a way as to 
provide more rather than less primary social goods to the people. Clothing, food and 
shelter are objectively ascribable goods not explicitly considered by Rawls; 
nonetheless, Daniels correctly states that these goods are best regulated by their 
exchange value with income and wealth.184 Daniels considers health care to be a 
“special”185 social good that is discontinuous with those other institutions that 
distribute clothing, food and shelter. He finds it hard to believe that hypothetical 
contractors would choose a system that distributes health care based solely on its 
exchange value with income and wealth, owing to the importance of health and the 
inequity that results from of privatisation. Unfortunately, Rawls is silent on the topic 
of health care allocation owing to his assumption of a “strict compliance” where “all 
citizens have physical and psychological capacities within a certain normal range”.186  
Put simply, in an original position, the assumption is made that nobody falls 
sick, all are mutually disinterested, and no one defies the principles of justice; 
therefore, there is no immediate need for Rawls to consider health care distribution. 
Ronald Green believes that Rawls uses strict compliance to avoid health care issues 
because he simply did not have enough space in A Theory of Justice to consider such 
                                                                                                                                            
(v) The social bases of self-respect, understood as those aspects of basic institutions normally essential 
if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends with 
self-confidence.” John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge: Harvard university 
Press, 2001), p. 58-59 
184 N. Daniels, (1979), pp. 179-180 
185 N. Daniels, (1985), p. 19 
186 John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, In: A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism and 
Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 168 
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a large topic.187 As it is a very narrowly defined book extensively concerned with the 
most fundamental questions of political justice, it keeps a notable silence on many 
other social issues, such as international law and society’s duty to animals and nature, 
so there is no pressing motivation for health care to receive special mention. Norman 
Daniels speculates that Rawls excluded health care to maintain a clear and uncluttered 
view of the fundamental issues of social justice, but believes that Rawls also 
implicitly recognised the truth of Outka’s discontinuity. It is Daniels’ conjecture that 
Rawls would not have desired health care to be influenced by income and wealth and 
proposed strict compliance primarily as a way around the problem.188 It is important 
to realise that Rawls’ silence does not mean that such social goods are not subjects of 
distributive justice, or that justice as fairness cannot be extended to cover these goods. 
Once acceptable principles of justice are selected under conditions of strict 
compliance and society moves gradually out of the original position, philosophers are 
allowed to modify the theory for situations of imperfect compliance. Daniels suggests 
that theorists can even invent entirely new principles of justice concerning health care, 
on the strict condition that Rawls’ hypothetical contractors will accept the revision:  
 
It is not a methodological requirement of his that a few such 
principles will apply to all situations. All that is required is that the 
special health care principles be suitably adjusted to other 
principles from the perspective of the original position, yielding a 
system with sufficient unity.189 
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Once this hypothetical society has moved out of the original position and away 
from strict compliance, if the original contractors have not devised any mechanism for 
dealing with health care, justice as fairness will fail as there will be members of 
society who are blatantly worse off with no remedy for their disadvantaged position. 
To illustrate this, Kenneth Arrow compares two representative individuals: one with a 
full set of primary social goods and perfect health record and another with a full set of 
primary social goods but who suffers from haemophilia and requires four thousand 
dollars worth of coagulant treatment per year.190 Both would come up equal on 
Rawls’ primary goods index, and allocation by the difference principle would not 
favour one over the other, despite the debilitating health care needs of the latter.  
 
4b. (i): Health Care as a Primary Social Good 
One simple and rather obvious way in which health care needs can be accounted for is 
to include health care in the index of primary social goods. Norman Daniels elucidates 
this approach; not as a serious way of including health care in Rawls’ theory, but 
more as a way of explaining the difficulties involved with such attempts. If health 
care is included as a primary social good, Daniels explains that “the index measures 
one’s share of primary social goods plus the share of health services needed to satisfy 
some objective measure of health.”191 When society attempts to redistribute goods in 
favour of those worst-off groups in accordance with the difference principle, re-
allocation raises the level of those with the lowest objective measure of rights and 
liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth, social bases of self-respect, 
and provides a level of health care services needed. By altering the list in such a way, 
                                                 
190 Kenneth Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of Justice, Journal of 
Philosophy, 70:9:1973:245-263, p. 254 
191 N. Daniels, (1979), p. 181 
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the subjects of maximin are not only those generally worst-off in society, but also 
those medically worst-off.  
 
4b. (ii): Objections to Health Care as a Primary Social Good 
Immediately this approach seems problematic. By definition, primary social goods are 
features of citizens’ political and social circumstances, and as such must be directly 
under the influence of the basic societal structure. It is a questionable empirical 
assumption that all health services will fit neatly into this socio-political index. To 
clarify this objection, it is helpful to talk about Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between 
brute luck and option luck.192 Dworkin states that the latter type of luck is a “matter of 
how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out – whether someone gains or loses 
through accepting an isolated risk he or she would have anticipated and might have 
declined”,193 while the former is the antithesis, being beyond an individual’s ability to 
anticipate. Reputable egalitarians194 maintain that social justice requires the 
nullification of the effects of bad brute luck, and does not require the mitigation of the 
effects of bad option luck. Injuries caused by second hand smoking, unprovoked 
assault, genetic disease, and environmental pollution are matters of bad brute luck; 
therefore, it is unfortunate and unfair for people to suffer from these ailments. Justice 
as fairness demands rectification of their disadvantaged position. On the other hand, it 
is questionable to say that ailments resulting from a person’s free choice, through 
alcohol and cigarette abuse or reckless participation in dangerous recreational 
activities, are unfortunate and unfair matters that demand rectification by the basic 
                                                 
192 Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, Philosophy and Public Affairs 
10:3:1981:283-345 
193 R. Dworkin, (1981), p. 293 
194 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 73; and, Gerald A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 
Ethics 99:1989:906-944, p. 908.   
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structure. If the role of justice as fairness is to mitigate injustice that results from bad 
brute luck in the natural and social lotteries, then health services that treat option luck 
ailments are technically not a concern of social justice. This may even be another 
reason why Rawls assumed ideal compliance and excluded health care from his 
schema – perhaps he realised that not all medical ailments are a matter of social 
justice, and therefore not all health care services are fit for inclusion into the primary 
social goods list. 
Philosophical contributions by Peter Vallentyne,195 Michael Otsuka,196 and 
Marc Fleurbaey197 all express doubts about the adequacy of Dworkin’s distinction 
between option luck and brute luck. Fleurbaey advocates a different interpretation of 
luck egalitarianism, which incorporates the simple idea that justice requires 
compensation for some, but not all, instances of bad option luck. Fleurbaey finds it 
more helpful to account for individual responsibility by distinguishing between 
socially relevant and private matters, rather than between option and brute luck.198 For 
example, Dworkin and Fleurbaey both agree that society need not rectify the loss of a 
drunken gambler who chooses to make a series of bad bets. This case of option luck is 
purely a private matter. On the other hand, if a drunk chooses to drive his or her car 
and is seriously hurt in a crash, then this is an instance of socially relevant option 
luck. This is socially relevant because it would be immoral and unjust for the driver to 
languish in agony while doctors withhold treatment. As far as medical care goes, if 
society has the capacity to treat an option luck ailment, but ignores the medical need 
on the grounds of its being a result of bad option luck, an injustice is created through 
                                                 
195 Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities, Ethics 
112:3:2002:529-559  
196 Michael Otsuka, Luck, Insurance, and Equality, Ethics 113:1:2002:40-56 
197 Marc Fleurbaey, Equal opportunity for Equal Social Outcome, Economics and Philosophy 
11:1995:25-55, pp. 40-41 
198 Marc Fleurbaey, Egalitarian Opportunities, Law and Philosophy 20:5:2001:499-530, p. 500 
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this blatant neglect of medical need. On Fleurbaey’s reinterpretation of luck 
egalitarianism, all health matters are a concern of social justice, whether or not they 
are a result of brute luck or option luck. I find Fleurbaey’s interpretation preferable to 
Dworkin’s, as the former better reflects commonsense intuitions about the diminished 
role individual responsibility plays in the basic structure’s obligation to rectify 
medical needs. In answer to the objection that the majority of medical ailments, and 
therefore medical treatments, are not a concern of social justice; on this revised 
conception of individual responsibility the satisfaction of all medical needs is the 
responsibility of the medical establishment. If primary social goods are defined as 
socially controlled factors that citizens use to criticise and revise their conceptions of 
the good, then the amount of health care a patient requires to return to an objective 
level of health fits well into this social goods index.  
Kenneth Arrow199 points out that Rawls’ second principle succeeds in utilising 
the unaltered original list of primary social goods because society can always take 
positive steps towards compensating the worst-off for their inadequate holdings. 
Health, however, is altogether different: the medically worst-off in society are often 
beyond improvement. Once again bottomless medical black holes open up, because 
maximin conflicts with the QALYs approach in demanding the limitless financing of 
terminally ill patients with minimal improvement in their condition. Arrow finds it 
unacceptable that maximin, when applied to medical matters, “implies that any 
benefit, no matter how small, to the worst-off member of society, will outweigh any 
loss to a better-off individual, provided it does not reduce the second below the level 
of the first.”200 A maximin medical plan of this sort transforms the institution of 
                                                 
199 K. Arrow, (1973), p. 251 
200 K. Arrow, (1973), p. 251 
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health care into a fiscal black hole, reducing the rest of society to a level of poverty. 
This is not a course of action that would be accepted by the hypothetical contractors; 
therefore, this proposal, as it stands, does not succeed. Before investigating the 
possibility of modifying maximin to exclude the medically irreconcilable, I wish to 
consider one final frequently cited proposal for incorporating health care. 
 
4b. (iii): Health Care as an Imperative Primary Social Good  
Ronald Green slightly modifies Daniels’ above approach by placing health care as a 
primary social good of insurmountable importance. Because any loss in health care 
access would mean that the contractors risk not satisfying a basic human need, Green 
believes that the hypothetical contractors will reject laissez-faire and utilitarian 
macro-allocation in favour of ranking health care as a primary social good that it is on 
a par with the equal basic liberties. Green assumed this overriding importance to be 
true without argument when he said, “there seems to be little question that in the 
priorities of rational agents health care stands near to the basic liberties 
themselves.”201 Equating health care with liberties and the social bases of self-respect 
is not a unique position. I have already discussed Gene Outka’s support for the 
overriding importance of health care; while elsewhere, Cecile Fabre202 likens health 
care to the various liberties, supporting the existence of second generation social 
rights by noting their similarities to first generation rights.203 David Lyons and 
                                                 
201 R. Green, (1976), p. 117 
202 Cecile Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
203 You will recall Chapter One where this generational distinction was made. First generation rights 
constitute Articles 2-21 of the UDHR and contain negative “freedoms from X” rather than positive 
“rights to X”. The second generation of rights are generally described as “rights to a substantive good 
X” rather than “freedoms from X”, and are embodied in Articles 22 – 27 of the UDHR. It is worth 
noting, however, that this classification is only a general rule of thumb.  
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Michael Teitelman204 further echoed Green’s comparison of health care to liberty 
when they questioned Rawls’ list of equal basic liberties, arguing physical well-being 
and security to be rationally preferable for the contractors. Green believes that 
impartial reasoning by the contractors will favour a structure that guarantees the 
highest possible level of health care for themselves and, owing  to the liberty-like 
importance of health care, a third principle of justice will be dedicated to an equal 
allocation of this high ranked primary social good: 
Principle of Equal Access to Health Care: Each member of society, 
whatever his position or background, would be guaranteed an 
equal right to the most extensive health services the society 
allows.205     
 
This principle is different from Veatch’s concept of equal access, which forbid 
inequality in health levels, and is far removed from an equality of resource 
distribution. Green is advocating a taxpayer-funded single tier system that forbids 
inequalities in a person’s ability to access any health care service provided by society. 
Given that there is a limited amount of resources, there shall be a reduced level of 
service quality and specialisation, in order to fund health care for the masses. For 
example, it may be necessary to exclude expensive atypical treatments and esoteric 
medical research in order to afford universal access to influenza vaccines and free 
visits to General Practitioners.206 
Aware of the importance of not turning the health care institution into a 
vacuous black hole, Green is quick to emphasise that this third principle applies only 
to accessing the health care system; stating that medical distribution within the 
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institution should be in accordance with “whatever other principles impartial rational 
agents consider appropriate.”207 These “other principles”, not elucidated by Green, are 
obviously on the micro-allocative level and will define an adequate upper and lower 
limit on expenditure that forbids a situation of black hole absorption. Given that 
impartial rational agents will agree with the practice, I find QALYs ideally suited for 
such a task.  
Green also provides two weaker arguments as to why the original contractors 
will not allow the health care institution to drain funding away from other social 
institutions, in the manner of Outka. First, Green points out that advances in the 
normal sectors of society can often be applied to medical care, for example, the way 
in which a telecommunications initiative (the laser) is used to treat glaucoma. 
Therefore, according to Green, it benefits those medically worst-off if society 
adequately funds projects that, on face value, hold no relation to health needs.208 
Second, the World Health Organisation incorporates conceptions of well-being into 
its definition of health; defined as “a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”209 Green expands on 
this line of thought, claiming that these mental and social factors are largely 
influenced by a person’s ability to pursue a range of opportunities over a lifetime. A 
health care system that drains large amounts of resources from the rest of society will 
diminish individuals’ range of social opportunities, negatively affecting their mental 
and social health.210 Green finds it a benefit of his equal access principle that “in 
contract terms, we can say that the members of the original position have very good 
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reasons for not settling for a society where its members are free from physical 
disability, but who otherwise live at a level of economic austerity.”211  
Green’s principle is parallel to the principle of equal basic liberties, in that it 
does not allow any one person to have more or less health care access than other 
people. Consequently, Green cannot allow people to purchase more medical access 
than others with their share of income and wealth, so the principle seems to rule out 
the existence of a medical marketplace. It appears that Green faces those serious 
problems found in Veatch’s equal access theory, where a prohibition on the free 
market results in a reduction of provider and consumer autonomy and it creates 
undesirable medical black markets.  
In reply, Green states that as long as the medical market follows what Rawls 
called “pure procedural justice”,212 there is no reason why his distributive principle 
would rule out the possibility of a medical marketplace. “The major objection to 
reliance on the free market”, Green claims, “is that it seems to re-introduce the 
income based distribution already repudiated by the contract parties. But this 
objection need not be decisive.”213 Under pure procedural justice, there is no criterion 
for what constitutes a just outcome other than the procedure itself. Therefore, as long 
as the procedure for market distribution is fair – as long as the medical market is in 
keeping with Green’s equal access principle – the resulting distribution must also be 
considered fair. Green suggests that a medical marketplace could be set up to follow 
the principle of equal access if it had progressive payment rates for care, when the 
poor would receive taxpayer subsidised health care and the rich would pay 
proportionately more according to a means tested sliding scale. This dual tier system 
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would secure universal access to the most extensive health services society can afford 
through a government provided first tier, with a second market tier providing services 
that are competitively priced for the rich and subsidised for the poor. Consumer and 
provider choice would be maintained and the freedom that would be created within 
the marketplace would discourage renegade medical markets. Equal access would be 
maintained as long as practitioners in the market do not provide a level of service for 
the rich that is unattainable by those who rely on government funding, and as long as 
the procedure is properly followed and no one cheats the system. Green insists that “at 
least theoretically… the free market in health care would function as an instance of 
‘pure procedural justice’ on a parallel with Rawls’ hope for the economic system as a 
whole.”214     
 
4b. (iv): Objections to Health Care as a Distinct Primary Social Good 
Allan Buchanan criticises the abstract nature of Green’s theory, and Rawlsian contract 
theory generally, as being too uninformative for practical use. The upper and lower 
limits of health care expenditure are left undefined by the original contractors because 
the veil of ignorance obstructs any information of this type; they only know that they 
prefer more health care rather than less. Moreover, contractors need to make the 
health care principles as non-specific as possible so that they function successfully in 
a variety of societies at varying levels of medical development. Green’s health care 
principle simply guarantees access to whatever the system can support for all, no 
more, no less, with the definition of what constitutes such basic care being flexible 
and relative to the society’s capability. For Buchanan, this abstract theorising does not 
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go far enough because hypothetical reasoning can only generate a “placeholder”215 for 
health care within the basic structure, providing no guidance as to the content of a 
right to health care and providing no way to define a fair level of health care funding 
or service provision. Buchanan writes:  
Rawls’ theory does not itself supply content for the notion of the 
right to a decent minimum of health care: instead, at best, it lays 
down a very abstract structure within which this content will be 
worked out through the democratic political process specified by 
the list of equal basic liberties. Given this, Rawls’ theory advances 
us very little beyond the broad intuitive consensus that there is a 
universal right to a decent minimum of health care.216 
 
 I believe that Buchanan is confused about what can be achieved by a 
distributional theory, such as that described in A Theory of Justice. Buchanan 
essentially states that he is seeking a concrete foundation for the intuitive consensus 
that there is a universal right to a decent minimum of health care. From this 
foundation he intends to derive specific health information, such as an intercultural 
and trans-historical definition of those services to be included in the decent minimum 
of health care. However, it must be clear that he will not find such foundations in the 
original position section of Rawls’ theory (which is the section that Green’s argument 
concerns), because at this level of development the theory is too abstract to concern 
human rights content. Moreover, in the above quotation Buchanan precisely 
articulates the proper role of Rawls’ theory at the original position stage of 
development; it is actually designed to establish a placeholder for those societal goods 
or ideals held to be morally desirable, and then will create a political process that 
ensures their realisation in due course. If Buchanan is concerned that Green’s theory 
does not define content for the human right to health care, I must say that his 
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objection seems out of place, because defining content for a right to health care is an 
issue that is best taken up prior to deciding just methods for distributing such content. 
This is why I presented foundational arguments above in Chapter Two, prior to 
distributional arguments in Chapters Three and Four. 
Norman Daniels217 objects that the somewhat assumptive argument that Green 
uses to promote health care can also be used to promote the other social goods of 
food, clothing and shelter. This is because the rational contractors would obviously 
want to secure more rather than less of these goods, with guaranteed access 
predominantly for the worst-off. In exactly the same way that Green proposed health 
care to be a primary social good of supreme importance, every other social good 
could be argued to be on par with the basic liberties. As a result, a principle of equal 
access would be formulated for each good by the hypothetical contractors, changing 
Rawls’ uncluttered view of social justice into a reasonably complicated indicator of 
need satisfaction. Daniels claims that Green, by introducing health care to the list, has 
corrupted the nature of the primary goods list. He has turned it from a list of general 
all-purpose goods that any rational person needs regardless of knowing specific needs, 
into a list of specific needs that must be satisfied because of their importance to the 
individual. This major change to Rawls’ theory is performed without adequate 
discussion when Green assumes health care to be the most important primary social 
good. 
To a degree, Green’s high prioritisation of health care goes against much of 
what I have been saying about the social good of health care. The moral obligation 
imposed by a second generation right is in direct proportion to the moral urgency of 
other social projects and a prioritisation of social expenditure. When the education 
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system, national defence, infrastructural maintenance, police and fire services are 
competing against one another for resources, there must be a certain degree of trade-
offs between goods. For example, in situations of natural disaster where many are sick 
and injured, the obligation for a state to secure health care may be at its strongest, but 
can be equally as strong as the obligation to provide clean drinking water, open lines 
of communication and transport, or provide a fire service and police presence to 
secure the area. Another example is the situation of imminent invasion and civil 
unrest, where health care obligations are weakened and must come after the stronger 
obligation of providing a well-staffed and well-armed defence force. It would not be 
right to say that a country has an atrocious human rights record if it slashes the health 
budget, then reallocates funds to quash violent civil unrest and aid fire fighters battle 
out of control infernos consuming major cities. The basic point here, implied by 
Daniels when he said “man does not live by good health care alone”,218 is that trade-
offs must occur between the social goods. This is true on the level of the 
representative individual trading between fair shares of primary social goods, and true 
on a macro-allocative level, trading between the services of social institutions. A 
problem arises because in the priorities of rational agents, health care is a social good 
that stands near to the basic liberties; a weighting that is so restrictively high that it 
does not permit ready trade-offs between the primary social goods. Daniels objects 
that “[f]rom the point of view of the original position, once we rank health care as the 
centrally important primary good Green takes it to be, it is hard to see how we can 
allow trade-offs of it with other social goods.”219 
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While health care will be undoubtedly important to the hypothetical 
contractors, as are all primary social goods, I am not yet convinced that it is a rational 
thing for the contractors to rank health care as an eminently important social good. 
Certainly, if the contractors are born into contemporary Western society, with all the 
conveniences of modern medicine, it is true that they may want more rather than less 
health care and might rank it on the same level of importance as the equal basic 
liberties. However, the opposite could be said if the contractors were born into a 
society of Dark Age medical practice, when painful bloodletting, leaches, exorcism 
and unhygienic open surgery could kill people faster and in a more gruesome manner 
than their ailment.220 Being adverse to risk, rational contractors simply will not rank 
health care as highly as Green does – having such importance that any loss of the 
good constitutes a severe loss to the individual – because in many societies 
throughout history a loss in health care access may potentially be of benefit to the 
individual. The epistemological constraints of the original position forbid the 
contractors from knowing how important health care will be during their life; 
therefore, being risk adverse, it is rational for the contractors to rank health care equal 
amongst the social goods, permitting trade-offs once beyond the veil of ignorance if 
they turn out to be in a society of undesirable medicine. This, of course, collapses 
Green’s approach into the problematic approach examined earlier (where health care 
was one primary good amongst others) and undermines the foundations of Green’s 
principle of equal access to health care.  
 
                                                 
220 I concede that by modern standards it is a stretch of the imagination to call these practices “health 
care”; nonetheless, those physicians who performed such procedures certainly considered them to be 
the greatest and latest in medical achievement. Perhaps physicians a thousand years from now will look 
back at 21st century medical practice with similar contempt, being reluctant to label our medicine as 
health care.   
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4c: A Proposal for Fair Health Care Distribution   
I now wish to reconsider Norman Daniels’ argument from Section 4b. (i), which 
attempted to include health care in the list of primary social goods. Daniels mentions 
the possibility of adding “the share of health services needed to satisfy some objective 
measure of health”221 as a sixth primary social good on Rawls’ list, so that maximin 
will demand the financing of health care for society’s medically worst-off. You may 
recall that Kenneth Arrow made the definitive objection that it is unacceptable to 
place health care as one primary good amongst others, since maximin will demand 
that limitless amounts of resources be poured into medical procedures for the sick, on 
the sole condition that those treatments bring about at least an infinitesimal 
improvement in health. While a principle of social justice that ensures treatment for 
the medically worst-off is morally desirable, it is problematic that maximin has no 
concern for essential cost-benefit restrictions. Many radical and expensive medical 
procedures such as nuclear powered hearts and cryogenics will become a regular 
demand of justice, transforming the institution of health care into a financial black 
hole that reduces the rest of society to a level of poverty. This is not a course of action 
that would be accepted by the hypothetical contractors because, as Green has already 
pointed out in section 4b.(iii), “members of the original position have very good 
reasons for not settling for a society where its members are free from physical 
disability, but who otherwise live at a level of economic austerity.”222 Therefore, 
Daniels’ proposition of placing health care as one primary good amongst others is not 
successful.  
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If health care is to be kept as a primary social good, qualifications must be 
made to Rawls’ second principle so to restrain maximin allocation. I suggest the 
following parenthesised additions to Rawls’ work: 
 
Second Principle [Amended] 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are…: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the [generally] least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and 
(b) [to the greatest benefit of the medically least 
advantaged, consistent with a fair principle of rationing, and  
(c)] attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.223    
 
I define the generally least advantaged as those who would be deficient in 
Rawls’ original list of five primary social goods: basic rights and liberties, freedom of 
movement and free choice of occupation, powers and prerogatives of offices and 
positions of authority and responsibility, income and wealth, and the social bases of 
self-respect. Therefore, in spite of the introduction of the word “generally”, clause (a) 
of the second principle continues to operate in keeping with Rawls’ original intent. 
The word “generally” is introduced for the sole purpose of distinguishing those 
individuals with medical needs, who are the legitimate subjects of rationing, from 
those individuals who are deficient in the other primary social goods, in whose case 
rationing is unnecessary or even an injustice. A separate clause (b) is created to 
regulate the additional primary social good of health care. The promotion of the health 
care institution above society’s other institutions is a matter on which many notable 
philosophers – Singer, Outka, Veatch, Daniels, and Green – have all agreed. For that 
reason, the creation of this extra health care clause and the manner in which it 
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operates independently from the regulation of the five other social goods implicitly 
distinguishes health care as a primary social good of special importance.224 My clause 
(b) concerns the medically least advantaged; defined as those who require a share of 
health services to fulfil an objectively ascribable medical need. I expect that it is 
rational for the hypothetical contractors to formulate this separate health care clause 
because of the supreme importance they place on having good health, and also 
because they would realise that health care is clearly discontinuous from the other 
social goods. In short, the hypothetical contractors will appreciate that health care is 
vastly different from the other primary social goods, so its distribution must be 
governed by a separate rule.  
When the unqualified maximin worked upon the health care institution it 
required that resources be dedicated to the unhealthiest member of society regardless 
of ailment, then to the second unhealthiest, then the third, and so on, with the goal of 
improving their medical situation. If left unqualified, this approach would be open to 
Arrow’s objection that maximin demands costly treatments for only minute returns. 
To avoid this, clause (b) now reads that maximin allocation for the medically least 
advantaged must be consistent with a fair rationing principle. The details of this 
rationing principle, however, cannot be determined from the original position under a 
veil of ignorance. This is because a major determinant of any rationing mechanism’s 
efficiency is the cost-benefit calculation, which depends heavily on precluded 
specifics such as the level of financial and technological availability. Clause (b) 
serves merely as a placeholder for a future rationing mechanism, stipulating that a 
                                                 
224 It has been mentioned above that Green attempted to account for the importance of health care by 
placing it as the most important good in the index, creating weighting problems amongst the goods and 
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maximin delivery of health care must be cost-effective. In this way, the health care 
institution functions in accordance with maximin – by arranging any inequalities in 
medical allocation to work towards the greatest benefit of the medically least 
advantaged – on the condition that the allocation is consistent with those fair rationing 
techniques best employed by the society in question. In other words, maximin will 
guarantee that the medically least well-off can access the medical system, while 
QALYs or some similar mechanism will ascertain the most cost-effective treatment 
plan, financing treatment options in a fair and just manner.225  
 
4c. (i): Practical Implementation: Government Tier 
As a way of guaranteeing that the position of the medically least advantaged is 
maximised, the envisaged health care system must ensure that all people with a 
medical need have access to medical services. Having already ascertained that 
distribution according to holdings of income and wealth does not adequately satisfy 
medical needs, and hence does not adequately satisfy justice as fairness, it seems that 
maximin will require a taxpayer-funded nationalised health system. Bernard Williams 
articulated an appropriate policy for accessing this governmental first tier, when he 
said: “Leaving aside preventative medicine, the proper ground of distribution of 
medical care is ill-health: this is a necessary truth.”226  
Universal access is an expensive goal for the government to achieve. To keep 
the costs of the health care system down and bring additional funds into the system, I 
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believe it is best for the first tier to operate in a manner similar to Green’s scheme of 
progressive payment rates.227 It is important to note that progressive payments are not 
a direct implication of the amended second principle; the system is merely a practical 
mechanism to share the financial burden of carrying society’s sick and provide equal 
access. Those financially worst-off individuals will receive heavily subsidised 
medical care while society’s richest individuals will pay near full-price, with a 
sliding-scale of income-tested subsidies available to all between these two poles. The 
idea is that everyone in society will pay for medical care in proportion to their 
income; and likewise, everyone in society will be eligible for government subsidies. 
For example, the poorest representative individual may only pay one dollar, while the 
richest representative individual may only receive a one dollar subsidy on the same 
service.  
This progressive payment system has multiple advantages. Unpaid medical 
bills from society’s least well-off mean the costs of treatment is passed onto the rest 
of society in the form of higher costs for treatment, higher insurance premiums and 
co-payments, and higher deductibles. A recent paper released by the New America 
Foundation estimates the Californian average family pays $1,186 a year in “hidden 
taxes”, such as increased insurance premiums to cover unpaid bills left behind by 
society’s uninsured.228 In response to the outstanding debt, insurance companies stop 
offering coverage to certain groups in society, which leads to more people without 
insurance creating unpaid bills, and the whole cycle keeps repeating. By creating 
universal access to a decent minimum of health services, no more unaffordable debt 
will be created, breaking the cycle. Moreover, dependence on charity would 
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ultimately reduce, as only the most destitute and socially isolated disabled would not 
be able to find funds for care. Perhaps a more extensive welfare system could even 
rule out the need for medical charity entirely, by securing a decent minimum of 
income through sickness or unemployment benefits; although it is beyond the scope 
of this essay to argue for such non-medical welfare systems.  
Making people pay for health care prevents reckless overuse of medical 
services, while the progressive subsidies will make it affordable for all people to 
attend regular preventative check-ups. Making people pay for health care will also 
increase public awareness of price, improving the individual’s ability to make 
informed medical choices. This increased public awareness of costs will allow the 
nationalised system to function like a quasi-marketplace; discerning consumers can 
choose to purchase care from those providers who keep their prices low, eliminating 
the practise of defensive medicine and an artificial inflation of price. This will 
therefore reduce the taxpayers’ national bill for subsidising health care. Furthermore, 
it is often said that equal access is an expensive goal that can only be achieved by 
reducing the service quality and level of specialisation to a decent minimum; for 
example, much medical research and complicated surgery must be sacrificed for 
universal influenza shots and general practitioner visits. My proposed structure avoids 
this criticism, since progressive payment rates combined with revenue raised by taxes 
will undoubtedly bring millions of dollars of increased funding into the health care 
system. Increased funding will allow the government to provide a full-spectrum of 
needed medical services, providing what Norman Daniels calls a “high-option 
plan”.229 If these extra funds are spent on creating increased service options and 
quality, health care provision may be improved to the point where even Veatch’s 
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optimistic vision230 could be realised; we shall truly have the funds available to work 
our way up the list of the worst ailments before the question of financial limits is 
raised. 
 
4c. (ii): A Decent Minimum 
Because government tiers of universal access are expensive to provide and there is a 
very real danger of creating an open-ended obligation to satisfy medical need, there 
should only be a decent minimum of service necessary in the first tier. Having said 
this, owing to the increase in funding that progressive payments provide, the first tier 
should be a high-option decent minimum. The decent minimum ought to work in 
conjunction with rationing techniques; a decent minimum of medical services admits 
ailments X, Y, and Z, while QALYs decides whether a sufferer of X ailment is 
justified in receiving treatment option A or B. Attempts have been made to flesh out 
this idea of a high-option decent minimum, with each proposal being markedly 
different from the next. The World Health Organisation unrealistically suggests a 
broad array of provision, including comprehensive psychological and social 
services.231 On the other hand, Norman Daniels allegedly maintains that many 
psychological services are used disproportionately by the wealthy to increase their 
well-being, not necessarily to treat illness, and therefore these services must not be 
included in a taxpayer-funded decent minimum.232 The President’s Commission for 
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research 
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formulated a comprehensive report, Securing Access to Health Care, in which it was 
suggested that the government provide a decent minimum of “adequate care without 
being subject to excessive burdens”.233 The President’s Commission stopped short of 
clarifying this proposal in any great detail, admitting that the terms “adequacy” and 
“excessive burden” are “amorphous” and “relative” notions best defined by a 
professional consensus within the medical institution.234 Ronald Bayer, Daniel 
Callahan, Arthur Caplan and Bruce Jennings propose a similarly ambiguous notion; 
that all must have access to services of “medical necessity”.235 Bayer et al leave the 
notion of necessity largely unexplained, concluding along similar lines to the 
President’s Commission, that “necessity in medicine is an extraordinarily complex 
notion” which will change over time and between cultures, given the availability of 
resources.236  
While the conclusions of Bayer et al and The President’s Commission seem 
generally correct in the characterization of the terms “adequacy” and “necessity” as 
best defined by current medical practices, both terms require further explanation 
before their practical application can be taken seriously. The most likely way that 
professionals within the health care system will determine which services are 
adequate or necessary for a decent minimum is by looking at the average utilization 
of various medical procedures within society. For example, a prioritized list of 
necessary services can be created according to statistical frequency of use; perhaps 
qualified by factors such as the financial costs of treatment, prospects of treatment 
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success, and the importance the individual and society place on curing the ailment. In 
the USA, the Oregon State Health Board was the first to formulate such a prioritized 
list of necessary services as part of an attempt to expand Medicaid to 100 per cent of 
people below the state poverty line. The Oregon Basic Health Services Act of 1989 
made use of the QALYs approach, along with population census and common-sense 
adjustments, to classify 1600 medical services according to their degree of 
necessity.237 Oregon’s list is reviewed annually, with the prioritization technique still 
in use today to fund procedures relative to their line on the list. The 2006 catalogue 
begins with treatments for severe/moderate head injury and ends with disorders of the 
eye.238  
At first glance, defining necessary or adequate medical services by average 
statistical use and then creating a decent minimum list of necessary services works to 
the advantage of society’s least-advantaged. It frees up resources by sacrificing 
obscure or infrequently used services, in order to improve access to reasonably 
common services for society’s least well-off. Before 1989, the uninsured least well-
off would not have been able to access those sacrificed services in the first place, so 
the uninsured are benefited at the expense of the insured. In this way, list 
prioritization reduces overall inequality between the poor and the rest of society. 
While this process cannot be faulted as violating Rawls’ distributive maxim, list 
prioritization is morally problematic in the way it uses current statistical averages as a 
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means of defining a just allocation of funds.239 The Oregon Health Services 
Commission was naïve to think that it could determine a fair decent minimum of 
necessary services by looking at current consumption trends of society. In a way, the 
Commission takes an annual snapshot of the medical system, riddled with injustice 
and inequality, and defines medically necessary services based on this distorted 
picture. Because insured people use more health care than uninsured people, and 
because the rich use more health care than the poor, current averages in medical 
consumption are going to be stacked in favour of these particular groups. Daniels 
correctly objects that average trends of medical consumption will formulate a highly 
inaccurate list, which in reality reflects “average use by people in the upper-middle 
income levels”.240 When the list of so-called “necessary” services is used to determine 
a decent minimum, the resulting decent minimum will reflect the many injustices that 
are present in the current health care system and work to benefit those of upper-
middle income. 
Both Bayer et al and the President’s Commission remain vague at crucial 
points, particularly concerning definition of their propositions and suggestions for 
effective practical implementation. Determining a list of necessary or adequate 
services for society is an extremely complicated matter that requires extensive 
empirical knowledge about the health care institution, such as demographic-relative 
consumption, the importance of treatments to the individual and society, and general 
considerations of resource availability. What is more, the task of generating accurate 
lists is never-ending since the decisive variables and statistics are in continuous flux, 
as are medical technologies and treatment trends. Rather than creating a list based on 
                                                 
239 N. Daniels, (1985), p. 77. Daniels’ italics. 
240 N. Daniels, (1985), p. 77 
 141 
societal averages, a preferable alternative to prioritization lists is to determine a 
specific criterion, where all services within the decent minimum will have in common 
a morally relevant characteristic, while those legitimately excludable from funding 
will lack that feature.  
Charles Fried proposed that decent minimum services are distinctive in 
ensuring “tolerable life prospects in general.”241 He goes on to state the decent 
minimum “should speak quite strongly towards things like maternal and child health, 
which set the terms under which individuals will complete and develop.”242 Fried’s 
criterion is perhaps even more obscure than the terms “necessity” and “adequacy”; his 
idea of “tolerable life prospects” is flawed by interpersonal subjectivity. As John 
Arras succinctly asked, “tolerable to whom?”243 
Norman Daniels has produced one of the more readily acceptable criteria for 
decent minimum services, stating that a decent minimum of health services will bring 
individuals back into the range of “species-typical normal functioning”.244 Normal 
functioning is important to Daniels, because departures from this norm reduce 
individuals’ opportunities to construct and fulfill their life plan or conception of the 
good. By ensuring an individual is kept within the range of species-typical normal 
function, the health care institution secures or restores an individual’s range of equal 
opportunities. The decent minimum generated by this criterion is a plan of services 
prioritized and funded in accordance with the negative impact a disease has on an 
individual’s possible opportunities. Those that impair opportunity the most would 
receive priority and proportionately more funding, given other important 
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considerations such as the costs of treatment. Without having to refer to current health 
trends or make value laden assumptions about which life prospects are tolerable, this 
principled account appears to be successful to some degree. Species-typical normal 
function also has the benefit of excluding many historically and culturally relative 
“diseases”, such as drapetomania. Nevertheless, a clear empirical notion of health and 
disease is still required to rank deviations from species-typical function. Lacking 
adequate empirical knowledge of the human condition, Daniels is reluctant to 
speculate on which disorders place a person beyond normal function. He also fails to 
provide a procedure for evaluating which ailments restrict opportunity more than 
others. In one telling example, he does state that a blocked nose constitutes deviation 
from normal function, while unwanted pregnancy does not.245 Daniels also claims, 
“adding mental disease and health into the picture complicates the issue further, most 
particularly because we have a less well-developed theory of species-typical mental 
functions and functional organization.”246 Having given a criterion for defining the 
decent minimum of service, Daniels simply turns the task of further defining species-
typical normal function and disease over to those involved in the bio-medical 
sciences.  
 
4c. (iii): Practical Implementation: Market Tier 
Finally, there is no reason why this philosophical system would not allow a free 
market of health care providers to operate alongside the government-provided tier. 
This second tier will obviously be unsubsidised, will therefore be more expensive 
than most people could or would be willing to afford, and will arguably be of a higher 
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quality of service than the first. It is even possible that having two tiers will 
undermine the quality of the government’s first, as asserted by McCreadie,247 
producing unequal health levels that are directly influenced by income and wealth. 
While these were all problematic for Veatch’s strict egalitarianism, the amended 
difference principle does not require equal levels of health. It does not even require 
that the medically worst-off have access to the best medical services available in 
society. It only requires that any medical inequalities that are present in society work 
to the advantage of the medically least-advantaged. So long as the first tier is 
accessible to all who have a medical need, then a free market allocation in accordance 
with income and wealth is allowed to offer higher quality goods and services. 
Moreover, since the free market promotes provider and consumer autonomy and 
eliminates the threat of medical black markets it is morally and factually desirable for 
a market system to work alongside the governmental tier. When both tiers operate 
side by side, the total system satisfies almost all imaginable medical needs and 
preferences. If there is enough demand for obscure medical procedure it will be 
satisfied by the market tier, while all other medical needs will be met by the high-
option nationalised tier.  
 
4d: A Summary and Conclusions of Distributive Sections 
It is desirable for a health care system to satisfy the objectively ascribable medical 
needs of the medically least well-off, by providing a decent quantity and quality of 
medical options under conditions that maximise consumer and provider autonomy. 
Utilitarian macro-allocation was refuted on the grounds that it advocates a semi-
genocidal health policy that will exclude a medical underclass in order to improve 
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care for the majority. I then acknowledged the cost-benefit approach of QALYs as an 
ideal mechanism for rationing at the level of micro-allocation. Health care distribution 
regulated entirely by the laissez-faire distributional principle – to each according to 
their personal share of income and wealth – was shown to be far from efficient, falling 
short of medical justice. As seen in my case study of the United States, market 
transactions are often guided by a self-interested policy of maximising financial 
returns, rather than creating an equitable distribution of goods and services. The 
competitive nature of laissez-faire distribution forces medical providers to introduce 
cost-cutting measures that are ill-suited for health care, creating excessive financial 
burdens on the medical consumer and reducing access to care for the medically and 
financially least advantaged. Privatisation also promotes the attitude that doctors are 
just another market commodity that can be brought, sold, and sued if they fail to live 
up to consumer expectations. This generates a fear of malpractice litigation, which 
destroys the sacred patient-doctor relationship and encourages the wasteful practice of 
defensive medicine. What is perhaps most worrying to the moral philosopher is the 
way in which the insurance industries actively obstruct the flow of health-related 
information to the consumer. Reducing the consumers’ access to health related 
information is an immoral cost-saving technique that is designed to under-insure the 
medically least well-off and hence reduce the company’s cost of caring for the sick. 
This policy primarily disadvantages the medically and financially least well-off 
groups in society. I find that these major problems, along with many more issues 
outlined in Section 3b, make the medical market an inadequate mechanism for 
satisfying medical needs.  
This is not to say, however, that the medical marketplace must be shunned 
entirely for just health care to prevail. It is beneficial for society to allow free-market 
 145 
transactions in medicine, because the medical market place improves consumer 
choice and autonomy if it operates alongside a nationalised health system. This 
nationalised system must work to satisfy the medical needs of those who cannot, for 
whatever reason, access the private market. As discussed in Section 3b (iii), having 
these two tiers working alongside one another will eliminate the most serious 
problems with medical markets and provide universal access for those in medical 
need. 
In choosing an adequate distributional principle for the nationalised tier I 
rejected a principle of strong equal access on the grounds that the position is 
theoretically and practically flawed. In theory, this strict egalitarianism is based on a 
discontinuity of the health care system, which relies on the false proposition that all 
health care needs are undeserved, unpredictable, and of overriding importance 
whenever they occur. Discontinuity also places health care on such a high moral 
pedestal that it cannot account for health care’s diminished importance in outstanding 
circumstances, such as imminent military invasion. In practical application, the strict 
equal access principle fails for two reasons. First, the principle is incompatible with a 
medical marketplace and therefore restricts patient and provider autonomy, 
encouraging medical black-markets. Second, because strict equality necessarily 
collapses the services of the second tier into the nationalised first tier, this requires a 
levelling down of service quality and quantity. Moreover, the demands placed on the 
nationalised tier to raise quality and quantity will be too great to succeed within a 
society of limited resources, ultimately disadvantaging society’s worst-off. 
It is proposed that Justice as Fairness best captures the concept of medical 
distributive justice. By placing the share of medical services required to satisfy 
medical needs as a primary social good, it becomes a demand of social justice that 
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society provide enough resources to satisfy the health needs of the medically least-
advantaged. In order to fairly restrict treatment options for the medically 
irreconcilable, a modified maximin is suggested to permit the use of rationing 
techniques, such as the QALYs approach. A government provided decent minimum 
of services, defined and prioritised by referencing the procedure’s effect on species-
typical normal function, will arrange inequalities in the health care system to work to 
benefit the medically least well-off. This proposed system will not hinder private 
medical research and will permit government medical research, so long as the 
research fits into the criterion of a service required within the decent minimum. It is 
proposed that all people must pay to access the first tier, with universal taxpayer-
funded subsidies provided on an income-tested sliding scale. Making the medical 
consumer pay for services has the primary practical benefit of bringing extra funds 
into medical system, which shall be used to expand the quality and quantity of the 
decent minimum. Moreover, making people pay will allow the governmental tier to be 
influenced by beneficial market forces; competition between providers will prevent an 
artificial inflation of the health care bill, and the price of services shall be dictated by 
the consumption demands of the people. A primary moral benefit of making people 
pay for services is that it enables the consumer to make cost-conscious medical 
decisions, transforming the role of the patient from a passive observer into a fully 
autonomous and active participant in medical decision making. If consumers are 
allowed to make fully informed choices within a medical system, then prudent 
purchasing by the people will work as cost-control for the macro-allocation of health 
care. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
The universal human right to health care is a cliché that is frequently invoked by 
politicians and various activist groups to express the idea that inequalities in the 
distribution of medical resources are unjust. These disgruntled social reformers are 
largely uninformed as to the nature of human rights, claiming that any society in 
which citizens go without comprehensive medical services is in violation of Article 25 
of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Politicians and rights 
activists often make exaggerated and expectant claims about the progress of medical 
technology and the accomplishments of the health care system, which only serve to 
distort the public conception of human rights and social justice in general. 
Furthermore, the United Nations itself is also the source of much misrepresentation of 
the nature of human rights, by making the strong universal claim that “[e]veryone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
of his family, including… medical care and necessary social services… and the right 
to security in the event of… sickness, disability,… old age or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control.”248 In this paper, I have attempted to elucidate 
the human right to health care, explaining what it actually means for a person to hold 
such a right. As well as outlining the implications this right has for the individual, this 
paper has explained the obligation that the right imposes on society. An appropriate 
distributive mechanism has also been proposed, based in Rawlsian justice as fairness, 
which will fulfill society’s duty to the medically needy in the fairest manner possible, 
assuming a situation of scarce medical resources.    
  
                                                 
248 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 2007),  See: Appendix 1. 
 148 
The human right to health care is a second generation welfare right, which 
finds its origin in the socialist tradition of socio-economic arrangements designed to 
secure access to important institutions such as education, housing, employment and 
health care. Welfare rights are embodied in Articles 22 – 27 of the UDHR, so the right 
to health care, being Article 25, finds itself squarely in the centre of this second 
generation. I have argued, contrary to popular philosophical opinion, that not all 
socio-economic rights are to positive assistance. Within the medical institution, 
preventive care or quarantine can often be the best medicinal course available; a 
largely inexpensive act of omission is enacted by the medical institution in order to 
satisfy medical needs. It has therefore been concluded that the right to health care is a 
second generation right that contains elements of negative duties of omission and 
positive duties of assistance. Furthermore, in a system of limited resources, expensive 
second generation rights frequently come into conflict and must be traded-off against 
one another. It is legitimate for a government to override some human rights in order 
to secure other “more important” rights, or to obtain a substantial public benefit. For 
this reason, I have defined the right to health care as a prima facie right. This means 
that the right to health care is not alienated if conflicting rights or considerations of 
the greater public good receive priority of implementation. As Beauchamp and Faden 
poetically point out, there cannot be multiple absolutes without contradiction: 
“virtually all agree that no right always has the right of way when rights themselves 
come into conflicting traffic.”249  
I have argued that a theory of human rights is only a part of a more general 
account that stakes out a valid claim to socio-economic goods. In order to uncover the 
true nature of rights, an ethical theory of respondent obligation must be devised that 
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explains the varying strength of obligation that human rights impose on respondents. I 
have argued that respondent obligation can vary in weight; from strong obligations 
where a particular right and duty are necessarily co-existent, to weak obligations 
where, as a matter of normative modality, fulfilment of obligation is not required. The 
right to health care seems to be the prime example of an “open textured”250 or 
ambiguous right, with the strength of obligation imposed on respondent institutions 
depending very much on varying situational contexts. Owing to this “firm but untidy 
correlation between rights and obligation”,251 and because the UDHR is ill-defined in 
its formulation, I have concluded that exercising a right to health care will not always 
necessitate a response from health care providers. When combined with the prima 
facie nature of rights, the effective exercise of the right to health care is severely 
weakened by variable factors, such as the availability of financial resources, society’s 
level of technological development, the considered prioritisation of competing social 
projects, and the demands of the greater good. 
The above description of the right to health care portrays the right as fickle. 
Under certain circumstances that are very real and imminent in many societies, 
Article 25 may be weakened to the point that it is frequently overruled by competing 
moral considerations. The lightweight nature of the right could be viewed by some 
critics as bringing its very existence into question, particularly in light of criticism 
from cultural relativist and anti-foundationalist philosophers. For this reason, I 
dedicated considerable space in this paper to securing the relatively universal and 
inalienable existence of the right to health care. It is proposed that the right has ethical 
foundations in the moral requirement to respond to basic and instinctive human needs. 
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In order to determine those needs that are relevant to justice, it was suggested that the 
medical institution concerns itself with survival and development needs. This 
approach grounds the existence of rights that fulfil scientifically ascertainable survival 
needs, such as a minimum quantity of essential nutrients, and also expands this 
scientific conception to include developmental needs, such as freedoms of expression, 
association, religious practise, and non-interference. The health care system can easily 
be understood as an institution concerned with helping people survive. What is more, 
modern health care institutions are also intimately concerned with the development of 
patients, and even the development of members of the wider healthy community. 
Medical practitioners not only help people to survive physiologically by treating 
debilitating diseases, but also provide rehabilitative, educational and social working 
services that aid people in their psychological, social and even spiritual development. 
It was proposed that all relevant survival and development needs must fit into a 
truncated scale, with the most urgent and objectively ascribable medical needs being 
fulfilled first.  
This survival and development approach has the supreme benefit of providing 
a way to indirectly ground normative claims in empirically determinable factors, 
without violating the logical rule that you cannot deduce an “ought” (human rights) 
from an “is” (human survival and development needs). The two considerations – 
human rights and empirically determinable needs – are logically independent from 
one another, yet the latter provides an excellent reason why the former is worthy of 
respect. Some critics of human rights will find it problematic that, despite numerous 
attempts, no foundation has been proven absolutely, objectively, or logically true. 
This is not only a problem concerning rights theory, but ethical theory in general.  
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In the course of arguing the above foundational approach, I encountered a 
substantial relativist objection to universal human rights, which stated that strict 
universality denies the ethical autonomy of some non-western cultures. This objection 
served as the first premise of Jack Donnelly’s theory for relatively weak universalism, 
which proposes that many traditional cultures do not and cannot understand 
fundamental concepts necessary for human rights claims, such as “equality” and 
“individual”. In societies where a level of respect for human beings is maintained 
through alternative means such as religion or tribal hierarchy, it must be accepted that 
these rules can perform identical functions and achieve the same beneficial ends as 
human rights. I find that the strict universality of human rights, as portrayed by the 
UDHR, must be weakened, out of a need to respect the ideologies of those “lower” 
moral communities who do not share the same moral aspirations or needs of the 
Western Liberal Democratic tradition. 
I find that the main problem with human rights charters is that they read like a 
child’s Christmas wish list; the representative level of resources chosen by the authors 
of the United Nations declarations was too high to successfully protect all the interests 
it addresses. Throughout this thesis I have portrayed the successful exercise of the 
right to health care as being dependent on situational contexts, such as the availability 
of financial resources, society’s level of technological development, the considered 
prioritisation of competing social projects, and the demands of the greater good. As a 
result, it seems that people are justified in claiming a right to health care only if it can 
be harvested from an acceptable theory of distributive justice, because if there are no 
mechanisms for health care allocation, then the right to receive medical care is 
reduced to impractical rhetoric. Some philosophers have even gone so far as to argue 
that a right to health care is unintelligible, even as abstract theory, without a particular 
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distributive framework in which to view it. I have attempted to address the contextual 
restrictions on practical implementation by articulating a theory of distributive justice 
for health care; given that not all people can be equally treated, an adequate theory of 
distributive justice shall decide which representative individuals must miss out.  
Distribution by Quality Adjusted Life Years was proposed and accepted as an 
ideal mechanism for deciding between treatment options. It was argued that the cost-
benefit calculation plays an important role in the distribution of medical resources, 
whenever a choice must be made between competing treatment options. I have 
concluded that the QALYs approach is philosophically defensible and a practically 
useful tool for conducting cost-benefit assessments on a micro-allocative level. 
Three distributive principles for macro-allocation were criticised and 
ultimately rejected: a utilitarian maximisation of the greatest good, distribution in 
accordance with income and wealth, and distribution in order to produce a strict 
equality of health levels. Rawlsian justice as fairness was accepted as being the most 
equitable way for society to satisfy medical needs; however, it was not accepted 
without qualification. The share of health services needed to satisfy some objective 
measure of health was added to Rawls’ primary social goods list. To avoid situations 
of medical black holes reducing society to a level of poverty in the name of maximin, 
Rawls’ second principle was adjusted to permit the utilisation of rationing techniques, 
such as QALYs, when distributing to the medically least well-off. I then proceeded to 
argue that practical implementation of the second principle will be eased by instituting 
a taxpayer-funded national health system, with universal access provided according to 
income tested progressive payments. The idea is that all must make out-of-pocket 
payments to access the health care institution and all shall receive state funded 
subsidies to ease the burden of these payments, relative to the individual’s level of 
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income. Owing to limited funds within the health care system, it has been proposed 
that government is only obliged to supply a so-called decent minimum of health care 
services. A decent minimum of health care services will be designed to bring the 
medically least well-off back within the range of species-typical normal function, and 
will be prioritised with regard to the impact an ailment has on the patient’s range of 
opportunities. For example, those ailments that impair opportunity most severely 
would be included in the decent minimum, will receive treatment priority, and will 
receive proportionately more funding relative to other important considerations such 
as the costs of treatment. Finally, there is no reason why this philosophical system 
would not allow a free market of health care providers to operate alongside the 
government-provided tier. Since the free market promotes provider and consumer 
autonomy and eliminates the threat of medical black markets, it is morally and 
factually desirable for a market system to work alongside the governmental tier. 
When both tiers operate side by side, the total system satisfies almost all imaginable 
medical needs and preferences. If there is enough demand for an obscure medical 
procedure it will be satisfied by the market tier, while most other medical needs will 
be met by the high-option nationalised tier.     
As a final note to my conclusion, it is worth mentioning that one week before 
this thesis is going to print, the Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
announced controversial health care reforms that fundamentally resemble my 
proposed system. The plan consists of three basic premises; cost containment, 
universal coverage for the medically least well-off, and an emphasis on public 
education for health related issues.252 If the plan is ratified by General Council, 100 
                                                 
252 Office of the Governor, Press Release, <http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/5057/> (20th of 
January, 2007) 
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per cent of Californians will be required by law to purchase “a minimum level”253 of 
health insurance, with substantial state subsidies for those who cannot afford private 
insurance. While the state subsidies are not as extensive as I have proposed, all 
citizens below 250 per cent of the federal poverty line shall receive some form of 
subsidy.254 The most controversial aspect of the proposal has been universal access, as 
many private citizens have objected to having their tax dollars spent on subsidising 
insurance for vagrants or illegal immigrants, who do not pay state tax. The state 
reform also proposes that government will have increased powers of regulation over 
private insurance companies, demanding that no providers shall continue the current 
practice of denying coverage or increasing the price of coverage based on age and 
health status. To lower the administrative costs of the health system, the state will also 
mandate in law that 85 per cent of every dollar spent by medical and insurance 
providers must be dedicated specifically to the health care of patients. Moreover, to 
increase consumer autonomy and improve the patient’s ability to make informed 
health decisions, Gov. Schwarzenegger proposes to establish “a one-stop resource for 
information on health plan performance… to increase the transparency of quality of 
care and [to provide] access to other information to help inform consumers.”255  
California’s proposed health care plan is certainly interesting and, had it been 
announced earlier, I would have enjoyed examining it in greater detail with reference 
to my thesis topic of human rights and just health care distribution. On first look, the 
                                                 
253 Office of the Governor, Governor’s Health Care Proposal, 
<http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/Governors_HC_Proposal.pdf> (20th of January, 2007) 
254 For example, if the federal poverty line for a family of four is defined as an income below 
US$20,000 per year. Those earning under US$50,000 will receive subsidy from Gov. 
Schwarzenegger’s scheme.  
Office of the Governor, Governor’s Health Care Proposal, 
<http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/Governors_HC_Proposal.pdf> (20th of January, 2007)   
255 Office of the Governor, Governor’s Health Care Proposal, 
<http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/Governors_HC_Proposal.pdf> (20th of January, 2007)   
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plan appears to address the majority of issues raised in this paper; it is particularly 
responsive to almost all of the injustices mentioned in Chapter Three, concerning 
inequities in the US health care system. Arnold Schwarzenegger (or at least the team 
of advisers he formed to tackle the health care issue) appears to be one of the few 
politicians who takes the right to health care as more than just a vote-winning cliché. 
He seems to understand the moral importance of equitable health care distribution in 
society and has the political nerve to provide state funded universal access, grounded 
in the moral premise of satisfying the needs of the medically least well-off. It is true 
that justice in health care costs a huge amount of money; however, as I have 
demonstrated in this paper, it is possible to make fiscal responsibility and ethical 
responsibility concurrent.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 156 
References 
 
Arras, John. “Health Care Vouchers for the Poor and the Rhetoric of Equity” Hastings 
Center Report 11:4:1981 
 
 
Arrow, Kenneth. “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of Justice” 
Journal of Philosophy 70:9:1973:245-263 
 
 
Bay, Christian. “Human Needs and Political Education” In: R. Fitzgerald (ed.) Human 
Needs and Politics (Rushcutters Bay: Pergamon Press, 1977) 
 
___________. “Self Respect as a Human Right: Thoughts on the Dialectics of Wants 
and Needs in the Struggle for Human Community” Human Rights Quarterly 
4:1:1982:53-75 
 
 
Bayer, Ronald., Daniel Callahan, Arthur Caplan, and Bruce Jennings. “Towards 
Justice in Health Care” The American Journal of Public Health 
75:5:1988:583-588 
 
___________., Daniel Callahan, Arthur Caplan, and Bruce Jennings. “Towards 
Justice in Health Care” In: T. Beauchamp and L. Walters (eds.) Contemporary 
Issues in Bioethics: 4th Edition (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994) 
 
 
Bayles, Michael D. “Reparations to Wronged Groups” Analysis 33:6:1973:182-184 
 
 
Beauchamp, Tom L., and Richard R. Faden. “The Right to Health and the Right to 
Health Care” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4:2:1979:118-131 
 
 
Bell, Nora K. “The Scarcity of Medical Resources: Are There Rights to Health Care?” 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4:2:1979:158-169 
 
 
Berlin, Isaiah. “Two Concepts of Liberty” In: Four Essays on Liberty: New Edition 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
 
 
Braybrooke, David. “Abstract of Comments” Nous 4:1:1970:56-57   
 
_______________. “The Firm but Untidy Correlativity of Rights and Obligations” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1:3:1972:351-363 
 
 
 157 
Buchanan, Allen. “An Ethical Evaluation of Health Care in the U.S.” In: T. 
Beauchamp and L. Walters (eds.) Contemporary issues in bioethics: 4th 
edition (Belmont: Wadsworth publishing co., 1994) 
 
_____________. “Privatisation and Just Health Care” Bioethics 9:1995:220-239 
 
 
Charny, M. C., P.A. Lewis and S. C. Farrow. “Choosing Who Shall Not be Treated in 
the NHS” Social Science and Medicine 28:12:1989:1331-1338 
 
 
Childress, James F. “A Right to Health Care?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
4:2:1979:135-141 
 
 
Cohen, Gerald A. “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice” Ethics 99:1989:906-944  
 
 
Cowan, Joseph L. “Inverse Discrimination” Analysis 33:1:1972:10-12 
 
 
Daniels, Norman. “Rights to Health Care and Distributive Justice: Programmatic 
Worries” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4:2:1979:174-191 
 
_____________. Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
 
 
Donnelly, Jack. “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-
Western Conceptions of Human Rights” The American Political Science 
Review 76:2:1982:303-316 
 
____________. “Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights” Human Rights 
Quarterly 6:4:1984:400-419 
 
____________. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1989) 
 
____________. Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice: 2nd Edition 
(London: Cornell University Press, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 158 
Dworkin, Ronald. “Hard Cases” Harvard Law Review 88:6:1975:1057-1109 
 
______________. Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977) 
 
______________. Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1977) 
 
______________. “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 10:3:1981:283-345 
 
______________. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 
(Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2000) 
 
 
Edgar, Andrew., Sam Salek, Darren Shickle, and David Cohen. The Ethical QALY: 
Ethical Issues in Healthcare Resource Allocation (Haslemere, U.K.: Euromed 
Communications, 1998) 
 
 
Engelhardt jnr., Tristram. “Rights to Health Care: A Critical Appraisal” Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 4:2:1979:113-117 
 
 
English, Dan. Bioethics: A Clinical Guide for Medical Students (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1994) 
 
 
Enthoven, Alain. C., and Richard Kronick. “A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 
1990’s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality 
and Economy” In: T. Beauchamp and L. Walters (eds.) Contemporary Issues 
in Bioethics: 4th Edition (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994) 
 
 
Fabre, Cecile. Social Rights Under the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000) 
 
 
Finnis, John. Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 
 
 
Fletcher, Joseph. “Ethics and Health Care Delivery: Computers and Distributive 
Justice” In: R. Veatch and R. Branson (eds.) Ethics and Health Policy 
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976) 
 
 
Fleurbaey, Marc. “Equal Opportunity for Equal Social Outcome” Economics and 
Philosophy 11:1995:25-55 
 
_____________. “Egalitarian Opportunities” Law and Philosophy 20:5:2001:499-530 
 159 
Freeman, Michael. “The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights” Human Rights 
Quarterly 16:3:1994:491-514 
 
 
Fried, Charles. “Equality and Rights in Medical Care” Hastings Centre Report 
6:1976:29-34 
 
___________. Right and Wrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
 
 
Gewirth, Alan. Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 
 
___________. “Rights and Duties” Mind 97:387:1988:441-445   
 
 
Green, Reginald. “Basic Human Rights/Needs: Some Problems of Categorical 
Translation and Unification” Review of the International Commission of 
Jurists 27:1981:53-58  
 
 
Green, Ronald. “Health Care and Justice in Contract Theory Perspective” In: R. 
Veatch and R. Branson (eds.) Ethics and Health policy (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976) 
 
 
Hadorn, David C. “The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality of Life and Public 
Policy” Hastings Center Report, 21:3:1991:S11 
 
 
Hanson, Robin D. “Why Health is not Special: Errors Involved in Bioethics 
Intuitions” Social Philosophy and Policy 19:2:2002:153-179 
 
 
Locke, John. “Second Treatise of Government” In: J. W. Gough (ed.) The Second 
Treatise of Government, and a Letter Concerning Toleration (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1946) 
 
_________. “Works” In: W. Yolton (ed.) The Works of John Locke 1632-1704: 9th 
edition, (London: Routledge, 1997) 
 
 
Lockwood, Michael. “Quality of life and Resource Allocation” In: J. Bell and S. 
Mendus (eds.) Philosophy and Medical Welfare (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988) 
 
 
 
 
 
 160 
Lyons, David. “The Correlativity of Rights and Duties” Nous 4:1:1970:45-55 
 
___________., and Michael Teitelman. “Symposium: A Theory of Justice by John 
Rawls” Journal of Philosophy 69:18:1972:535-557 
 
___________. Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994) 
 
 
McCreadie, Claudine. “Rawlsian Justice and the Financing of the National Health 
Service” Journal of Social Policy 5:2:1976:113-130 
 
 
McKie, John., Jeff Richardson, Peter Singer, and Helga Kuhse. The Allocation of 
Health Care Resources: An Ethical Evaluation of the Q.A.L.Y Approach 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) 
 
 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 
1981) 
 
 
Maslow, Abraham. Motivation and Personality: 2nd Edition (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1970)  
 
 
Mill, John Stuart. “Utilitarianism” In: G. Sher (ed) Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1979) 
 
_____________. “On Liberty” In: John Gray (ed.) On Liberty and Other Essays 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 
 
 
Moore, Michael. “Good without god” In: R. P. George (ed.) Natural Law, Liberalism, 
and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
 
 
Nielsen, Kai. “The myth of natural law” In: S. Hook (ed.) Law and Philosophy (New 
York: New York University Press, 1964) 
 
 
O’Manique, John. “Universal and Inalienable Rights: A Search for Foundations” 
Human Rights Quarterly 12:4:1990:465-285 
 
______________. “Human Rights and Development” Human Rights Quarterly 
14:1:1992:78-103 
 
 
Otsuka, Michael. “Luck, Insurance, and Equality” Ethics 113:1:2002:40-56 
 161 
Outka, Gene. “Social Justice and Equal Access to Health Care” Journal of Religious 
Ethics 2:1974:11-32 
 
 
Plato, “Euthyphro” In: H. Tredennick and H. Tarrant (eds.) The Last Days of Socrates 
(London: Penguin, 1993) 
 
 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research, The. Securing Access to Health Care 
Volume One: The Ethical Implications of Differences in the Availability of 
Health Services (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983) 
 
 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) 
 
_________. “Social Unity and Primary Goods” In: A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.) 
Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
 
_________. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard university 
Press, 2001) 
 
 
Sade, Robert M. “Medical Care as a Right: A Refutation” The New England Journal 
of Medicine 285:1971:1288-1292 
 
 
Scanlon, Thomas M. “Preference and Urgency” Journal of Philosophy 
72:19:1975:655-669 
 
 
Shue, Henry. “Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy” 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)  
 
 
Siegler, Michael. “Right to Health Care: Ambiguity, Professional Responsibility, and 
Patient Liberty” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4:2:1979:148-157 
 
 
Singer, Peter. “Freedoms and Utilities in the Distribution of Health Care” In: R. 
Veatch and R. Branson (eds.) Ethics and Health Policy (Cambridge: Ballinger 
Publishing Co., 1976) 
 
 
Vallentyne, Peter. “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities” 
Ethics 112:3:2002:529-559 
 
 
 162 
Veatch, Robert. “Who Should Pay for the Smokers Health Care?” Hastings Center 
Report 4:1974:8-9 
 
____________. “What is a “Just” Health Care Delivery?” In: R. Veatch and R. 
Branson (eds.) Ethics and Health Policy (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing 
Co., 1976) 
 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. “A Right to do Wrong” Ethics 92:1:1981:21-39 
 
_____________. “Rights” In: R. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds.) A Companion to 
Contemporary Philosophy (Massachusetts: Blackwell Malden, 1998) 
 
 
Wang, Andrew J. “Key Concepts in Evaluating Outcomes of A.T.P. Funding of 
Medical Technologies” Journal of Technology Transfer 23:2:1998:61-65; also 
at The National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Key Concepts in 
Evaluating Outcomes of A.T.P. Funding of Medical Technologies” 
<http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/jtt/wang.htm> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
Weston, Burns. “Human Rights” Human Rights Quarterly 6:3:1984:257-283  
 
 
Williams, Bernard. “The Idea of Equality” In: Hugo Bedau (ed.) Justice and Equality, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971) 
 
 
Electronic Resources 
 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, “Employer and Insurance Trends”, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap6/employer/ch6_Slide_2.ht
ml> (15th of January, 2007)    
 
 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, “Engaging Consumers”, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap2/general/ch2_Slide_4.htm
l> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, “Engaging Consumers”, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap2/general/ch2_Slide_7.htm
l> (15th of January, 2007)   
 
 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, “Expanding Access to Care”, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap5/uninsured/ch5_Slide_3.h
tml> (15th of January, 2007)  
 
 163 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, “Homepage”, <http://www.bcbs.com/> (15th 
January, 2007) 
 
 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, “Increasing efficiency and Information 
sharing”, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap4/healthit/ch4_Slide_6.htm
l> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, “National Health Care Trends”, 
<http://www.bcbs.com/betterknowledge/mcrg/chap1/> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
Human and Constitutional Rights, “Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the 
Citizen”, <http://www.hrcr.org/docs/frenchdec.html> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
Murphy, Mark. “The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics” In: Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Winter 2002 Edition 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/natural-law-ethics/> (15th 
of January, 2007)   
 
 
New America Foundation, “A Premium Price”, 
<http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/a_premium_price> (15th of 
January, 2007) 
 
 
Office of the Governor, “Governor’s Health Care Proposal”, 
<http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/Governors_HC_Proposal.pdf> (20th of January, 
2007) 
 
 
Office of the Governor, “Press Release”, <http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-
release/5057/> (20th of January, 2007) 
 
 
Oregon Health Services Commission, “Prioritized List of Health Services: October 
1st, 2006”, <http://egov.oregon.gov/DAS/OHPPR/HSC/docs/Oct06Plist.pdf> 
(15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Declaration on the Right to 
Development”, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm> (15th of 
January, 2007) 
 
 
 164 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights”, <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (15th of January, 
2007) 
 
 
The US Constitution Online, “The Declaration of Independence”, 
<http://www.usconstitution.net/declar.html> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
The World Health Organisation, “Countries: New Zealand”, 
<http://www.who.int/countries/nzl/en/> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
The World Health Organisation, “Countries: USA”, 
<http://www.who.int/countries/usa/en/> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
US Census Bureau, “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United 
States”, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf> (15th of 
January, 2007) 
 
 
US Department of Health and Human Services, “Effects of Health Care Spending on 
the US Economy”, <http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/costgrowth/index.htm> (15th of 
January, 2007) 
 
 
US Department of Health and Human Services, “Glossary”, 
<http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/glossary/default.asp?Letter=M&Language=En
glish> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
US Department of Health and Human Services, “Medicare Part B”, 
<http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareGenInfo/03_Part%20B.asp#TopOfPage> 
(15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
US Department of Labour, “FAQ about COBRA”, 
<http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_cobra.html> (15th of January, 
2007) 
 
 
 
 165 
Wang, Andrew J. “Key Concepts in Evaluating Outcomes of A.T.P. Funding of 
Medical Technologies” Journal of Technology Transfer 23:2:1998:61-65; also 
at The National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Key Concepts in 
Evaluating Outcomes of A.T.P. Funding of Medical Technologies” 
<http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/jtt/wang.htm> (15th of January, 2007) 
 
 
World Health Organization Regional Office for South-East Asia, “Constitution of the 
World Health Organization”, 
<http://www.searo.who.int/EN/Section898/Section1441.htm> (15th of January, 
2007),  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 166 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Preamble 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world,  
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which 
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and 
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,  
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, 
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by 
the rule of law,  
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between 
nations,  
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the 
equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom,  
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the 
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms,  
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest 
importance for the full realization of this pledge,  
Now, therefore,  
The General Assembly,  
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every 
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching 
and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive 
measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves 
and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.  
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Article 1  
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.  
Article 2  
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional 
or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it 
be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.  
Article 3  
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.  
Article 4  
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be 
prohibited in all their forms.  
Article 5  
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.  
Article 6  
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.  
Article 7  
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in 
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.  
Article 8  
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.  
Article 9  
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.  
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Article 10  
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any 
criminal charge against him.  
Article 11  
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the 
guarantees necessary for his defence.  
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal 
offence was committed.  
Article 12  
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.  
Article 13  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of each State.  
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return 
to his country.  
Article 14  
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.  
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising 
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations.  
Article 15  
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.  
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to 
change his nationality.  
Article 16  
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to 
equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.  
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2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses.  
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the State.  
Article 17  
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others.  
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.  
Article 18  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.  
Article 19  
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.  
Article 20  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.  
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.  
Article 21  
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives.  
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.  
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent 
free voting procedures.  
Article 22  
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance 
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.  
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Article 23  
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.  
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal 
work.  
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and 
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.  
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests.  
Article 24  
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working 
hours and periodic holidays with pay.  
Article 25  
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack 
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.  
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All 
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social 
protection.  
Article 26  
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be 
compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally 
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of 
merit.  
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality 
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all 
nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of peace.  
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to 
their children.  
Article 27  
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits.  
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2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author.  
Article 28  
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.  
Article 29  
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.  
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of 
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare 
in a democratic society.  
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.  
Article 30  
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”  
 
Retrieved from the World Wide Web on the 15th of January, 2007.  
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm>  
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Appendix 2: Declaration on the Right to Development 
 
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 on the 4th of December, 1986. 
 
The General Assembly, 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
relating to the achievement of international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian nature, and in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,  
Recognizing that development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and 
political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and 
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits 
resulting therefrom,  
Considering that under the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in that Declaration can be fully realized,  
Recalling the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,  
Recalling further the relevant agreements, conventions, resolutions, recommendations 
and other instruments of the United Nations and its specialized agencies concerning 
the integral development of the human being, economic and social progress and 
development of all peoples, including those instruments concerning decolonization, 
the prevention of discrimination, respect for and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the maintenance of international peace and security and the 
further promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter,  
Recalling the right of peoples to self-determination, by virtue of which they have the 
right freely to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development,  
Recalling also the right of peoples to exercise, subject to the relevant provisions of 
both International Covenants on Human Rights, full and complete sovereignty over all 
their natural wealth and resources,  
Mindful of the obligation of States under the Charter to promote universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status,  
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Considering that the elimination of the massive and flagrant violations of the human 
rights of the peoples and individuals affected by situations such as those resulting 
from colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, all forms of racism and racial 
discrimination, foreign domination and occupation, aggression and threats against 
national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity and threats of war would 
contribute to the establishment of circumstances propitious to the development of a 
great part of mankind,  
Concerned at the existence of serious obstacles to development, as well as to the 
complete fulfilment of human beings and of peoples, constituted, inter alia, by the 
denial of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and considering that all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent and that, 
in order to promote development, equal attention and urgent consideration should be 
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights and that, accordingly, the promotion of, respect for and 
enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial 
of other human rights and fundamental freedoms,  
Considering that international peace and security are essential elements for the 
realization of the right to development,  
Reaffirming that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development 
and that progress in the field of disarmament would considerably promote progress in 
the field of development and that resources released through disarmament measures 
should be devoted to the economic and social development and well-being of all 
peoples and, in particular, those of the developing countries,  
Recognizing that the human person is the central subject of the development process 
and that development policy should therefore make the human being the main 
participant and beneficiary of development,  
Recognizing that the creation of conditions favourable to the development of peoples 
and individuals is the primary responsibility of their States,  
Aware that efforts at the international level to promote and protect human rights 
should be accompanied by efforts to establish a new international economic order,  
Confirming that the right to development is an inalienable human right and that 
equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both of nations and of 
individuals who make up nations,  
Proclaims the following Declaration on the Right to Development:  
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Article 1  
1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every 
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.  
2. The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of 
peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of 
both International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right 
to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.  
Article 2  
1. The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active 
participant and beneficiary of the right to development.  
2. All human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and 
collectively, taking into account the need for full respect for their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which alone can 
ensure the free and complete fulfilment of the human being, and they should therefore 
promote and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for 
development.  
3. States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development 
policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire 
population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful 
participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting 
therefrom.  
Article 3  
1. States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international 
conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development.  
2. The realization of the right to development requires full respect for the principles of 
international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.  
3. States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and 
eliminating obstacles to development. States should realize their rights and fulfil their 
duties in such a manner as to promote a new international economic order based on 
sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all 
States, as well as to encourage the observance and realization of human rights.  
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Article 4  
1. States have the duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate 
international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the 
right to development.  
2. Sustained action is required to promote more rapid development of developing 
countries. As a complement to the efforts of developing countries, effective 
international co-operation is essential in providing these countries with appropriate 
means and facilities to foster their comprehensive development.  
Article 5  
States shall take resolute steps to eliminate the massive and flagrant violations of the 
human rights of peoples and human beings affected by situations such as those 
resulting from apartheid, all forms of racism and racial discrimination, colonialism, 
foreign domination and occupation, aggression, foreign interference and threats 
against national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, threats of war and 
refusal to recognize the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination.  
Article 6  
1. All States should co-operate with a view to promoting, encouraging and 
strengthening universal respect for and observance of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion.  
2. All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; 
equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, 
promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.  
3. States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development resulting from 
failure to observe civil and political rights, as well as economic social and cultural 
rights.  
Article 7  
All States should promote the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of 
international peace and security and, to that end, should do their utmost to achieve 
general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as to 
ensure that the resources released by effective disarmament measures are used for 
comprehensive development, in particular that of the developing countries.  
Article 8  
1. States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the 
realization of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of 
opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, 
housing, employment and the fair distribution of income. Effective measures should 
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be undertaken to ensure that women have an active role in the development process. 
Appropriate economic and social reforms should be carried out with a view to 
eradicating all social injustices.  
2. States should encourage popular participation in all spheres as an important factor 
in development and in the full realization of all human rights.  
Article 9  
1. All the aspects of the right to development set forth in the present Declaration are 
indivisible and interdependent and each of them should be considered in the context 
of the whole.  
2. Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as being contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations, or as implying that any State, group or 
person has a right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
violation of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
the International Covenants on Human Rights.  
Article 10  
Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and progressive enhancement of the 
right to development, including the formulation, adoption and implementation of 
policy, legislative and other measures at the national and international levels.  
 
 
Retrieved from the World Wide Web on the 15th of January, 2007. The Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Declaration on the Right to Development, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm> 
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Appendix 3: Constitution of the World Health Organization 
 
THE STATES Parties to this Constitution declare, in conformity with the Charter of 
the United Nations, that the following principles are basic to the happiness, 
harmonious relations and security of all peoples: 
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity. 
The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental 
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition. 
The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is 
dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and States. 
The achievement of any State in the promotion and protection of health is of value to 
all. 
Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health and control of 
disease, especially communicable disease, is a common danger. 
Healthy development of the child is of basic importance; the ability to live 
harmoniously in a changing total environment is essential to such development. 
The extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical, psychological and related 
knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of health. 
Informed opinion and active co-operation on the part of the public are of the utmost 
importance in the improvement of the health of the people. 
Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples, which can be 
fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social measures. 
  
ACCEPTING THESE PRINCIPLES, and for the purpose of co-operation among 
themselves and with others to promote and protect the health of all peoples, the 
Contracting Parties agree to the present Constitution and hereby establish the World 
Health Organization as a specialized agency within the terms of Article 57 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
 
 
Retrieved from the World Wide Web on the 15th of January, 2007. World Health 
Organization Regional Office for South-East Asia, Constitution of the World Health 
Organization, <http://www.searo.who.int/EN/Section898/Section1441.htm> 
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Appendix 4: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. 
entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27. 
 
Preamble 
The States Parties to the present Covenant,  
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the 
United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world,  
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,  
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved 
if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and 
cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights,  
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to 
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,  
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community 
to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and 
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,  
Agree upon the following articles:  
PART I  
Article 1  
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.  
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic 
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no 
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.  
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for 
the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the 
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realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity 
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.  
 
PART II  
Article 2  
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.   
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any 
kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.  
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, 
may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in 
the present Covenant to non-nationals.  
Article 3  
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the 
present Covenant. 
 
Article 4  
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those 
rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may 
subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as 
this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 
 
Article 5  
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to 
a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.  
2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights 
recognized or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or 
custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize 
such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.  
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PART III  
Article 6  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which 
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he 
freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.  
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training 
programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural 
development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.  
Article 7  
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:  
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:  
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of 
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to 
those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;  
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Covenant;  
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;  
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an 
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and 
competence;  
(d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays 
with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays  
Article 8  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:  
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, 
subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and 
protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others;  
(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and 
the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union organizations;  
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than 
those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
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interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others;  
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the 
particular country.  
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of 
these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration 
of the State.  
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour 
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply 
the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that 
Convention.  
Article 9  
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social 
security, including social insurance. 
 
Article 10  
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:  
1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, 
which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its 
establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent 
children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending 
spouses.  
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before 
and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid 
leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.  
3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all 
children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or 
other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from economic and 
social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or 
dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be punishable 
by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid employment of child 
labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.  
Article 11   
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The 
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent.   
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2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-
operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed:  
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by 
making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of 
the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a 
way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources;  
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting 
countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to 
need.  
Article 12  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.  
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the 
full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:  
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for 
the healthy development of the child;  
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;  
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases;  
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness.  
Article 13   
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall 
enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, 
and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.  
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving 
the full realization of this right:  
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;  
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational 
secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every 
appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;  
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(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, 
by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free 
education;  
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for 
those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary 
education;  
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an 
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of 
teaching staff shall be continuously improved.  
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty 
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, 
other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such 
minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to 
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their 
own convictions.  
4. No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of 
individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always 
to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph I of this article and to the 
requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such 
minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.  
Article 14   
Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has 
not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its 
jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two 
years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive 
implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the 
principle of compulsory education free of charge for all. 
 
Article 15  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone:  
(a) To take part in cultural life;  
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;  
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.  
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the 
full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the 
development and the diffusion of science and culture.  
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.  
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4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from 
the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the 
scientific and cultural fields.  
PART IV  
Article 16  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit in conformity with 
this part of the Covenant reports on the measures which they have adopted and the 
progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized herein.  
2. (a) All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
who shall transmit copies to the Economic and Social Council consideration in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;  
 
(b) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall also transmit to the specialized 
agencies copies of the reports, or any relevant parts therefrom, from States Parties to 
the present Covenant which are also members of these specialized agencies in so far 
as these reports, or parts therefrom, relate to any matters which fall within the 
responsibilities of the said agencies in accordance with their constitutional 
instruments. 
 
Article 17  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant shall furnish their reports in stages, in 
accordance with a programme to be established by the Economic and Social Council 
within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant after consultation with 
the States Parties and the specialized agencies concerned.  
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of 
obligations under the present Covenant.  
3. Where relevant information has previously been furnished to the United Nations or 
to any specialized agency by any State Party to the present Covenant, it will not be 
necessary to reproduce that information, but a precise reference to the information so 
furnished will suffice.  
Article 18  
Pursuant to its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations in the field of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Economic and Social Council may make 
arrangements with the specialized agencies in respect of their reporting to it on the 
progress made in achieving the observance of the provisions of the present Covenant 
falling within the scope of their activities. These reports may include particulars of 
decisions and recommendations on such implementation adopted by their competent 
organs. 
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Article 19  
The Economic and Social Council may transmit to the Commission on Human Rights 
for study and general recommendation or, as appropriate, for information the reports 
concerning human rights submitted by States in accordance with articles 16 and 17, 
and those concerning human rights submitted by the specialized agencies in 
accordance with article 18. 
 
Article 20  
The States Parties to the present Covenant and the specialized agencies concerned 
may submit comments to the Economic and Social Council on any general 
recommendation under article 19 or reference to such general recommendation in any 
report of the Commission on Human Rights or any documentation referred to therein. 
 
Article 21  
The Economic and Social Council may submit from time to time to the General 
Assembly reports with recommendations of a general nature and a summary of the 
information received from the States Parties to the present Covenant and the 
specialized agencies on the measures taken and the progress made in achieving 
general observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant. 
 
Article 22  
The Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of other organs of the 
United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies concerned with 
furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred to in this 
part of the present Covenant which may assist such bodies in deciding, each within its 
field of competence, on the advisability of international measures likely to contribute 
to the effective progressive implementation of the present Covenant. 
 
Article 23  
The States Parties to the present Covenant agree that international action for the 
achievement of the rights recognized in the present Covenant includes such methods 
as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of 
technical assistance and the holding of regional meetings and technical meetings for 
the purpose of consultation and study organized in conjunction with the Governments 
concerned. 
 
 
Article 24  
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized agencies 
which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the United 
Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the 
present Covenant. 
 
Article 25  
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of 
all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources. 
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PART V  
Article 26  
1. The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of the United 
Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the present 
Covenant.  
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession by any State referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this article.  
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States which have 
signed the present Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit of each instrument of 
ratification or accession.  
Article 27  
1. The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the 
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument 
of ratification or instrument of accession.  
2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant or acceding to it after the deposit of 
the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, the present 
Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of its own 
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.  
Article 28  
The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States 
without any limitations or exceptions. 
 
Article 29  
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may propose an amendment and file it 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall 
thereupon communicate any proposed amendments to the States Parties to the present 
Covenant with a request that they notify him whether they favour a conference of 
States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposals. In the 
event that at least one third of the States Parties favours such a conference, the 
Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United 
Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and 
voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations for approval.  
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2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States 
Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes.  
3. When amendments come into force they shall be binding on those States Parties 
which have accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of 
the present Covenant and any earlier amendment which they have accepted.  
Article 30  
Irrespective of the notifications made under article 26, paragraph 5, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred to in paragraph I of the 
same article of the following particulars:  
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under article 26;  
(b) The date of the entry into force of the present Covenant under article 27 and the 
date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 29.  
Article 31  
1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.  
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the 
present Covenant to all States referred to in article 26.  
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